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ABSTRACT
Through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs) have been promoting a particular model of development in 
developing countries. However, the traditional model o f “economic” development 
advocated by the BWIs has been criticised for contributing to environmental degradation 
generally and to increases in greenhouse gas emissions linked to climate change. A 
variety of legal instruments and other mechanisms have been developed that seek to 
reverse this trend. The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was adopted 
in 1992 and innovative, mechanisms designed to help implementing the Convention such 
as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) have been established in the World Bank.
The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate whether the legal and quasi-legal 
instruments employed by the BWIs in promoting structural adjustment may serve as 
effective tools in assistingj to implement the FCCC in developing countries.
The effectiveness o f these legal and quasi-legal instruments, including 
conditionality and policy-based lending, is examined in the context of the leverage o f the 
BWIs in influencing developing countries. This thesis posits that the governance 
structure of the BWIs, perceived as asymmetrical by developing countries, has affected 
the relationship between the BWIs and developing countries and might have undermined 
the effectiveness of these instruments in promoting structural adjustment. This thesis 
shows that GEF has begun to employ instruments similar to SAPs such as conditionality 
and policy-based lending, but in combination with innovative features such as novel 
decision-making rules and closer links with multilaterally negotiated environmental 
agreements such as the FCCC. The present study, thus, proposes that these legal and 
quasi-legal instruments identified in the GEF might be more effective because o f the 
innovative features of the GEF that help to improve the relationship between the World 
Bank and the developing countries.
The interaction between treaty obligations of the FCCC and regular operations of 
the BWIs is further explored, and suggestions for reforming the SAPs and in further 
developing the innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank are offered. The arguments 
presented in the thesis are illustrated through a case study comprising four developing 
countries of Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand). By 
evaluating whether the experiences of the BWIs in promoting “economic” development 
can provide valuable insights into how they might promote “sustainable” development 
through assisting the implementation of the FCCC in developing countries, the thesis 
hopes to contribute to the evolving field of study on the interface between international 
financial institutions and international environmental law.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate whether the experiences o f the Bretton 
Woods Institutions (BWIs) in promoting “economic” development, a traditional 
development model, can provide valuable insights into how they might instead promote 
“sustainable” development through assisting the implementation o f the 1992 Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in developing countries. Issues relating to this 
evaluation and raised in the present studies are categorised into two groups. The first 
relates to the governance structure of the BWIs and the second concerns the interaction 
of the BWIs with multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in particular the FCCC.
First, this thesis will investigate developing countries’ perception o f the BWIs 
governance structure, and how this perception affects the relationship between the BWIs 
and developing countries and possibly undermines the effectiveness o f the legal and 
quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs to influence developing countries. 
Secondly, this thesis will examine the impact the FCCC have on the regular operations of 
the BWIs and how this increasing interaction has led to the involvement o f the World 
Bank in innovative mechanisms such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
1.1 Purpose of this thesis
1.1.1 Background
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) —  the so-called BWIs —  have been at the 
forefront o f international efforts to promote economic stability and development in their 
member states since their establishment in 1944. When most of the developed country
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members ceased to borrow from the BWIs after the 1970s1, the BWIs began to focus on 
structural economic problems and the promotion of development in their developing 
country members. The prevailing development model favoured by the IMF and World 
Bank management2 focused on “economic growth” (Griesgraber and Gunter, 1996a). As 
a result, the mode of “development” promoted by the BWIs in the developing countries 
mainly aimed at maximising economic growth, usually measured by the growth o f Gross 
National Product (GNP) per capita and by the level of industrialisation3.
This model of development, promoted by the BWIs, not only brought about 
economic transformation in the developed countries, but also contributed to changes in 
their natural environment. Disillusionment with this traditional development model and 
its failure to take into account the environmental constraints of the ecosystem contributed 
to a rise of environmentalism in those countries. Various schools of thought have 
attempted to challenge the theoretical underpinnings of this traditional model of 
development, and have offered alternative theories4. The most prominent alternative 
proposed to this traditional model of development, which has gained the widest 
international support, is the concept of sustainable development. Starting with the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration, various international instruments and declarations have reiterated 
the relationship between development and environment. The 1987 Brundtland Report5, a 
non-binding but influential set of recommendations from a high-level group of
1 For example, the last borrowing :—  “drawing” as termed by the IMF —  from the IMF by the major 
industrialised countries (known within the IMF as the “G-10”) was made by the UK in 1977. There has 
been no drawing by the G-10 since then (Graham, 1995).
2 The “management” of the BWIs referred to in the present study includes their respective Boards of 
Executive Directors and staff.
3 See, for example, the World Economic Outlook published annually by the IMF.
4 For example, some advocate a “zero growth” or the steady state economy strategies to respond to this 
growth intensive development path (Daly and Townsend, 1994, part III).
5 For the historical account of the concept “sustainable development” before the 1992 Rio Conference, see 
Adams, 1990, chapters 2 and 3.
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policymakers6, gave birth to the most widely referred to definition o f sustainable 
development7. The 1992 Rio Declaration introduced principles to the field o f 
international law relating to sustainable development8. Agenda 21, another document 
produced at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
provided, inter alia, action programmes for reforming international financial institutions 
(chapter 38). One commentator concludes that “what is urgently needed is a change in 
the nature of economic development in order to deal with the ever-widening scope of 
environmental degradation” (Williams, 1995, p. 196).
However, one might doubt whether a shift o f development paradigm from 
“economic” development to “sustainable” development has truly occurred, and whether 
the practice within the BWIs has changed accordingly. Both of the BWIs, through 
various public statements by their high level management9, have officially committed 
themselves to the goal of sustainable development. In practice, however, their operations 
are still being criticised as ignoring the social and environmental impact o f their projects 
and programmes (eg Comia et al, 1987; Reed, 1992 and 1994; Rich, 1994). The BWIs 
have responded to these criticisms by adopting new practices such as the “social safety 
net” and new internal policies on, for example, environmental impact assessment. As the 
World Bank itself concluded in 1997: “In the past five years [after Rio] the [Bank] has
6 The World Commission on Environment and Development, the body that produced the Brundtland 
Report, was set up as an independent body by the UN in 1983. It was chaired by the Norwegian Prime 
Minster Gro Harlem Brundtland and consisted of several cabinet ministers and senior leconomists in the 
national governments.
7 The Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as “development that meets the need o f the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World- 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 43).
8 Literature abounds with regard to the legal implications of the concept sustainable development under 
international law, see, for example, Freesone, 1994; Lang, 1995; and Sands, 1994.
9 For example, the President of the Bank and the Managing Director of the IMF both recognised the 
importance of this concept at the 1992 UNCED. Also, more recently, the speech by the President o f the
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become the major financier of programs addressing the objectives laid out in Agenda 
21.” (World Bank, 1997a, p. 3) Nevertheless, the Bank still has large lending operations 
to fund fossil fuel-related projects in developing countries10. These, in turn, lead to 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) emission and contribute to the problem o f climate change. The 
“climate friendliness” o f the Bank’s portfolio has emerged as a test o f the efforts made 
by the BWIs to promote “sustainable development”.
As the potential threat o f climate change became known and attempts to deal with 
it escalated to the international scale, an international legal instrument was opened for 
signature at the UNCED, the 1992 UN FCCC, which has incorporated several principles 
pertinent to the goal of sustainable development11 and is referred to by one commentator 
as “ ... a Convention about sustainable development rather than environmental 
protection” (Sands, 1994, p. 331). The causes o f and solutions to climate change lie in 
every aspect o f human economic activities, with “development” being an important 
aspect. This has brought increasing interaction between the FCCC and the BWIs, as 
BWIs are often the main international institutions that promote “development” in their 
member states. The best example is the energy sector. A country’s energy policy is an 
integral part o f its development strategies and has been a focus o f the BWIs since the
Bank at the UN Assembly Special Session on the environment in 1997 also reiterated the Bank’s 
commitment to the goal o f sustainable development.
10 Lending for energy typically represents between one-fifth and one-sixth o f the total annual commitments- 
of the IBRD and IDA. In FY 1997, IBRD and IDA lending for oil, gas and coal represents 43% o f the total 
commitments in the energy sector (World Bank, 1997d).
11 Principles in the field o f sustainable development and their legal implications have been subject to 
extensive discussion since the term emerged in 1987. See, for example, Sands, 1994; CSD, 1996. 
Nevertheless, various principles adopted in the FCCC Article 3 such as precautionary principle and 
common but differentiated responsibilities have been widely perceived as closely associated with the spirit 
of sustainable development.
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early days of their operations12. Energy policy can also affect a country’s GHGs 
emissions by, for example, determining the relative reliance on fossil fuel and renewable 
energy sources. In addition to energy policy, policies implemented to maximise 
economic growth and encourage industrialisation, two landmarks for the traditional 
model of development promoted by the BWIs, are linked to increases in GHGs 
emissions. Assisting with the implementation of the FCCC can enable the BWIs to put 
into practice their public endorsement of the goal of “sustainable development”. The 
purpose o f the present study is to evaluate whether the BWIs can effectively employ the 
legal and quasi-legal instruments that have been used in the past to promote “economic” 
development to play this new role in assisting the implementation o f the FCCC in 
developing countries.
1.1.2 Governance structure o f  the B WIs
The BWIs have been flexible in institutional and operational reforms in 
responding to the changing external socio-economic environment in which they operate 
and internal demands from member states with different needs. However, one feature that 
remains constant and controversial is the governance structure13 o f the BWIs. The 
decision-making rules based on weighted voting system have given the developed 
countries a dominant power in making decisions relating to the operations o f the BWIs.
12 The importance of energy policy was re-affirmed after two oil crisis o f the 1970s. For example, an oil 
facility was set up in the IMF in 1975 and energy conservation policy has been incorporated as a part of 
conditionality if  access to this facility is to be granted. See Chapter 3.4 for further discussion.
13 Governance structure encompasses institutional aspect such as the hierarchy of different bodies within 
an organisation with different function, as well as substantive aspect such as voting rules prescribed for the 
operations o f these bodies. The term “governance structure” is, nevertheless, used loosely in the present 
study. In the context of the BWIs, “governance structure” refers to the decision-making rules, the weighted 
voting system, within the Boards of Executive Directors. In the context of GEF, governance structure 
refers | to not only the decision-making rules within the GEF Council, but also various arrangements agreed 
with the FCCC in setting up formal link with the Convention.
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Developing countries have been campaigning for the reform of this governance structure 
since the 1970s. This thesis examines how the BWIs’ governance structure led to the 
perception of asymmetry in the operations of the BWIs from the developing countries’ 
viewpoint. This perception has strained the relationship between the BWIs and the 
developing countries and, as this thesis shows, might have undermined the effectiveness 
o f the legal and quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs to influence developing 
countries.
1.1.2.1 Structural adjustment programmes
As mentioned earlier, BWIs have been at the forefront o f international efforts to 
promote development. They have employed various legal and quasi-legal instruments in 
the past to promote the particular model of development in developing country clients. 
Before the threat of climate change was widely perceived, the BWIs, drawing upon the 
experiences and ideologies of their developed country members, regarded economic 
growth and industrialisation as the optimal goal of “development”, and designed their 
programmes and operations accordingly for their developing country members. 
Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), associated with structural adjustment 
lending14, have been the primary mechanism employed by the BWIs to influence 
developing countries to pursue this model of development.
Based on the existing empirical research conducted by the BWIs and external 
institutions, this thesis intends to analyse the effectiveness o f the SAPs at two levels. 
Firstly, whether SAPs have been effective in producing changes o f domestic law and
14 Structural adjustment lending mainly refers to the following lending mechanisms o f the BWIs: the 
Structural Adjustment Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility of the IMF, and Structural
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policy in the borrowing developing countries, ie their effectiveness in producing an 
outcome. Secondly, whether, as a result of these changes of laws and policies, SAPs have 
been effective in producing the intended results15 in the borrowing country, ie their 
effectiveness in producing an impact16.
This thesis intends to demonstrate that, with the application of conditionality and 
programme and policy-based lending —  arguably the most powerful tools employed to 
influence developing countries —  the SAPs have, to a certain extent, been able to induce 
changes o f domestic laws and policies in the borrowing government. Namely, the 
somewhat coercive SAPs have been effective at producing an outcome. On the other 
hand, from the existing literature, the effectiveness of the SAPs in producing the intended 
result has been subject to keen debate and no consensus can be achieved as to whether 
the overall economic situation in the borrowing countries have improved as envisaged by 
the SAPs. In other words, the BWIs and their SAPs might be less effective at producing
Adjustment Loan and Sectoral Adjustment Loan of the IBRD. For further discussion on the concept of 
structural adjustment, structural adjustment lending of the BWIs, and the SAPs, see Chapter 3.1 and 3.2.
15 To put it more precisely, whether the SAP has achieved the intended “economic” impact as envisaged by 
the BWIs in the borrowing country by improving the economic state o f the country. The SAP has been 
criticised for producing other impact such as social inequality and environmental degradation, as can be 
attested by the amount of literature produced by NGOs and academic institutions (eg Comia et al, 1987; 
Reed, D, 1992 and 1994). Nevertheless, the main purpose o f the SAP is to correct the structural problems 
in a country’s economy and its intended goal is to improve the country’s balance o f payments situation 
and other macroeconomic policies. Although the impact of the SAP goes beyond the intention o f the 
architect of the SAP, it is precarious to imply that the allegedly negative impact on the poor and on the 
environmental is intended when the SAP is designed. Thus, the thesis will only focus on the “economic”, 
as opposed to other unintended impact of the SAPs when examining the effectiveness o f the SAP in 
producing an impact. Note that limited discussion on the environmental impact o f the SAP, in particular 
on climate change, will take place in Chapter 5 for its relevance in the recommendations proposed in the 
chapter.
16 The terms “outcome” and “impact” are borrowed from the analysis o f regime effectiveness, in particular 
international environmental regime, in the international relations school. A regime can be evaluated on the1 
basis o f the norms, principles and rules constituting its substantive contents {output), or on the basis o f the 
consequences flowing from the implementation of and adaptation to these norms and rules. When dealing 
with environmental regimes, the latter may be further specified by making a distinction between influence 
on human behaviour (outcome) and consequences for the state of the biophysical environment itself 
{impact) (Underdal et al, October 1998). Nevertheless, the detail discussion and analytical tools used in the 
international regimes study will not be employed in this thesis. For further discussion, see, for example, 
Bemauer, 1995; and Levy et al, 1995.
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an impact in the developing countries. By investigating the governance structure of the 
BWIs and the implications it bears on the relationship with their developing country 
members, this thesis proposes that, one of the reasons for the lack of effectiveness at 
producing an impact might be embedded in the governance structure of the BWIs. As 
pointed out earlier, the governance structure and the operations of the BWIs have been 
perceived as asymmetrical by developing countries and this perception has affected the 
relationship between those two parties. This strained relationship, as this thesis argues, 
might have undermined the borrowing governments’ determination to carry out SAPs 
and, as a result, affected the effectiveness of the SAPs17. This issue o f governance 
structure and how it might affect the effectiveness of the BWIs programmes can, as we 
shall see later, have profound implications for the World Bank in the process o f assisting 
the implementation of the FCCC through its various innovative mechanisms.
1.1.2.2 Innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank
As private capital became increasingly available to the wealthier developing 
countries, such as those in East and South-east Asia, the World Bank has been searching 
for another role other than providing financial resources for traditional “economic” 
development. Private capital has, however, been reluctant to provide the huge resources 
needed for implementing the alternative development models promoted by the FCCC18. 
Furthermore, interaction between the BWIs and the FCCC has been increasing as their 
membership and areas of competence began to overlap. In search o f a new role, the
17 This situation has been referred to as the “borrower or programme ownership” problem (eg Killick, 
1995a; Johnson and Wasty, 1933) and will be subject to closer examination in Chapter 3.5.2.
18 This lukewarm attitude from the private sector might begin to change as market-based instruments such 
as emission trading are authorised by the Kyoto Protocol as implementation mechanisms. For example, the
World Bank has developed, or is in the process of developing, various innovative 
mechanisms for the purpose of assisting the implementation o f the FCCC in its 
developing country clients. These innovative mechanisms that are examined in the 
present study include GEF19, the World Bank’s Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) 
programme developed in collaboration with the government o f Norway20 and the 
proposed Global Carbon Initiative (GCI) and its Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF)21.
The GEF has had the most operational experience out o f the three innovative 
mechanisms. As this thesis illustrates, GEF operations have been gradually developing 
legal and quasi-legal instruments similar to those employed in the SAPs by the BWIs. 
These instruments include the application of conditionality and programmatic and 
policy-based lending, possibly the two most powerful tools used by SAPs to produce an 
outcome from the borrowing governments. As a result, GEF has the potential to induce 
the policy changes in the recipient countries that support GEF objectives. On the other 
hand, this thesis identifies two distinctive characteristics o f GEF that have implications 
for the asymmetry problems perceived by developing countries to be associated with the 
BWIs, which might be one element that undermined the effectiveness o f the SAPs in 
producing an impact. The first is its novel decision-making rules22, under which power is 
more evenly distributed between developed and developing countries. Also the latter
private sector is to play a major role in one o f the Bank’s innovative mechanisms: the Prototype Carbon 
Fund.
19 GEF is a pool of fund from the contributions of mostly developed countries and provides funding to 
eligible developing countries to finance the incremental costs for projects with global environmental 
interests. For a more detailed discussion on GEF, see Chapter 4.1.2.1.
20 A pilot phase for AIJ was established by the Parties to the FCCC as one o f the possible mechanism for 
joint implementation. The World Bank initiated a three-year programme on AIJ in collaboration with the 
government of Norway in April 1996. For more detail discussion, see Chapter 4.1.2.2.
21 This is still under development within the World Bank. The idea is to launch a “Prototype Carbon Fund” 
as a market intermediary by obtaining funds from investors and investing in projects which would result in 
carbon emission reductions. For more detail discussion, see Chapter 4.1.2.2.
22 See Chapter 4.2 for further discussion on the governance structure of GEF.
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may participate in the decision-making process on a more equal footing. The second 
feature is the closer link between GEF and the FCCC. Under the arrangement between 
the two, developing countries may be more confident that their priorities will be 
incorporated in the operations of GEF via the forum o f the Conferences o f the Parties 
(COPs) to the FCCC. As a result, in spite o f its association with the World Bank and its 
similar features to SAPs, GEF might be perceived by developing countries as less 
asymmetrical than the existing mechanisms of the BWIs. This thesis, thus, argues that as 
GEF becomes less asymmetrical, developing countries might be more willing to co­
operate and carry out conditionality and policy advice attached to GEF grants and 
produce the intended impact that GEF hoped to achieve23. In other words, the legal and 
quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs might achieve greater effectiveness in 
this new role o f assisting the
implementation of the FCCC assumed by the World Bank.
On the basis of the aforementioned arguments, this thesis suggests that one o f the 
keys for the BWIs programmes to achieve effectiveness in producing outcome as well as 
impact lies in the governance structure and how it affects the relationship between the 
BWIs and the developing countries. If this relationship could be improved as a result o f 
the novel governance structure o f the innovative mechanisms, the BWIs, and in particular 
the World Bank, may be able to apply their financial resources, and legal and political 
influence more effectively to assist in the implementation of the FCCC in their 
developing country members. The manner in which the BWIs can use this influence and
23 One limitation in the validity of this argument is that empirical evidence of the “asymmetric GEF 
operations” and their effectiveness is difficult to come by at the moment, for conditionality and policy 
advice are not yet fully developed in GEF lending and grants, see Chapter 4.3 for further discussion.
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their legal and quasi-legal instruments to play this new role in their developing country 
members is the second theme of this thesis.
1.1.3 Interaction between the BWIs and the FCCC
Concern with environmental reform in general within the World Bank dates back 
to the 1980s as a response to external criticism coming mostly from environmental non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) and, later, the US Congress24. The BWIs, bound by 
their respective Articles of Agreements, must base their decisions on economic, non­
political, grounds25. The BWIs have, in the past, justified their failure to consider, for 
example, human rights issues, or human rights impact of their operations in borrowing 
countries by arguing that their mandate only allows them to take into “economic” 
considerations in their operations and specifically excludes such “political” concerns (eg 
Shihata, January 1992). Nevertheless, the meaning and content of “economic” 
consideration have been subject to interpretation and re-interpretation by the two 
institutions to discuss issues such as education and “good governance” (Bradlow and 
Grossman, 1995). Furthermore, the basic underpinning o f the concept “sustainable 
development” lies in the integration of economic and environmental policies (eg 
Muschett, 1997). In the case of climate change, the causes and solutions particularly 
require the integration of several environmental considerations into economic decision
24 For a more detailed account on how the NGOs and the USA Congress have influenced the World Bank’s 
environmental practices, see Bowles and Kormos, 1995; Le Prestre, 1989, chapter 3; and, Mikesell and 
Williams, 1992, chapter 9; Rich, 1994.
25 Article I o f the IMF Articles o f Agreement states that: “The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and 
decisions by the purposes set forth in this article.” According to Gold, this provision forbids the Fund from 
taking political considerations into account (Gold, May 1983). Article III, Section 5(b) o f the IBRD’s 
Articles o f Agreement states that: “The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds o f any 
loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of 
economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or 
considerations." (emphasis added)
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making. As a result, the World Bank’s efforts to assist the implementation o f the FCCC 
and achieve sustainable development objectives have not been viewed as derogating 
from the obligation imposed by its Articles of Agreement to take into account only 
“economic” consideration in its operations.
•Furthermore, the areas of competence and membership have already begun to 
overlap between the BWIs and the FCCC. For example, it is provided in the FCCC that 
its Parties are to “co-operate to promote a supportive and open international economic 
system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parities” 
(FCCC, Article 3.5) and that all parties shall “take climate change considerations into 
account ... in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions” 
(FCCC, Article 4.1[f]). All these obligations touch upon the economic and 
developmental policies of the | Parties, over which the BWIs traditionally have 
competence. This increasing interaction has its ramifications for the BWIs. This thesis 
illustrates that the existence of the climate change regime26 affects the regular operations 
of the BWIs through the different treaty obligations imposed by the FCCC on developed 
and developing countries that are either decisionmakers or recipients o f the BWIs. Thus, 
this thesis argues that the staff and management of the BWIs can no longer carrying out 
their regular operations without properly taking into account obligations under the 
climate change regime.
At present, developing country parties are not yet subject to substantive 
obligations, such as the reduction o f GHGs emissions, under the current climate change 
regime. The majority o f developing countries are minor emitters of the GHGs compared 
with the developed country Parties. However, if  the ultimate objective o f the FCCC, ie
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the stabilisation of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, is to be achieved, 
developing countries will eventually need to undertake such substantive commitment. In 
addition, if  the development process accelerates, in particular at a pace that has been 
witnessed in the newly industrialised countries27, developing country Parties will soon 
become the major GHGs emitters as their economies continue to grow. As a result, 
developing countries need to develop in a sustainable way that minimises the threat to 
climate change. The present study thus puts forward suggestions in reforming the SAPs 
of the BWIs such as the “SAP with a climate safety net”. In addition, this thesis evaluates 
the innovative mechanisms of the World Bank and examines ways in which these 
innovative mechanisms should be developed if  the goal o f assisting the implementation 
of the FCCC is to be effectively achieved. At the end of this thesis, a brief case study will 
be conducted on four developing countries in South-east Asia28, a region that, until 
recently, was held as a development model by the BWIs. The arguments and analysis 
proposed in this thesis are further tested in this case study.
By identifying the relevant issues as to how the BWIs can play their new role 
effectively, this thesis hopes to provoke further research and to make a contribution to 
the existing body of knowledge relating to the BWIs, as well as to the evolving field o f 
study on climate change.
26 The “climate change regime” refers to the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol that has yet to come into force.
27 Admittedly, the recent financial crisis in South-east and East Asia will slow their growth. Nevertheless, 
this does not necessarily mean that they will contribute less to the problem o f climate change, for further 
discussion see Chapter 6.2.
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1.2 Limitations of the present study
In order to narrow the scope of this thesis, certain limitations have been imposed. 
The main limitation is within the studies of the operations of the BWIs.
The BWIs undertake various types of operations29, some of. which are consultative 
and advisory in nature, such as the IMF consultation with its members, laid down in 
Article VIII Section 6 o f the IMF Articles of Agreement. Others engage in lending 
activities, in particular in the World Bank30. Each of these operations is capable, to a 
greater or lesser extent, o f influencing the members’ choice o f development path. This 
thesis limits its study to only one traditional type of operation within the BWIs —  
structural adjustment lending. The main reason for this is to focus on the most relevant 
and, arguably, the most effective, existing mechanism the BWIs employed to influence 
their developing country members. The choice of structural adjustment lending over 
other types of lending mechanisms is based on the distinctive legal and quasi-legal 
instruments employed in structural adjustment lending, which include the nature of 
policy-based lending and the application of conditionality31. These legal and quasi-legal 
instruments give the BWIs greater leverage over the borrowing members in terms of their 
greater access to the decision-making process in the borrowing governments32. As a 
result, the adjustment-type lending and its SAPs have been the major mechanisms 
employed by the BWIs since the late 1970s and, in particular, in the 1980s to promote
28 The four countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. Reasons why these four have 
been selected will be described in Chapter 6.
29 Chapter 2.1.2 will provide a brief outline of the types of operations o f the IMF and the World Bank.
30 Although much publicity has been generated about its lending activities, the primary function of the IMF 
is actually to provide “a permanent forum for consultation” (Bakker, 1996, p. 15).
31 Detailed discussion on programmatic and policy-based lending and conditionality will be conducted in 
Chapter 3.3 and 3.4.
32 For example, adjustment loans are usually used for correcting balance o f payments deficit and “such 
loans directly affects the macroeconomic policy choices open to the borrowing country” (Mason and 
Asher, 1973, p. 430).
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the traditional model of development that seeks to maximise economic growth. The 
scope of this thesis is therefore limited to structural adjustment lending when examining 
the operations o f the BWIs.
Another limitation that needs to be noted concerns the discussion of the IMF. As 
mentioned earlier, the main function of the IMF is to provide a permanent forum for 
consultation to monitor the macroeconomic policies of its member states. However, this 
aspect of the operation of the IMF is not dealt with in this present study. As a result, 
discussion on the IMF is limited in the context of its role in SAPs. In addition, as the 
innovative mechanisms are developed, or are developing in the World Bank, the 
evaluation conducted and suggestions proposed relating to these new mechanisms focus 
exclusively on the World Bank. As the preceding section indicated, the two pillars o f the 
present study are the governance structure of the BWIs and the interaction between the 
BWIs and the FCCC. In the case of the latter, discussion on the close link with the FCCC 
focuses on the World Bank because of the role it plays in GEF and other innovative 
mechanisms.
As noted earlier, a case study on developing countries has been conducted and 
four developing countries in South-east Asia have been selected. The reasons for that 
choice of region are as follows. Firstly, South-east Asia has been characterized as a 
“development model” by the BWIs. Despite the financial turmoil in the region in 1997- 
98, the lessons o f the developing countries in South-east Asia after the 1980s are still 
held as a model when it comes to “development”, one in a more traditional sense that 
seeks to maximise “economic growth”. The economic path chosen by the governments in 
South-east Asia is the one promoted by the BWIs and, to a certain extent, guided by their 
SAPs in the 1980s. Secondly, the SAPs o f the BWIs resulted not only in economic
transformation, but also in environmental transformation in the region33, as illustrated in 
the present study. In addition, energy demand, in particular for fossil fuel, for their 
growing economies has been increasing so rapidly that South-east Asia will become a 
major GHGs emitter34 in the future35. As a result, the present economic structure might 
impede the governments’ abilities to implement the FCCC, which would provide the 
World Bank with an excellent opportunity to experiment with its innovative mechanisms 
by assisting South-east Asian governments to implement the FCCC. For these reasons, 
South-east Asia is selected as the regional focus in this thesis. If  these innovative 
mechanisms prove to be successful and efficient in encouraging South-east Asia to adopt 
a development path that takes into account climate change, these mechanisms might be 
applied more effectively to all the developing country members of the BWIs.
1.3 Structure of this thesis
There are seven chapters in this thesis. Following this introductory chapter, 
Chapter 2 focuses on the BWIs. A brief institutional account is provided in the first 
section and the obligations imposed on member Istates, by the Articles o f Agreements and 
loan documents are described. The second section examines the evolving relationship 
between the BWIs and their developing country members. It is divided into two sub­
sections. The first looks at the relationship in the context o f “economic” development, in 
which the BWIs provide their developing country members with financial and technical
33 For example, deforestation is occurring faster in East Asia, including South-east Asia, than anywhere 
else in the world (Hammer and Shetty, 1995).
34 For example, according to a World Bank study, if the past patterns o f GHGs emission continue, East 
Asia, including South-east Asia will account for more than half o f the World’s incremental C02 and 
sulphur dioxide emissions (World Bank, 1993b), see Chapter 6.2.2 for further discussion.
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assistance for the purpose of “economic” development. The issue o f governance and 
asymmetry problem perceived by the developing countries are identified and discussed in 
this type o f relationship. The second sub-section investigates a new dimension o f this 
relationship after sustainable development emerged as a new development paradigm. As 
a result of this new development, the relationship becomes one in which the World Bank, 
one of the BWIs, provides assistance for a different purpose —  to assist developing 
country members in implementing ME As, in particular the FCCC.
Chapter 3 focuses on the SAPs and the legal and quasi-legal instruments 
employed by the BWIs to influence the developing countries. The legal and quasi-legal 
instruments associated with the SAPs in general are depicted in the discussion on the 
operational and legal aspects of the structural adjustment lending and programmes. The 
nature o f programme and policy-based lending and the application o f conditionality, in 
particular, are subject to separate and closer examination, and are followed by an 
investigation into the effectiveness of these legal and quasi-legal instruments in 
producing outcome and impact. For empirical research on the operations o f the SAPs36, 
this thesis draws upon existing literature by the BWIs and other institutions to analyse 
the effectiveness of the SAPs. The final section in Chapter 3 briefly revisits the 
relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries in the context o f 
“economic” development, and looks at the implications o f this relationship on the 
operations and effectiveness of the SAPs.
35 The rate o f growth might be retarded due to the recent financial crisis in this region. However, the 
impact of this financial crisis on the energy demand or environmental policies in this region remains 
uncertain. For further discussion, see Chapter 6.2.
36 This is due to both the scope and time constraint of the thesis, and the limited expertise of the author to 
conduct economic empirical research. In addition, a large body of research work has been produced by 
both the staff o f the BWIs and academic institutions.
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Chapter 4 turns to an examination of the innovative mechanisms introduced by 
the World Bank after the 1990s. The establishment and operations of the following three 
mechanisms are introduced: GEF, the Bank AIJ programme, and the proposed GCI/PCF. 
Since GEF has the most operational experiences among these mechanisms, it is subject 
to separate discussion. The distinctive features of GEF in its decision-making rules and 
closer link with the FCCC in the forms of formal and informal arrangements are 
investigated. Furthermore, operations similar to the application of conditionality and 
policy-based lending are identified and comparison with the SAPs is made. Lastly, the 
new dimension o f the relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries, 
identified in Chapter 2, is analysed in more detail in light of these innovative 
mechanisms, in particular, GEF.
On the basis of these early chapters, this thesis suggests that the SAPs of the 
BWIs, through various legal and quasi-legal instruments employed, might have achieved 
a certain degree of effectiveness in producing the changes o f domestic laws and policies, 
ie an outcome. Nevertheless, the asymmetry treatment perceived by developing countries 
under the BWIs and its ramifications on the relationship between the BWIs and the 
developing countries might be one reason why the SAPs were not fully implemented 
and, as a result, undermined the effectiveness of the SAPs in producing the intended 
impact. The new dimension introduced by GEF through its novel governance structure to 
the interaction between the BWIs and the developing countries might mitigate the 
asymmetry problems perceived by the developing countries. This, as a result, might help 
the legal and quasi-legal instruments identified in GEF operations to increase their 
effectiveness in producing the desired impact in the recipient countries.
Chapter 5 looks at the FCCC in more detail. A brief account of the FCCC is 
provided from the outset. The interaction between the FCCC and the BWIs is then 
discussed, including the manner in which the existence o f the FCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol can affect the regular operations of the BWIs. The implications o f the Kyoto 
Protocol for the World Bank are also examined. The following two sections examine and 
evaluate the operations o f the BWIs that are relevant to the FCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. The third section scrutinises the SAPs operations in light o f the FCCC and 
proposes a “climate safety net” as one possible reform to the design of the SAPs. The last 
section evaluates the operations o f the World Bank’s innovative mechanisms and 
suggests future developments that can be made under the climate change regime.
Chapter 6 provides a brief case study of South-east Asia to put the arguments 
proposed in the present study to the test. A condensed account on the economic 
development in South-east Asia after World War II (WW II) and the role o f the BWIs in 
this process of development are provided from the outset. The second section discusses 
the relationship between the FCCC and South-east Asia in the context o f potential 
environmental, in particular, climate change, impact of the development path in this 
region. The last, section explores the possibility o f using the World Bank’s innovative 
mechanisms to assist South-east Asia in tackling the problems of climate change.
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, briefly summarises the major findings and 
arguments of this thesis, offers concluding observations and looks forward to stimulate 
future research and discussion on the BWIs and climate change.
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1.4 Methodology
The methodology this thesis adopts is mainly analysis of the academic 
discussions and official literature dealing with climate change, the BWIs, and sustainable 
development. Since it is a relatively new area of legal study, very little systemic 
academic research has been conducted and published. The sources o f material rely on 
both official publications from the BWIs and research papers from NGOs conducting 
similar research, and materials published by relevant academic institutes. Due to the 
fundamental ideological differences between the BWIs and the NGOs, it is anticipated 
that conclusions reached in the research reports produced by these two groups rarely 
agree with each other. The analytical tool this thesis adopts to examine these reports is a 
law-based policy analysis, which assesses whether the policy conclusions have a sound 
legal basis. Furthermore, the interpretations and conclusions in these documents are 
treated with caution. Interviews have been used as a supplement to investigate the actual 
practices of the BWIs. Two short field trips were made to Washington DC for the 
purposes of visiting the Joint Library of the IMF and the World Bank to obtain materials 
that cannot be located in London, and of conducting interviews with BWIs and NGOs 
staff. Interviews were conducted with staff from the Environment Department and Legal 
Department of the World Bank, and the Legal Department o f the IMF, In regard to 
NGOs, interviews were conducted with members from the following organisations: the 
World Wildlife Fund (USA) and the Environmental Defence Fund and from one Filipino 
NGO: the Asia-Pacific Forum of Environmental Journalists.
Difficulties arose regarding some methodological issues. First, very little 
literature was focused on the relationship between the IMF and the environment in
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general and climate change, in particular37. Most of the available literature is located 
within the economic discipline, focusing on the relationship between macroeconomics 
and the environment. It has been indicated that this thesis has limited its discussion of the 
IMF on the role it plays in the SAPs and literature relating to the role of the IMF in the 
SAPs abounds38. Hence, it was anticipated that this gap in the existing literature on the 
IMF would not cause too many difficulties. Second, economic theories and principles, 
which were not legal, generate most of the debate around the operations o f the BWIs, in 
particular concerning their adjustment lending operations39. This thesis attempts to utilise 
the interpretations o f all the relevant legal instruments, such as the Articles o f 
Agreements of the BWIs and decisions of their organs, as a supplement to the debate. In 
addition, potential legal issues have been identified. For example, what are the legal 
implications of conditionality, and what is the binding character o f treaty obligations for 
institutions whose members are parties to another treaty and so on. It was expected that 
these issues and the potential solutions would be the main contributions to the present 
thesis.
One more methodological issue concerns the use of the following terms in the 
operations of the BWIs: mechanisms, instruments, techniques, and tools. This thesis puts 
together a brief explanation and an example of each of these terms in Table 1-1.
37 This is one of the reasons why the present study will put more emphasis on the World Bank, as pointed- 
out in the preceding section.
38 For example, the IMF itself has conducted several evaluation studies on its experiences under the ESAF. 
See, for example, Schadler et al, 1993; IMF, December 1997. Studies on the IMF and the SAPs were 
carried out by other institutions as well, such as Killick, 1995a and 1998.
39 For example, Bird, 1995; Corbo and Fischer, 1991; Davis, 1992; Eichengreen and Kenen, 1994; 
Jayarajah and Branson, 1995; Killick, 1995a and 1998; Obstfeld, 1993; Singer, 1995; World Bank, 1988a 
and 1988b.
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Table 1-1: Terms used in the BWIs operations
T erm s E xam ples E xplanations
M echanism Structural adjustment 
lending and programme, 
GEF, GCI
Has the broadest application, referring to a 
framework with institutional, procedural, and 
substantive aspects.
Instrument Loan agreement, Policy  
Framework Paper, Letter o f  
Developm ent Policy
Has the more general application, referring 
both “m echanism ” and “technique/tool”, as 
w ell as legal and sem i-legal docum ents o f  
governments or between governm ent and the 
BW Is in a structural adjustment type lending.
Technique/tool Conditionality, policy- 
based lending
Has the narrowest application, referring to 
specific, individual forms contained in the 
“m echanism ”.
These terms are used interchangeably in some instances. For example, 
conditionality is a “technique/tool” used in the operations o f the SAP and it is also a 
quasi-legal “instrument” employed by the BWIs to influence developing countries. 
Structural adjustment lending and programme are “mechanisms” o f the BWIs to promote 
a particular model of development in their member states, but they are also legal 
“instruments” used to obtain leverage over developing countries. Nevertheless, the term 
“legal and quasi-legal ‘instruments’” is used most frequently in the present study to refer 
to all these mechanisms and techniques/tools employed by the BWIs to influence 
developing countries.
The 50th anniversary of the Bretton Woods Conference was celebrated in 1994, 
producing a rich literature and providing an excellent opportunity to examine the 
operations o f the BWIs. Meanwhile, the FCCC has had five years o f operations and, after 
intensive negotiations, has produced a significant Kyoto Protocol which, when in force,
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will provide binding emissions targets for developed country'Parties. All of these events 
shed light on the future direction that the BWIs will take in the 21st century. The purpose 
of this thesis is an attempt to provide some clues as to what future directions the BWIs 
can take in pursuit of sustainable development and in contributing to the global efforts 
used to tackle the threat o f climate change. By identifying lessons to be learned from the 
previous experiences of the BWIs in promoting “economic” development, this thesis 
endeavours to offer insights as to how the BWIs can effectively play its new roles in 
assisting implementation o f the FCCC.
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CHAPTER 2: BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
This chapter will focus on the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) and their 
relationship with developing countries. It will begin with a brief look at the histories of 
the BWIs, their present day operations and obligations for member states arising from the 
Articles of Agreement and the loan documents. The degree of flexibility in the operations 
o f the BWIs, from their official amendment to their respective Articles of Agreements to 
utilising legal mechanisms such as trust funds to take on new mandates without 
undergoing cumbersome amendment procedures, will be emphasised. In addition, by 
examining the obligations of member states, the section sets the scene for a discussion on 
governance structure, which is perceived by developing countries as asymmetrical, and 
its implications on the relationship between the BWIs and their developing country 
members.
This relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries will be 
examined from two perspectives. The first will look at the traditional relationship in 
which the BWIs provide funding and policy advice for development purposes and the 
second at recent developments in the 1990s when the World Bank took a new role by 
channelling funding to developing countries for the purpose of implementing multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs).
The governance structure of the BWIs and the resulting asymmetry problems 
perceived by developing countries will be identified and examined in the context o f the 
relationship between the BWIs and those countries. In addition, the increasing interaction 
between the BWIs and the MEAs, which results in the introduction o f new mechanisms 
in the 1990s, will also be discussed briefly.
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2.1 Brief introduction to the Bretton Woods Institutions
2.1.1 Histories'
The protectionist policies of the major industrialised countries in the 1930s led to 
a chaotic international economic order and to World War II (WW II)2. Under these 
circumstances, it was felt by economists and statesmen that international economic co­
operation should be promoted and institutionalised. Meanwhile, as WW II was coming to 
an end, it was widely perceived that a large amount of financial assistance would be 
urgently needed to help the reconstruction and development of war-torn Europe and low 
income countries. That was the background leading to the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference held in New Hampshire, United States, at which the Articles of Agreements 
of the IMF and of the IBRD —  the so-called Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) —  were 
negotiated and concluded3. During the following five decades, the socio-economic 
context in which the BWIs operate has gone through various changes and the services 
required o f the BWIs from their member states have been constantly changing. The two 
institutions have, thus, made several reforms accordingly.
2.1.1.1 The IMF
The purposes of the IMF, as laid down in Article I o f the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement4, include to promote international monetary co-operation, to facilitate the
1 This section will briefly outline the IMF's and the World Bank's major institutional reforms and the new 
mechanisms introduced in a chronological order. The flexibility of the BWIs in responding to new demand 
and in introducing new mechanisms can be noted at all times.
2 The competitive currency devaluation and protectionist trade policies led to a contraction in world trade 
and the low income levels o f the Great Depression during the 1930s (De Vries, 1986). The difficult 
economic situation in, for example, Germany brought discontent to the people and an unstable social and 
political situation, which contributed, partly, to the rise of Hitler.
3 There is a wealth o f literature regarding the historical background of the Bretton Woods Conference, for 
example, De Vries, 1986; James, 1996; and Oliver, 1996.
4 2 UNTS 39 (1947), as amended: 726 UNTS 266 (1976) and 29 UNTS 2203 (1978); reproduced in: 
Zamora and Brand, 1990.
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expansion and balanced growth o f international trade, to promote exchange stability and 
to give confidence to its members by making the general resources o f the IMF 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards. The IMF has undergone 
various reforms by adopting amendments to its Articles o f Agreements and introducing 
new facilities during the past five decades in response to the new development in the 
international monetary system and to the new demands of its members. These reforms 
are outlined in Table 2-1:
T a b l e  2-1: IMF reform
Y ear N ew  facilities and A m endm ents Purpose o f  the reform
1952 Stand-by arrangement5 To make the resources o f  the IMF available to 
its members when difficulties arise w ith balance 
o f  payments.
1971 First Amendment and introduction o f  
the SDR6
To solve the international liquidity problem  in 
the 1960s7.
1974 Oil facility To assist its members in tackling tw o oil crises.
1963,
1975
Compensatory Financing Facility To assist its members w ho faces a shortfall in 
export earning due to factors beyond their 
control.
1975 Extended Fund Facility (EFF) To supplement the short-term nature one-year 
stand-by arrangement when mem bers face 
serious structural balance o f  payments 
difficulties and require more tim e to adjust 
(James, 1996).
1976 Trust Fund To assist the poorest developing country 
members and to supplement the high interest 
rate oil facility by providing this low  interest 
rate fund.
5 Decision No 270-(53/95) 23 December 1953, as amended by Decision Nos 876-(59/15), 27 April 1959. 
and 1151-(61/6), 20 February 1961 (IMF, June 1997).
6 The allocation, use and operation of the SDR are set out in Article XV-XXV o f the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF, the detail discussion of which is omitted here due to the scope and the relevance of 
the thesis. For a more general account on the SDR, see James, 1996; and Dam, 1982.
7 International liquidity is the total o f international reserves held by all countries plus credit available from 
the IMF. The liquidity problem in the 1960s refers to the situation in which international trade expanded in 
such a rapid pace that the existing reserves were insufficient to cope and that additional reserves were 
required (Dam, 1982).
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1978 Second Amendment8: official 
sanction of floating system, 
introducing surveillance into the 
IMF’s operation
To respond to the reality where most of its 
members already operate a floating system9 and 
to continue monitoring the international 
monetary system by installing the surveillance 
mechanism.
1986 Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) To address a more fundamental structural 
problems in its members encountering acute 
debt problems in the 1980s10 (Bretton Woods 
Commission, 1994).
1987 Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility" (ESAF)
To supplement the SAF by providing larger 
funding to its poorest members for a longer 
period.
1992 Systematic Transformation Facility 
(STF)
To assist the former central planning economies 
in their transfer to market-based economies 
(James, 1996).
1993 Third Amendment: strengthen 
compliance
To address its members’ non-compliance 
problems, by authorising the IMF to suspend 
members’ voting rights in case of non- 
compliance12.
1997 Supplementary Reserve Facility 
(SRF)
To assist member states experiencing balance of 
payments difficulties due to a large short-term 
financing need resulting from a sudden and 
disruptive loss of market confidence reflected in 
pressure on the capital account and members’ 
reserve13.
8 For the discussion on the negotiation, significance and impact o f the Second Amendment to the IMF’s 
Articles o f Agreement, see James, 1996; and De Vries, 1986.
9 The whole event was triggered by the U S’s announcement to suspend the convertibility o f officially held 
US dollars into gold in August 1971, which led to the end o f the classic Bretton Woods system since the 
two main features of the system —  par values and dollar convertibility —  were, as a result, no longer 
operative. For a more detailed discussion on the relationship between the US dollar convertibility and the 
fixed exchange rate system under the original IMF Articles o f Agreement, see, for example, James, 1996.
10 The cause o f the debt crisis and its impact on the BWIs, the commercial banks and debtor countries will 
not be discussed here as they are not relevant to the thesis and due to the existing extensive literature on 
the topic. See, for example, James, 1996.
11 The SAF was phased out in 1994-95, leaving the ESAF as the IMF’s only adjustment-type lending. 
More detailed discussion on these two facilities will be conducted in Chapters 3.
12 Under the original Articles, the IMF usually seeks to end the violations o f the Articles through 
consultations with officials o f the offending member country. In addition, under Article XXVI, Section 
2(a), the IMF can formally declare a member “ineligible” to use the IMF’s general financial resources. 
Furthermore, under Section 2(b), the offending member can be expelled from the IMF. The new method 
introduced by the Third Amendment lies in between these two sanctions. See: 31 ILM 1307-11 (1992) for 
the full text of the Third Amendment.
,3 This Facility was approved by the IMF Executive Board in December 1997, mainly as a response to the 
large financial assistance needed in South-east and East Asia because of the financial crisis in the second 
half o f 1997. South Korea was the first member state to receive assistance under this Facility.
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From Table 2-1, it can be seen that the IMF’s operations have gone through 
various and, at times, drastic reforms during the last 50 years. Although its mandates, as 
prescribed in Article I, remain the same, its Articles o f Agreements have undergone three 
amendments during the last five decades to accommodate external changes and internal 
demands from its member states. In addition, by adopting the Board o f Executive 
Directors’ decisions, new financing mechanisms (“facilities”) o f different terms for 
different members and with different purposes have been established from time to time. 
All these illustrate how flexible the IMF has been in responding to the external demand, 
ie changes in the international socio-economic environment14 and internal demand, ie 
different needs of its members at different development stages. The Second Amendments 
to the Articles o f Agreement, which acknowledges the floating exchange rate system 
practised by most of its member states, is an example of the former; while the 
introduction of the EFF, SAF and ESAF as a response to the long-term need o f some of 
its developing country members is an example of the latter.
After the onset of the South-east Asian and Korean financial crisis in 1997-98, 
which the IMF was unable to predict in its 1997 World Economy Outlook, the 
effectiveness of the IMF’s rescue package remains unknown and demand for reforming 
the IMF mounted (eg The Economist, April and October 1998; Sachs, 1997). The IMF’s 
Executive Board, partly in response to this demand, passed the decision to set up a new 
financial mechanism —  the SRF — at the end of 1997. At present, it remains too early to 
predict whether reforms will be undertaken more widely within the IMF’s operations15.
14 The changing socio-economic environment does not refer to any particular event at any particular period 
of time. It simply refers to the international setting in which interaction among countries and their 
economic activities take place and is constantly changing according to, for example, political or economic 
changes internationally and domestically.
15 Discussions have taken place and opinions exchanged as to whether, or how the IMF's role should be 
reexamined in coping with the series of financial crisis that began in South-east Asia in 1997.
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2.1.1.2 The World Bank
The purposes of the IBRD, as laid down in its Articles of Agreement16, include to 
assist in the reconstruction and development o f its members’ territories and to promote 
the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance o f equilibrium 
in balance of payments. The IBRD is part of the World Bank Group. Like the IMF, the 
institutions within and operations of the World Bank Group have expanded in the last 50 
years and the reforms are outlined in Table 2-2.
t a b l e  2-2: World Bank reform
Y ear N ew  institu tions and  
lend ing  operations
Purpose o f  the reform
N ew  institu tions
1945 International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
D evelopm ent (IBRD)
To restore the war-torn Europe and to promote developm ent in its 
member states.
1956 International Finance 
Corporation (IFC)17’ 18
To revive the very sluggish private capital market in the early 
1950s and to encourage private investm ent dom estically as w ell 
as internationally.
1960 International 
D evelopm ent 
A ssociation (ID A )19’ 20
To meet the needs o f  the less developed country mem bers by 
establishing the IDA to provide more concessional financial and 
technical assistance.
1966 International Center 
for Settlement o f  
Investment Dispute 
(ICSID)21
To provide a conciliation and arbitration service for investm ent 
disputes between foreign investors and host governm ents.
Nevertheless, as pointed out in the previous chapter, the discussion o f the IMF in the present study will 
only focus on its structural adjustment-related operations. Since most o f the recent discussion is concerned 
with issues such as financial market and capital movement, it will not be dealt with in the present study.
16 2 UNTS 39 (1947), as amended: 17 December 1965,2 UNTS 134; reproduced in: Mutharika, 1978.
17 The IFC charter came into force on 20 July 1956. 264 UNTS 117 (1957).
18 For a more recent development on the operations and role of the IFC, see Ryrie, 1995.
19 The IDA charter came into force on 24 September 1960. 439 UNTS 249 (1962).
20 For a more detail account on the negotiation and operations of the IDA, see: Mason and Asher, 1973.
21 The Convention on the Settlement o f Investment Disputes between States and Nationals o f other States 
came into force on 14 October 1966 and established the ICSID: 575 UNTS 159 (1965).
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1988 Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA)
To provide insurance against non-commercial investment risk and 
technical services that help to promote investment flows.
1991 Global Environment 
Facility — pilot phase 
(GEF P)22
To respond to the increasing financial needs of its developing 
country members to implement MEAs.
1993 Inspection Panel23 To respond to the complaints from those affected by the Bank’s 
project by creating the Panel to investigate such private 
complaints about the Bank’s operations24
1994 Global Environment 
Facility — 
restructured (GEF I)25
To meet the requirements of the FCCC, Convention Biological 
Divesity (CBD) and Agenda 21 to serve as their financial 
mechanism.
LENDING OPERATIONS
Be­
fore
1980s
Mainly project lending To comply with the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement which 
stipulates that loans made by the Bank shall be for the purpose of 
specific projects of reconstruction or development26
After
1980s
Beginning to engage 
in more programme 
lending and 
introducing Structural 
Adjustment Loan 
(SAL), Sectoral 
Adjustment Loan 
(SECAL) and, Sector 
Investment 
Programmes (SIPs)27
To assist its members in dealing with structural and sectoral 
problems when the macroeconomic environment and the resulting 
difficult balance of payments position endangered the 
effectiveness of the Bank’s project lending operations (Reed, 
1992)28.
From Table 2-2, it can be seen that the Bank, similar to the IMF, has been flexible 
enough to undertake various reforms. While the IBRD’s Articles o f Agreement have not
22 World Bank Resolution 91-5 Establishment o f GEF, April 1991, 3 0 ILM 1735-54, 1991.
23 The Resolution of the Executive Directors establishing the Inspection Panel (Resolution No. 93-10 & 
Resolution No. IDA 93-6); reproduced at 34 ILM 520, 1995.
24 For a more detailed account on the establishment and operations of the Inspection Panel, see Shihata, 
1994b. The impact and significance of the Inspection Panel will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following section.
25 Instrument for the Establishment o f the Restructured Global Environment Facility, reproduced at 33 
ILM 1283, 1994.
26 Article III, Section 4(vii) states that: “Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special 
circumstances, be for the purpose o f specific projects of reconstruction or development”.
27 The SIPs operate differently from the SAL/SECAL in that donor countries are called upon to coordinate 
their development assistance in a particular sector in the programme countries. The SIPs, thus, will not be 
looked at in this study. For more discussion on the SIPs, see: Okidegbe, 1997.
28 More detailed discussion on the operation of SALs and SECALs will be conducted in Chapters 3.
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adopted as many amendments as that of the IMF, member states and management o f the 
Bank were innovative enough to establish new institutions, including, for example, an 
Inspection Panel that was held to be the first such dispute settlement mechanism in any 
international and/or regional development and financial organisation. In addition, the 
management of the Bank was flexible enough to interpret the language o f the original 
Articles o f Agreement to expand the lending scope of the Bank in order to engage in 
programme and policy-based loans after the 1980s. Furthermore, the Bank, as will be 
discussed in more detail later, has borrowed legal mechanisms such as trust funds to take 
on new mandates as demand arose without going through cumbersome amendment 
procedures to the Articles of Agreement.
2.1.2 Present day operations
After a brief account of the historical development of the BWIs, this section will 
look at their operations. As previously mentioned, both o f the BWIs have undergone 
various reforms in the last five decades. This section will only delineate the present day 
operations o f the BWIs.
2.1.2.1 ThelMF
The two main operations of the IMF are to engage in regular consultation with 
the member states and to provide financial assistance to member states through various 
mechanisms.
After the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement came into force, it is 
the legal duty of the IMF to exercise “firm” surveillance over the policies o f its member
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states29. The IMF usually sends a team of staff to member states on a regular basis to 
engage in consultation with officials. The purpose of the surveillance mechanism is to 
monitor macroeconomic policies of the member states, such as their exchange 
arrangements30. Surveillance activity is gradually becoming the main operation o f the 
IMF. For example, it estimated that the cost to carry out its surveillance activity in the 
fiscal year 1998 is more than one-fourth of all the costs o f its major activities31.
However, financial assistance provided by the IMF to its members through its 
various mechanisms remains top of the agenda, as attested by the emergency assistance 
provided to the troubled South-east Asian members and South Korea in the second half 
o f 199732. One of the IMF’s purposes, as laid down in its Articles o f Agreement, is “to 
give confidence to members by making the general resources of the IMF temporarily 
available to them under adequate safeguards . . .” (Article I.)
Using the IMF’s terminology, a member that has balance o f payments difficulties 
can use its own currency to purchase another member’s currency from the IMF33. After a 
certain period of time the borrowing member is obliged to buy back its own currency 
with another member’s currency designated by the IMF34. Whether the purchase comes 
with conditions depends on the facility or mechanism the member uses to draw from the 
IMF. The scale of conditionalities is largely determined by the relative amount o f money
29 Article IV, Section 3(b) states that: “In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the IMF shall 
exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies o f members and shall adopt specific principles 
for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies.” (emphasis added.)
30 For a discussion on the IMF’s role in maintaining orderly exchange arrangements and facilitating 
multilateral payments, see: Fieleke, 1994.
31 The estimated cost o f surveillance takes up 28.5%; while that o f its lending activity (“Use o f Fund 
Resources” should be the correct term) is about 21.1% (IMF, 1998a).
32 However, some commentators remain skeptical about the role of the IMF and the effectiveness o f the 
programme prescribed by the IMF in a situation like this. See, for example, Sachs, 1997; Lacayo, 1997.
33 This is called “currency swap” in IMF terminology. Note that the operations o f the SAF and ESAF do 
not involve a currency swap. For more discussion o f the SAF/ESAF, see Chapter 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
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a member draws. Different type of facility allows members to draw a different 
percentage of their IMF quota. A facility that allows members to draw larger percentage 
of their IMF quota usually prescribes more stringent conditions for the borrowing 
members35. Members have almost unconditional access to the “reserve tranche”, which is 
part of the country’s own reserves that it keeps on deposit with the IMF. In addition, the 
member can reach an agreement with the IMF to draw (borrow) four further “credit 
tranches”, each equivalent to 25% of its quota. The first tranche, which is the first 25% of 
its quota, is with least stringent conditions. After the first tranche, the other three bring 
much more stringent conditions to the member. Meanwhile, conditionalities differ as 
well depending on through which facility does the IMF provide its resources36.
Through the regular consultation conducted with the member states, the IMF has 
been able to take part in examining the economic policies o f its member states. The 
conditionality requirement for access to the IMF’s resources has given the IMF much 
leverage over its member states through the participation o f “designing” the state’s 
economic policies using its resources. The IMF has been able to exercise a certain degree 
of influence through both these operations, in particular the application o f conditionality. 
The practice of. conditionality has become a sensitive issue since the 1960s (James, 
1998), and more discussion on the implication of conditionality will follow in the 
preceding chapter.
34 For the IMF’s operations and transactions, see Article V, in particular Section 3 (conditions governing 
use o f the IMF’s general resources), Section 5 (ineligibility to use the IMF’s general resources), and 
Section 7 (repurchase by a member o f its currency held by the IMF).
35 For example, under the SAF, members are allowed to draw up to 70% o f their IMF quota; while in the 
case of the ESAF, members are allowed to draw up to 250% of their IMF quota. As a result, ESAF has 
more stringent conditions than SAF.
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2.1.2.2 The World Bank: IBRD and IDA11
The main operations o f the World Bank (IBRD and IDA) are to provide loans and 
technical assistance to its member states. In addition, the Bank also hosts various trusts, 
some of which serve environmental purposes38. The combination o f its financial and 
advisory roles has given the World Bank a certain degree of influence over its members, 
just as the IMF has been able to influence its members in the same manner. However, the 
emphasis accorded to different roles varies according to an individual country’s needs 
and circumstances (World Bank, 1994).
There are five types of loans provided by the Bank to its members. The first type 
is specific investment loans for projects, which are the typical and most traditional type 
of loans as laid down in the Articles of Agreement (Article III, Section 4[vii] o f the 
IBRD Articles of Agreement). The second type is a sector loan, eg Sectoral Adjustment 
Loans, which addresses policies such as input and output prices and lending rates for the 
sector being assisted. The third type is the Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) and was set 
up in 1980 to deal with macroeconomic policy programmes and institutional changes 
necessary to modify the structure of the economy. The purpose o f the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) is for the economy to achieve and maintain an appropriate 
growth rate and the viability of its balance of payments in the medium term with 
emphasis on sectors in which adjustment is considered to be most urgent. The last two
36 For more discussion on the IMF’s conditionality, see Chapter 3.4.
37 This sub-section will only discuss the operations of the IBRD and IDA. The IFC performs a similar task; 
however, the entities to whom its services are provided are private parties. As for MIGA and ICSID, both 
of them have different types of operations than those of the IBRD and IDA.
38 These trust funds include, for example, Global Environment Tmst Fund (of the pilot phase Global 
Environment Facility), Ozone Projects Tmst Fund (transferred from the Multilateral Fund o f the Montreal 
Protocol), and the Rain Forest Tmst Fund. For more discussion on the role o f the World Bank as the 
trustee o f these various funds, see: Sand, 1995.
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types are technical assistance loans for institution building and support; and emergency 
reconstruction loans (Silard, 1989).
In addition to lending activity, the World Bank also engages in activities that 
provide technical assistance to its members. Although the IBRD’s Articles o f Agreement 
do not contain provisions for technical assistance, the Bank soon realised that its less 
developed members lacked the expertise to present well-prepared project proposals and 
that some assistance from the Bank was needed. As a result, technical assistance in 
project identification and preparation and other investment-related activities have been 
increasing steadily (Mason and Asher, 1973, chapter 10).
Apart from providing technical assistance to its members, another o f the Bank’s 
operation that is not laid down in its Articles of Agreement is to act as a trustee of 
various trust funds established by agreements between the Bank and the donors. The 
creation of a trust fund hosted by an international organisation has been practised for a 
long time. The IMF, for example, set up a Trust Fund in 1976 to assist some o f its 
poorest members by providing them loans on concessionary terms39. The Bank is not a 
newcomer in this area and had established a trust fund from as early as I96040. It has now 
hosted more than 1,500 trust funds41 (Shihata, 1994b).
The creation of trust funds administered by existing international organisations 
avoids the need to establish new organisations with limited purposes and makes use of 
the experience and expertise o f the existing organisations (Gold, 1978). Both the Bank 
and the IMF have been able to take advantage o f this and entered into agreements with
39 For more discussion on the IMF’s 1976 Trust Fund, see: Gold, 1978.
40 In 1960, the Bank entered into an agreement with a number of governments that provides for the 
creation and administration of the Indus Basin Development Fund, the purpose of which is the effective 
utilisation by Pakistan of the waters assigned to it by the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 (Gold, 1978).
41 For detailed discussion on the Bank’s trust funds, see its OP 14.40 of February 1997 which provides 
operational policies regarding trust funds administered by the Bank.
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donors to set up trust funds for different purposes. This, again, illustrates the flexibility 
o f the BWIs in coping with new demands.
2.1.3 Obligations o f  the member states
This section will discuss the obligations of the BWIs’ member states. Treaty 
obligations arise when a country becomes a member of the BWIs and, as a result, agrees 
to abide by the Articles of Agreements o f the institutions. A second set o f obligations 
will only arise when member states make use of the BWI’s financial resources, through 
loan documentation with different legal effect. The former type o f treaty obligations, 
obligations under the Articles of Agreements, gives less cause for discontent because, 
firstly, countries are aware of these obligations when they become members and, 
secondly, these treaty obligations are prescribed in more general terms. On the other 
hand, the latter set of obligations, the loan obligations, sometimes cause tension between 
the BWIs and the borrowing member because the conditions attached to the loans are 
“probably not feasible or desirable” (Gold, 1984, p. 825)42.
By examining the members’ obligations to the BWIs under both the Articles of 
Agreements and specific loan documents, this discussion will put the relationship 
between the BWIs and their members into context and demonstrate the leverage the 
BWIs have over their members, in particular developing country members. In addition, 
as will be seen at the end of the discussion, developing countries, because they use the 
institutions’ financial resources more frequently, bear heavier obligations under the loan 
agreements and decisions of the Executive Boards relating to lending operations in the
42 This comment by Gold was made in the context of the IMF’s conditionality. Nevertheless, the same 
sentiment can be equally observed in the case of the Bank’s conditionality since under both institutions, 
“countries are not asked to subscribed to such a code [of conditionality] by becoming members . . .” (Gold, 
1984, pp. 825-26).
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BWIs than “donor countries”, ie developed countries. Furthermore, the governance 
structure of the BWIs that affects the ways in which these obligations are designed and 
imposed, gave rise to an asymmetry problem widely perceived by the developing 
countries43. As a result, the BWIs seem to have more influence over the developing 
country members. Before looking at the relationship with the developing countries, this 
section will first outline the two types of obligations briefly.
2.1.3.1 Obligations under the Articles o f Agreement
The respective Articles of Agreements, by which the BWIs were created, govern 
the mutual rights and obligations of the BWIs and their members and those o f members 
inter se, arising out o f membership. The relationship is, thus, one of international law and 
treaty law (Broches, 1980)44.
A. IMF
The general obligations of the member states of the IMF are regulated in Article 
VIII of the Articles of Agreement, which includes, inter alia, avoidance of restrictions on 
current payments and of discriminatory currency practices, convertibility and 
consultation. Other specific obligations relating to, for example, exchange arrangements 
(Article IV) and drawing from the IMF (Article V) are set down in sections throughout 
the Articles of Agreement. For members who are participants in the Special Drawing 
Rights Department, ie those that have been allocated the SDR, obligations regarding their
43 Developing countries have long complained that their interests are not adequately expressed within the 
BWIs and, through forum and bodies such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and G-77, have sought to change the current weighted voting system to a voting system that resembles the 
UN style voting. For more discussion, see, for example, Ferguson, 1988, and Gold, 1972.
44 Broches was discussing the relationship between the World Bank and its member states. However, the 
same can be applied mutatis mutandis to the IMF and its member states in the same context.
37
participation in the SDR Department are further set down in Article XXII and other 
related provisions. Interpretations of the Articles (Article XXIX), over which the 
Executive Board and the Board of Governors of the IMF enjoy the exclusive power45, 
might contain obligations for members as well.
In addition to the provisions in the Articles o f Agreement, certain obligations are 
provided in the guidelines and decisions, in particular those regulating the use o f the 
IM F’s resources and creating new facilities, approved by the Board o f Executive 
Directors. Theoretically, these obligations are applicable to all members, as opposed to 
those arising from specific “drawings” (loans) that are only applicable to the borrowing 
members. In practice, however, members that rarely use the IMF’s resources are not 
affected by this type of obligation, leaving those members who regularly need to turn to 
the IMF for financial assistance the only subject to which these obligations apply. The 
last drawing from a developed country member was made by the United Kingdom in 
1977, which meant that the developing countries fell in the latter category46. The 
implications of this asymmetry will be looked at in the next section.
B. IBRD
While the IMF is more of a regulatory institution47, the IBRD is designed to be 
more like a commercial bank that provides services to its clients. As a result, the 
obligations of the IBRD’s member states, stated in it Articles of Agreement are less
45 If a question of interpretation of provisions of the Articles arises between any member and the IMF, or 
between members, the Boards of Governors and Executive Directors of the IMF is empowered to interpret 
its Articles authoritatively, that is to say, with finality and binding effect for members and the IMF. This 
power is an exclusive one, because members are precluded , from resort to some external tribunal when 
questions within either of these two categories arise (Gold, 1984 and 1996).
46 One o f the OCED countries, South Korea, drew from the IMF’s Supplementary Reserve Facility in 
1998. Nevertheless, access to the SRF is for exceptional circumstances. Most o f the facilities, such as the 
ESAF, allow only the poorest developing country members to have access to it.
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comprehensive than those laid down in the IMF’s. For example, the IBRD’s Articles of 
Agreement do not have provisions equivalent to Article VIII o f the IM F’s Articles of 
Agreement, whereby the general obligations of the members are prescribed. The main 
treaty obligations provided by the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement are to subscribe shares 
of the capital stock of the Bank and to make a minimum payment48 of the subscribed 
share (Article II, Section 3, 5 and 7). Another main obligation for IBRD members is to 
guarantee the repayment of the principal, interest and other charges on the loans made by 
the Bank to the public entity in its territory (Article III, Section 4[i]).
As with the IMF, the Bank’s Board o f Executive Directors has adopted 
operational procedures and manuals from time to time. However, these procedures and 
manuals usually set out guidelines to the Bank’s staff, rather than to members, in making 
loans. Bank members who borrow from the Bank are not subject to these operational 
procedures. These operational procedures and manuals are designed for a speedier 
process o f the loans and are supposed to be beneficial to the borrowing members. With 
the establishment of the Inspection Panel in 1993, citizens in the territory o f a member 
state who are likely to be affected by the Bank projects can bring complaints before the 
Panel in cases. where the Bank has allegedly fail to comply with its operational 
procedures. While the borrowing government itself is not eligible to bring complaints to 
the Inspection Panel49, this complaint system was set up to investigate and, therefore, to
47 According to Gold, the IMF “is a regulatory organization in the sense that it can decide that certain 
exchange practices o f a member are or are not consistent with the treaty” (Gold, 1996, p.xxix).
48 20% o f a member’s subscribed share shall be paid or subject to call as needed by the Bank for its 
operations (Article II, Section 5). Among the 20%, 2% of the price of each share is to be paid in by gold or 
United States dollars and, when calls are made, the remaining 18% shall be paid in the currency o f the 
member (Article II, Section 7).
49 While it is not explicitly mentioned in the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel, it is implied that 
the “affected party” can not be the borrower itself. Standard Bank loan agreements usually provide that 
disputes arising under them between the Bank and the borrower are to be settled by negotiation and, 
failing this, by arbitration (Shihata, 1994b).
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ensure that Bank staff comply with all these operational procedures and manuals when 
preparing and implementing any Bank loan.
Overall, obligations derived from the Articles o f Agreements and from the 
decisions of the Boards of Executive Directors with regard to the interpretations o f the 
Articles of Agreements apply to all member states of the BWIs. Decisions o f the Boards 
relating to loan operations, on the other hand, affect borrowing members, developing 
country members at present, more deeply since they are the main group to which these 
decisions apply. An important aspect of the obligations arising from the Articles of 
Agreements is to make contribution to the BWIs according to the quotas and shares 
prescribed. Developed countries are required to make more contribution to the BWIs as a 
result o f their larger quotas and shares in the institutions and bear heavier burdens in 
terms of putting in more resources50. Nevertheless, this is an obligation countries are 
aware of when they made the decisions to become member states o f the BWIs. 
Furthermore, developed countries are designated with more votes and have access to 
larger amount of the resources because o f their larger quotas and shares within the 
BWIs51.
Developing countries are the main subjects of the decisions o f the Executive 
Boards relating to loan operations. However, in the present governance structure o f both 
of the BWIs where weighted voting system is the rule, developing countries do not have 
votes sufficient to influence the ways in which these decisions are reached at the Boards
50 This is more so in the case of the IMF where the review o f the existing quotas of the member states take 
place on a regular basis (usually five years). Developed countries usually are required to make increased 
contributions to the IMF as a result o f this review.
51 In addition, the five countries that make the largest contributions are entitled each to appoint an 
Executive Director.
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of Executive Directors52. Although the Boards usually adopt decisions on the basis of 
consensus and very few formal votes are ever taken by the Executive Boards (Lister, 
1984, cited in Stiles, 1991). The meaning o f consensus can be referred to as “the sense of 
the meeting of the Executive Board”53. It is noted by one commentator that: “The 
definition of ‘the sense of the meeting’, adopted by the Executive Directors in 1947, 
however, underscored that the voting strength o f members remains a crucial 
consideration with regard to the evaluation o f consensus on any matters.” (Ferguson, 
1988, p. 6534.) In addition, according to another commentator, one plausible reason why 
poor countries avoid voting to take place might be: “to ensure that they are not on the 
record as opposing policies approved by developed nations.”55 (Ekchaus, 1986, cited in 
Stiles, 1991, p. 37.) Therefore, even though formal votes rarely take place and consensus 
is sought instead, developed countries can still dominate the decision-making process by 
virtue of their voting strength as a group on the Board.
As a result, developing countries might have felt being treated asymmetrically 
due to the fact that they are the only group of member states required to undertake 
heavier obligations from the decisions relating to loan operations o f the Boards56, over
52 For example, 24 OECD countries out of a total 181 IMF members have more than 61%s o f the total 
quotas allocated by the IMF to its members as of FY 1998.
53 The rules for voting are prescribed in the paragraphs C-10 to C-12 in Rules and Regulations o f  the IMF. 
According to paragraph C-10: “The Chairman [of the Executive Board] shall ordinarily ascertain the sense 
of the meeting in lieu of a formal vote.” (IMF, January 1997, p. 23.)
54 “The sense of the meeting” is explicitly defined by the Directors in 1947 to be: “a position supported by 
those Directors having sufficient votes to carry the question if a veto were to be taken.” (cited in: 
Ferguson, 1988, p. 65.)
55 Developing countries of course can object to certain policies approved or favoured by developed 
countries. Nevertheless, they fear the possible retribution on the day that they themselves might seek 
assistance from the IMF (Stiles, 1991).
56 Killick, for example, identified two forms of unequal treatment that has affected the effectiveness of 
conditionality. One occurs among borrowing countries where, due to lobbying from major shareholder 
governments, certain developing countries can receive better treatment than others do. The second form of 
unequal treatment is one o f “asymmetry between developing and developed countries, with the former 
required to endure a degree of BWI involvement in policy formation that would not be tolerated for a 
moment by OCED governments, who routinely discount the ‘surveillance’ advice of the IMF.” (Killick, T, 
1995b, p. 33.)
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which, formally as well as in practice, they have less control compared with developed 
countries. The affect on the relationship between the BWIs and their developing 
countries members will be discussed after we examine another set o f obligations for the 
member states of the BWIs, ie obligations arising from loans.
2.1.3.2 Loan obligations57
A. IMF
The major difference between an IMF’s “arrangement” and a World Bank’s58 
“loan” is that the former does not constitute an international treaty between the IMF and 
its member; (Gold, 1970 and 1982), while the latter is an international treaty between the 
Bank and the borrowing government (Broches, 1959 and 1980). However, the legal 
characteristics should not be confused with the functional reality, in which conditions set 
down in either the IMF’s arrangements or Bank’s loans carry significant implications59.
In the case of the IMF, obligations o f the borrowing members, ie members that 
draw from the IMF, to remain in consultation with the IMF, to pay charges, and to 
repurchase in certain circumstances or at certain times are relevant to the IMF’s 
arrangement with the members. However, these are derived not from the loan 
arrangement made with the IMF but from the provisions of the Articles o f Agreement or 
the general decisions of the IMF (Gold, 1980c). A member that wishes to use the IMF’s 
resources needs to present it with a “Letter o f Intent”, which sets out policies to correct 
its balance of payments difficulties. The Letter o f Intent is usually heavily negotiated
57 The “loan” obligations here also refers to the conditions in the IMF’s stand-by arrangement and the 
Letters of Intent of the governments who draw from the IMF.
58 Observations made here to World Bank loans apply generally to loans made both by IBRD and IDA. 
Note that in the IDA, the term “credit” is used instead of “loan”.
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between the IMF staff and the government. The Board of Executive Directors, after 
reviewing and discussing the context of the Letter of Intent, decides whether to grant the 
member’s request. Neither the Letters of Intent nor the decisions o f the Executive 
Directors are considered by the IMF to be documents, creating contractual obligations for 
the members. In addition, the member’s Letter of Intent is not considered a unilateral 
declaration that creates obligations on the member to pursue its announced policies 
(Gold, 1980a). Does this mean that there are no contractual obligations on the part of 
Fund’s members who draw from the IMF? In a formal legal sense, this might be the case 
since there is no contract o f any sort between the IMF and the member requesting a 
purchase. However, in practice, failure to comply with the performance criteria60 set 
down in the Letter o f Intent can result in the suspension of releasing the subsequent 
tranches61,62. Hence, members who draw from the IMF are under obligations arising from 
the Letter of Intent or any similar instruments in making arrangement with the IMF.
B. IBRD
In the IBRD’s case, every loan agreement between the Bank and a member state 
is considered an international agreement, a treaty in the broad sense o f the term and, as
59 As one commentator puts it: “Legal formalism should not allow the international financial institutions to 
escape responsibility for the consequences of their actions in these processes.” (Bradlow and Grossman, 
1995, p. 428.)
60 Performance criteria, usually expressed in quantitative indicators o f certain economic criteria, refer to 
the terms on which the IMF will permit the member to use, and continue to use, the IMF’s resources.
61 The language that specifies the performance criteria usually states that, in the event o f non-observance, 
the member will not be ale to engage in exchange transactions “except after reaching understandings with 
the IMF regarding the circumstances in which such purchases may be made.” However, sine it is the 
member who decides whether or not to consult with the IMF for the purpose o f receiving the subsequent 
tranches, this language is not to be considered contractual (Gold, 1980c).
62 For more discussion on the implications of performance criteria and conditionality, see Chapter 3.4.
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such, is registered with the UN63 (Head, JW, 1996). As a result, the borrowing 
government is under a legal obligation to fulfil the conditions laid down in the loan 
agreement. The Bank’s loan agreements typically include covenants or schedules 
detailing undertakings made by the borrower regarding the implementation o f the project 
or programme involved. Such loan agreements represent the main instruments through 
which the Bank ensures that the relevant conditions are agreed upon in a clear and 
binding manner (Shihata, 1995, chapter 17).
The loan obligations of the member, thus, refer to those negotiated undertakings 
provided in covenants or schedules of the loan agreement64. As part o f its close, ongoing 
relationship with borrowers, the Bank has rarely conditioned the availability o f future 
loans on compliance with current loan conditions, nor has it suspended loan 
disbursements to encourage compliance with current loans (Guyett, 1992)65. An 
arbitration clause is usually included in the Bank’s loan agreement in which dispute that 
has not been settled by the agreement will be subject to binding arbitration. However, 
there has been no incident where either the Bank or the borrowing member has invoked 
the arbitration clause regarding non-compliance with the loan obligations66. Nevertheless, 
failure to comply with the loan obligations carries legal consequences, such as the 
shortened period for repayment, as well as practical consequences, such as the potential 
difficulties in obtaining future loans from the Bank and from the private sources67.
63 Article 102, para. 1 o f the United Nations Charter states that: “Every treaty and every international 
agreement entered into by any member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force 
shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.”
64 The loan agreements referred to here are those for the financing o f a specific project or programme. The 
guarantee agreements are not included since the nature of the borrowing government’s obligations are 
different from those in a loan agreement.
65 This is particularly in the case o f environmental covenants (Guyett, 1992).
66 Personal communication with a staff member in the Bank’s Legal Department.
67 For more detailed discussion on the international legal aspect of World Bank’s loan and guarantee 
agreements with its members, see Broches, 1959.
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Another type of loan agreement exists in both the IMF and the IBRD —  the loan 
agreements between the IMF and the Bank and donors in setting up trust funds that are 
administered by the former68. In this type of agreement, loan obligations will be imposed 
on both the IMF and the Bank and the donors, which, in most of the cases, are developed 
country members and are applicable mainly to the developed country members. 
However, such loan obligations mainly concern the contribution the donors intend to 
make and the associated issues, such as method of payment and financial terms. In 
addition, the BWIs usually do not impose any conditions on the part o f the donors in this 
type of loan agreement since the BWIs themselves are the borrowers. Considering the 
focus of this chapter is on loan obligations agreed between the BWIs and their borrowing 
members, this type of loan agreement and the ensuing loan obligations will not be the 
subject o f the present discussion.
To conclude, it is clear that the treaty obligations o f member states arising from 
the Aaticles of Agreements are applicable to all members, developed as well developing 
ones. On the other hand, loan obligations and obligations derived from decisions o f the 
respective Board of Executive Directors of the BWIs relating to loan operations mainly 
apply to members who borrow from the BWIs, which are all developing country 
members after 1980. One might argue that developing countries have the option of 
declining loans from the BWIs since they are clearly aware o f obligations arising (from 
such loans. Nevertheless, it is precisely such awareness among developing countries that 
result in the present situation where only countries in serious debt servicing problems
68 For example, the operations of the IMF’s ESAF are financed mainly from contributions from Fund 
members in the form o f loans and grants to the ESAF Tmst, which is administered by the IMF. In the case 
of the World Bank, OP 14.40 on Tmst Fund states that: “A tmst fund is a fund administered by the Bank in 
accordance with the terms of an agreement with a donor.”
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and/or have no alternative source of capital that are seeking loans from the BWIs69. When 
developing countries in such a dismal economic state negotiate with the BWIs, the 
relationship between the borrowing countries and the donors and management o f the 
BWIs becomes even more sensitive.
The preceding discussion suggests that developing country members seem to be 
under more rigorous obligations under the BWIs70. In other words, the BWIs seem to be 
able to have more influence on their developing country members through decisions and 
loans. The governance structure of the BWIs affects how these decisions and loan are 
made and, as a result, has ramifications on developing countries and their perception 
toward the BWIs themselves. The preceding paragraphs briefly touched upon the issue of 
governance structure by pointing out how the voting rules in which developed countries 
hold the majority of votes affect the ways in which these decisions and obligations are 
drawn up. The next section will continue to examine how the governance structure o f the 
BWIs has brought out a sense of asymmetry from developing countries’ perspective and, 
as a result, influenced the relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries.
2.2 Relationship with the developing country members
During the early days of the BWIs, the focus was on the war-torn countries of 
Western Europe. After the Marshall Plan took over the task of reconstruction in Western 
Europe, the World Bank first started to concentrate on making development project loans 
to the developing countries. In the meantime, while the focus o f the IM F’s operations
69 After the debt crisis broke out in early 1980s, most o f the developing countries, especially the low 
income countries were virtually cut off from the commercial loans by 1982 (Ghai, 1991). Similar situation 
can be observed when the financial crisis broke out in South-east and East Asia in 1997-98 when 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea had to seek emergency financial assistance from the IMF.
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before 1971 was on developed countries, it found that it was losing influence over most 
of its developed member states after the collapse of the par value system in 1971 
(Carreau, 1991). Consequently, the IMF gradually began to concentrate on its developing 
members after the 1970s. The relationship between the BWIs and the developing 
countries in the context of promoting the traditional model of “economic” development 
is the subject of Chapter 2.2.1.
In late 1980s and 1990s, there were changes in this traditional relationship on the 
World Bank’s part. As a response to the external pressures from the US Congress and 
environmental NGOs, the Bank has underwent some environmental reforms in the 1980s, 
which progressively led to the establishment of new mechanisms within the Bank in the 
1990s. That brought a new dimension into the relationship with the developing members 
— a new relationship in which the Bank channels resources to assist developing 
countries implementing multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). This 
development will be the subject of Chapter 2.2.2. As demonstrated in the following 
chapters, this closer link with the MEAs have, in turn, had impact on how the World 
Bank and the BWIs, as a group, have begun to employ their influence over developing 
countries to assist the implementation of a particular MEA: the FCCC.
2.2.1 Traditional relationship fo r  development
After the collapse of the par value system in 1971, the IMF began its new role as 
a “development” institution. Virtually all o f the new financing mechanisms (“facilities”) 
introduced after 1970, such as the 1974 EFF, 1976 Trust Fund, 1986 SAF and 1987
70 Some commentators even suggest that: “While the IMF is able to exercise substantial control over the 
affairs of its poorer member states, it has very little control over the behavior o f its richer member states.” 
(Bradlow and Grossman, 1995, p.420.)
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ESAF, within the IMF had the common aim of better serving the needs o f the IMF’s 
developing country members (Carreau, 1991). In addition, references to developing 
countries were incorporated in the Second Amendment to the Articles o f Agreement in 
1978 as members deserving special consideration in some respects71. Although 
“development” was not added to the mandates of the IMF as prescribed in the Articles of 
Agreement, the purpose relating to trade (Article I[ii]), including that relating to the 
“development of productive resources” (Article I[ii]), should produce certain beneficial 
consequences without making “development” itself a purpose (Gold, 1981-82).
The IMF played another role different from that of a “development institution” in 
assisting its developing country members to tackle the debt crisis in the 1980s. This role 
continues to be quite significant in the latest crisis in Mexico, Indonesia and South 
Korea. This role of the IMF has wider implications beyond development, such as 
maintaining an orderly international financial order. Considering the fact that debt 
burden has always been a major obstacle for development in the highly indebted 
developing countries, this role still enables the IMF to play an important part in 
promoting development. Furthermore, the programmes attached to most o f the IMF’s 
facilities, in particular the EFF, SAF and ESAF usually prescribe conditions to be 
implemented that are for development purposes. As a result, the IMF, sometimes eagerly, 
sometimes hesitantly, has taken on the unfamiliar role of development lending by the end 
of 1980s (The Economist, October 1991).
In contrast to the IMF, the Articles of Agreement o f the IBRD mandated the Bank 
to specifically “assist in the development72 of territories o f members”. Nevertheless, the
71 Article V, Section 12(f)(ii) states: “Under the subsection (f)(ii) balance o f payments assistance may be 
made available on special terms to developing members in difficult circumstances . . .” (emphasis added.)
72 The term “development” was not defined in the Articles o f Agreement of the IBRD. As the concept of 
“development” itself differs in a developing world where wide spectrum o f developmental situations
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Bank’s earlier operation concentrated on the “reconstruction” side in re-building the war- 
torn Europe. It was not until the American Marshall Plan took over the reconstruction job 
in Western Europe (Kaplan, 1996) that the Bank began to turn its attention to its 
developing country members. During 1950s to 1970s, the World Bank’s main operations 
were financing specific projects for development purposes, largely for infrastructure 
purposes such as dams and roads. By the 1970s, the Bank has come to regard itself as a 
major development institution responsible for promoting broadly based economic and 
social development in countries that were desperately poor and whose governmental 
policies were generating even further economic and social degradation (Mikesell and 
Williams, 1992). During the 1980s, in particular after the introduction o f SALs and 
SECALs, the number of non-project loans increased rapidly. Although the World Bank 
provides only a small portion out of the total bilateral and multilateral financial resources 
for development purposes available for developing countries, the Bank is probably the 
single most important external source o f ideas and advice to developing country 
policymakers (Gavin and Rodrik, 1995).
From the preceding discussion, it can be concluded that the BWIs have positioned 
themselves, intentionally (in the case of the Bank) or unexpectedly (in the case o f the 
IMF), as the promoters of development in developing countries. In the late 1940s and 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, “development” was referred to as economic growth, 
development of infrastructure and rapid industrialisation (Shihata, 1995, chapter 1). As a 
result, the BWIs began to promote development in their developing country members
exists, it is difficult to give a precise definition as to what “development” is. During the operations in the 
past five decades, the experience and thinking of the Bank about development have broadened with its 
membership over the years. For a more detailed discussion, see: Mason and Asher, 1973, chapter 14, and 
Shihata, 1995, chapter 1.
based on this model o f “economic” development and to provide financial and technical 
assistance accordingly in the 1960s and 1970s.
In the 1980s, a new challenge to development arose from the serious 
disequilibrium in developing countries’ balance of payments, resulting from an 
increasing external debt burden and falling commodity prices (Shihata, 1995, chapter 1). 
The BWIs, thus, began to address this new challenge by introducing adjustment loans in 
order to assist developing countries to address the macroeconomic imbalances. The 
medicine prescribed by the BWIs to this new challenge, however, is still based on their 
traditional “development model”. The BWIs have been criticised for not taking into 
account the increasing social and environmental problems associated with this model in 
their developing country members (eg Comia et al, 1987; Reed, 1992 and 1996). 
Meanwhile, the “medicine,” adjustment loans, with its programmatic nature and 
conditionality, has enabled the BWIs to gain more influence in their developing 
members73.
Recalling the flexibility of the BWIs in introducing new reforms, as discussed in 
the preceding section, the BWIs have shown to be very adaptive in a changing socio­
economic environment where the concept of “development” changed from time to time. 
As one commentator puts it “[the BWIs] have the institutional strength and flexibility to 
adapt their services to the new development concepts they have helped to promote and 
enjoy increasing international acceptance.” (Ardito-Barietta, N, 1994, p. 199.) As these 
changes in the development paradigm and the operations of the BWIs took place, 
developing countries gradually became the only group of clients the BWIs are to serve in
73 For more discussion on the leverages of structural adjustment lending of the BWIs over developing 
countries, see Chapter 3.2.1.
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terms of lending operation after 1980 and the relationship between the BWIs and the 
developing countries began to attract more attention.
From the perspective of developing countries74, their relationship with the BWIs 
has been anything but harmonious. There were more delegates from developing countries 
than from developed countries presented at the Bretton Woods Conference. However, the 
BWIs were mainly the joint design of the British and the American delegates. This led to 
“an almost inevitable lack of concern for the interests of developing countries” (South 
Commission, 1990, p. 27). In addition, it is noted by one commentator that: “Based on an 
informal arrangement, from which the [less developing countries] are excluded, the 
presidentship of the World Bank and the post of Managing Director of IMF are rotated 
between the US and Western Europe.” (Dasgupta, B, 1998, p. 73.) These historical 
events have left the impression that the BWIs were established to serve the developed 
country members’ interests.
In the mid 1970s, the developing countries, with their newly gained voting 
majority within the UN system, expressed their dissatisfaction o f the existing 
international economic system, including the decision-making procedure within the 
system, by demanding for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)75. For example, it 
was suggested that: “The participation of developing countries in the decision-making
74 Among the group of “developing countries,” we have the “newly industrialised countries” in East Asia 
and Latin America, as well as less developed countries and high indebted countries in Africa. With varying 
degree of development, different countries will have different needs from and interaction with the BWIs. 
Nevertheless, the term “developing countries” is used loosely in this context referring to developing 
member states to which the BWIs lend exclusively after the 1980s. The same loose definition goes to 
“developed countries” discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, since developed countries have among' 
them Nordic countries which are traditionally more sympathetic to the needs o f developing countries as 
well as US which has doubts in the work and effectiveness of the BWIs. (As can be seen from the recent 
difficulties encountered by its President to request for extra funding for the IMF in the Congress.)
75 The most important developments were the adoption o f the two UN General Assembly Resolutions in 
1974: the “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order” (UNGA Res. 
A /3201 [S- VI] of 1 May 1974) in May, and the “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties o f States”(UNGA
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process in the competent organs of international finance and development institutions 
should be adequately increased.” (UN General Assembly Resolution 3362 [S-VII] 
“Development and International Economic Co-operation”, 1975.) Meanwhile, 
developing countries also began to demand fundamental reforms in a decision-making 
process they perceived as asymmetry from within the BWIs76. For example, the call for a 
change in the decision-making procedures within the BWIs has repeatedly come out from 
the Communique of G-24 of the IMF77 since 197278. All o f these demonstrate the 
dissatisfaction of the developing countries toward the governance structure of the BWIs.
Admittedly, at the time near the end of WW II, the Bretton Woods delegates, in 
particular the principle architect of the BWIs, the US and UK delegates, may not have 
been able to foresee how rapidly the colonial world would disintegrate and what this 
disintegration would do to the organisation o f the IMF and the World Bank. 
Consequently, insofar as the Bretton Woods delegates were concerned, they saw no 
reason to distinguish those policies relating to trade, payments and capital flows which 
were considered to be favourable to the growth and prosperity o f the developed countries 
from those favourable to developing countries (Mason and Asher, 1973). Despite this
Res. A/3281 [XXIX] of 12 December 1974) in December. For a brief historical survey o f the NIEO 
concept, see Van Dijk, 1987, pp. 91-98.
76 For example, the Indian Governor made the following statement at the 1970 Annual Meeting: “In our 
judgment, the whole question of the structure o f management, distribution o f quotas, as well as o f voting 
rights, needs to be examined afresh and thoroughly ... Whatever else this reform might encompass, it must 
clearly reduce the weightage o f economic power and reflect instead the aspirations o f the vast majority of 
the people in the world.” (Cited in Ferguson, 1988, p. 88.)
77 G-24, the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs, was set up in 
1972. It represents the minority shareholders, both in terms of votes and the predominant numerical 
membership, in the IMF. It has evolved into a group that defends a common position for the Third World 
members o f the IMF on international monetary issues (Ferguson, 1988, pp.74-75). It still holds regular 
meeting these days to provide advice and reports to the Boards of Governors o f the BWIs on development 
issues.
78 For example, in its First Ministerial Meeting in 1972, the G-24 “expressed its dissatisfaction that 
important decisions affecting the International Monetary System have been taken by a small number of  
developed countries to the exclusion and neglect o f the interests of the rest o f the international community, 
and that these decisions have adversely affected the economies of developing countries.” (Sauvant, 1981, 
p. 298.)
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lack of foresight that failed to recognise the special need o f developing countries in their 
original Articles of Agreements, the BWIs have been quick to identify the special 
circumstances of their developing country members. Consequently, they have adopted 
various mechanisms and decisions in the following five decades that seeks to better serve 
the interests of their developing country members79.
However, one major element inherited in the operations of the BWIs has been at 
the root of the discontent o f the developing members and that is, the governance structure 
o f the BWIs. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, demand for reforming the decision­
making process has been made since the 1970s and is continuing to be made in the 
1990s80. And yet no actions have been taken so far by the BWIs on this issue. The 
decision-making rules within the BWIs have given the developed countries greater 
influence in deciding the policies of the BWIs. Whereas basic votes are guaranteed to 
every member81, the proportion of basic votes to total votes has regressed every time 
when the capital (“quotas” in the IMF’s term) of the BWIs increased82. Various proposals 
have been put forward to reform this voting system regarded as asymmetry to developing 
countries83,84. The reform of the voting system requires a formal amendment to each of 
the Articles of Agreement of the BWIs. Nevertheless, the issue o f voting system reform
79 Another possible explanation for setting up these mechanisms specially for developing members, 
however, is that the BWIs had no other alternative as their developed members no longer use their 
financial services.
80 For example, in the Report of the Commission on Global Governance published in 1995, it is stated that: 
“... the decision-making structures of the Bretton Woods institutions have to be reformed.” (Commission 
on Global Governance, 1995, p. 187.)
81 Article XII, Section 5(a) of the IMF Articles o f Agreement: “Each member shall have 250 votes plus 
one additional vote for each part o f its quota equivalent to 100,000 special drawing rights”. Article V , 
Section 3(a) of the IBRD Articles o f Agreement: “Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus 
one additional vote for each share o f stock held.”
82 For example, the proportion of basic votes to total votes in the IMF has been decreased from 12.5% in 
1947 to 4.2% in 1992 (Gerster, 1993a).
83 For example, the proportion o f basic votes to total votes should be expanded; or the size o f population 
should be considered (Gerster, 1993a).
84 The voting formula in the IDA and the MIGA is much more favourable toward developing countries 
than the formula in the IMF and the IBRD. For detail discussion, see: Gianaris, 1990-91, p. 928.
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was not taken up in two amendments (one in 1978 and one in 1993) to the Articles of 
Agreement o f the IMF after 1972 when call for such reform was put forward.
The discontent the developing countries felt toward the operations o f the BWIs 
has been derived from the imbalance in governance structure of the BWIs and the 
resulting asymmetric treatment received by the borrowing developing Countries85. The 
developing country members, as pointed out in the preceding section, are under more 
rigorous obligations, such as loans and arrangements as well as guidelines and decisions 
relating to loans, than developed country members. This, however, is not the 
consequence of treaty obligations in the Articles o f Agreements. Rather, it is the result o f 
a more frequent use of the BWIs’ financial resources. Nevertheless, it can also be argued 
that the more frequent use the BWIs’ resources by developing country members is the 
result o f the asymmetric treatment implicit in the operations of the BWIs86.
From the perspective of the Boards of Executive Directors, it may seem fair that 
developing countries should undertake a greater burden in the form o f “loan obligations” 
and the applicable guidelines or decisions. However, by examining how these decisions 
and obligations are made, the decision-making process perceived as asymmetric by 
developing countries, seems to have partially produced a wider asymmetry in the 
operations of the BWIs. The Boards of Executive Directors are controlled by the
85 According to Sir Joseph Gold, (Gold, 1980b) there are three types of classifications in the international 
monetary system: members that issues reserve currencies and members that issue other currencies; 
members in surplus and members in deficit in their balance of payments; and developed and developing 
members. One of the asymmetries in the international monetary system is that members with a surplus in 
their balance of payments are not required to take any adjustment measures; while members with deficit in 
their balance of payments bear the sole responsibility to adjust (South Commission, 1990).
86 As some o f the commentators argue, the international economic environment constructed by the BWIs 
has benefited only the developed world. In addition, development projects and programmes designed and 
financed by the BWIs to be applied on developing world failed to adopt input from the developing 
countries because of the asymmetric decision-making process. As a result, developing countries are 
“trapped” in poverty and debt and, consequently need to resort to the BWIs for assistance. See, for 
example, Bandow and Vasquez, 1992.
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donors87. The terms and conditions attached to the loans, arrangements in the IM F’s case, 
have been criticised as being designed and drafted by the Bank’s or the IMF’s staff 
without sufficient consultation with the borrowing governments88.
As a result, although the developing countries have greater access to the financial 
sources of the BWIs, they have less control over how the money is going to be used in 
their countries, as they need to implement conditionalities and policy advice drawn up by 
the staffs of the BWIs if the governments are to receive further financial assistance. 
Furthermore, while these decisions are made in a decision-making process where 
developing countries are not able to participate fully, the costs and consequences o f the 
decisions and conditions made by the BWIs fall largely, if  not exclusive, on the 
developing countries89. In addition, the economic situation under which developing 
countries go to the BWIs for financial assistance is often in such a dire state that the 
borrowing governments have no other choice but to comply with the conditions set by 
the staffs of the BWIs90.
The wider asymmetric treatment implied in the operations o f the BWIs, thus, 
raises the following concerns. Firstly, the burden of obligations that developing countries 
need to carry under the BWIs; secondly, the ways in which decisions relating to lending
87 For example, each of the five major donors have the right to point one Executive Director in both the 
institutions; while the developing countries have to form various “constituency” and elect one Executive 
Director among themselves in the same group. The five biggest donors have a total o f 36.69% voting 
power in the IBRD and 38.82% voting power in the IMF in 1997.
88 For example, the Letter o f Intent, a document formally submitted by the government to the IMF to 
request for a stand-by arrangement, is “almost invariable drafted in Washington [by the staff o f the IMF], 
with government left trying to negotiate variations in a draft presented to it.” (Killick, 1995a, p. 155.)
89 As one commentator puts it: “What is particularly unacceptable to developing countries ... is the 
inequality o f a system where a few major contributing countries, which basically do not use the IMF’s 
resources and are thus unaffected by its policies, are the ones that seek to impose, by way o f their control 
of the policy-making process, their view of economic organization and management.” (Ferguson, 1988, p. 
230.) The same observation was made by Killick, but in the context o f the BWIs, rather than developed 
countries and developing countries: “It is the [borrowing] governments which have to live, politically, 
with the consequences of SAP policies, whereas the BWIs are made largely immune from the adverse
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operations are drawn up by the Executive Board; and thirdly, the unequal proportion of 
costs and consequences of decisions and programmes of the BWIs developing countries 
need to bear.
The decision-making process has contributed in producing this wider asymmetry 
treatment under the BWIs in the second and third aspects. Although the sense of 
asymmetry might not be shared by the developed countries91, the asymmetry, both in the 
governance structure and in the operations o f the BWIs, is still perceived by developing 
countries under the operations of the BWIs. This perception o f asymmetry has affected 
the relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries and, as the following 
chapter will seek to demonstrate, undermined the effectiveness of the legal and quasi- 
legal instruments the BWIs employed in their SAPs to influence the developing 
countries92. Further discussion will following in future chapters.
The traditional model of “economic” development, encouraged and assisted by 
the BWIs with their adjustment programmes, has sometimes left out environmental 
considerations in the path of development and has resulted in the degradation o f the 
environment, local and global93. The coming of age of the concept o f sustainable 
development reflects this inadequacy and has given rise to a new generation o f MEAs 
that seek to redress this inadequacy by beginning to seek to regulate economic activities
consequences of bad lending decisions by a ‘preferred creditor’ status which largely ensures that they will 
get their money back for good and bad loans alike.” (Killick, March 1996, p. 217.)
90 This is the reason the BWIs, in particular the IMF, are often called the “lenders o f last resort”.
91 For example, developed countries might not regard the governance structure as asymmetrical since it is 
their taxpayers’ money that is being used and, as a consequence, they should be entitled to decide how the 
money should be spent. Nevertheless, this rationale might not be as convincing as developed countries 
would have liked for the following two considerations. First, it is the people in the borrowing developing 
countries that are greatly affected by decisions on how the money will be spent. Secondly, a large portion 
of the money disbursed by the BWIs often end up either back to the donor governments as, for example, 
repayment o f official debt, or in the hands of their citizens in the form of, for example fees paid for foreign 
expertise and technology.
92 For further discussion, see Chapter 3.5.
93 For more discussion on the structural adjustment programmes and the environment, see Chapter 5.3.1.
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and development path of their parties94. This has resulted in closer interaction between 
the World Bank and the MEAs, which brought out a new relationship between the World 
Bank and their developing country members after the late 1980s and throughout the 
1990s, which we now examine.
2.2.2 New developments in the 1990s
The World Bank had an Office o f Environmental and Science Affairs from as 
early as the 1970s95. However, environmental consideration was not incorporated in the 
operations o f the Bank loans. For example, the Bank, “recognising the urgent need of 
developing countries to develop their indigenous sources o f energy”, was, in 1980, 
expanding its lending for coal and had established a lending programme in support o f 
petroleum development (Broches, 1980) both of which had a potentially negative effect 
on climate change. It was not until the mid 1980s, when external criticisms from 
environmental NGOs and major donors, in particular the US Congress96, had been 
mounting to such an extent, that serious reforms were undertaken within the World Bank. 
The Environmental Department was established in 1987 and various decisions were 
adopted regarding environmental aspects of the Bank’s lending operations in the late 
1980s and early 1990s97.
94 For example, the Preamble of the FCCC states that: “... responses to climate change should be 
coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated manner . . .” (emphasis added.)
95 For this early environmental organisational reform within the World Bank, see: Le Prestre, 1989.
96 Literature abound regarding the discussion o f how these external pressures have helped to brought out 
reform in the World Bank. See, for example, Bowles and Kormos, 1995; Le Prestre, 1989, chapter 3; 
Mikesell and Williams, 1992, chapter 9; and, Rich, 1985 and 1994.
97 For example, an Operational Manual Statement on the “environmental aspects o f Bank work” was 
introduced in May 1984 (OMS 2.36); and an Operational Directive on the environmental assessment was 
adopted in October 1989 (OD 4.00). However, most o f the major Operational Directives relevant to the 
environment only came in early 1990: such OD 4.01 (Environment Assessment) in October 1991, OD 4.02 
(National Environmental Action Plans) in July 1992, and OD4.30 (Involuntary Resettlement) in June 
1990. For more discussion, see: Shihata, 1994a and 1994b, Annex I, and 1995, chapter 17.
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One of the earliest decisions, Operational Manual Statement (OMS) 2.36 on the 
Environmental Aspects of Bank Work, adopted in May 1984, specifically states that: 
the Bank will not finance projects that contravene any international environmental 
agreement to which the member country concerned is a party.” (OMS 2.36, para. 9[e].) 
The statement was reiterated in the Bank’s Operational Policy (OP) on Forest adopted in 
September 1993, which confirms that: “the Bank does not finance projects that 
contravene applicable international environmental agreements.” (OP 4.36, para. 298.) No 
similar internal policy statement is found in the Bank in relation to other international 
public policy considerations such as human rights. Gradually, the Bank, from this 
passive obligation" of not financing certain types of projects, began to adopt a more 
active role in participating major MEAs, such as in the ozone regime. For example, at the 
end o f 1980s, the Bank participated in the discussions leading to the establishment of the 
Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol (Shihata, 1992).
The issues of financing mechanisms for the environment was raised during the 
1989 Development Committee of the Boards of Governors of the IMF and o f the World 
Bank. At this meeting, the Bank was requested to prepare a report assessing the 
requirements for additional funding associated with its increased attention to 
environmental issues and to prepare recommendations of possible mechanisms for 
managing such resources.
As previously indicated in the preceding section, the Bank has borrowed the legal 
concept o f “trust funds” in its operations to take up new mandates without the need to
98 The legal implications of these internal guidelines o f the Bank on the interaction between the FCCC, an 
MEA, and the Bank will be subject to detail discussion in Chapter 5.2.2.
99 The term “obligation” here is not in the sense of a strict “legal” obligation. In practice, there is no way to 
find out whether this “obligation” has been complied with by the Bank since there are no criteria to be 
used against which to judge the Bank’s operations. The establishment o f an Inspection Panel might
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amend its Articles of Agreement. The Bank has been hosting more than 1,500 trust funds 
established by agreements between donors and the Bank (Shihata, 1994b), many for 
environmental purposes, where resources were mobilised from the donors.
The Bank has acted as trustee and implementing agency to administer their use 
(Shihata, 1995, chapter 17; Sand, 1995). As the demand for more resources for 
environmental purposes increased, the management of the Bank turned to the practice of 
hosting trust funds as a response. Among these trust funds, the most publicised was 
probably the GEF Trust Fund100 established for the purpose of assisting its developing 
members to implement MEAs, the FCCC being one o f which. According to its policy 
statement, the Bank is to identify and to address difficulties that prevent its developing 
members from participating in or properly implementing MEAs such as the FCCC 
(World Bank, 1997a). In addition to channelling financial resources to developing 
countries, the Bank also assists countries in complying with MEAs through its policy 
dialogue as well as in the design of economic and sector strategies and investment 
projects and programmes (World Bank, 1996a).
All these developments have brought about closer link between the World Bank 
and the MEAs. This closer relationship is reinforced by the tendency o f the more recent 
MEAs that seek to regulate economic activities of the parties, over which the BWIs 
traditionally have competence, which is vividly illustrated in the case o f climate change. 
It is set down in the FCCC that its parties are to: “cooperate to promote a supportive and 
open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and 
development in all parties . . .” (FCCC, Article 3.5.) All parties to the FCCC shall “take
encourage the Bank to respect such “obligation.” Nevertheless, the decisions o f the Panel are advisory in 
nature and the final decisions lie in the Executive Board. For more discussion, see Chapter 5.2.2.
100 For more discussion on GEF, the GEF Tmst Fund and the implications of the Bank serving as Tmstee 
of the Tmst Fund, see Chapter 4.1 and 4.2.
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climate change considerations into account ... in their relevant social, economic and 
environmental policies and actions” (FCCC Article 4.1[f]) (emphasis added). With the 
unfolding of these developments, the Bank has grown from its role in project finance to, 
as one commentator puts it, “adjudicator and financier o f domestic compliance with 
international environmental norms.” (Nelson, PJ, 1996, p.633.) Whether this shift has 
genuinely taken place is doubtful since the traditional role o f the World Bank in 
development projects and programmes finance continues to take up a large part o f the 
Bank’s portfolio. However, this new role has implications on the traditional operations of 
the Bank and the relationship between the Bank and its developing country members, 
which will be examined throughout the following chapters.
In May 1987, the World Bank President, at the time, Barber Conable stated that 
the Bank would address environmental aspects o f development projects (Joannides, 
1989). Since that time, the Bank has gone beyond addressing the environmental aspect of 
its traditional development projects and has established various mechanisms for the 
purpose of assisting its developing members to implement MEAs. This development has 
taken the relationship between the World Bank and their developing country members 
into a new dimension. The new relationship shows that the World Bank somehow needs 
to come to terms with the concept of sustainable development and recognises the need of 
its developing country members whose lack o f resources have hampered their abilities to 
implement obligations under the MEAs to which they are parties. This new relationship 
also seeks to address some of the discontent o f the developing countries as the new 
mechanisms have adopted novel governance structures'01. Whether these new 
mechanisms have any impact on the relationship between the World Bank and its
101 For more discussion on the governance structure of these new mechanisms, see Chapter 4.1 and 4.2.
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developing countries and enable the Bank to assist the implementation o f the FCCC will 
be investigated in the succeeding chapters.
In this chapter, we recalled the flexibility of the BWIs at adapting themselves to 
changing external socio-economic environment and internal demand from member states. 
We have also examined the governance structure and the operations of the BWIs, which 
have been perceived by developing countries as asymmetrical in the context o f heavier 
obligations for developing country members as well as the ways in which these 
obligations are drawn up and imposed through the existing mechanisms o f the BWIs. 
After the emergence o f sustainable development, overlap between the MEAs such as the 
FCCC and the operations of the BWIs has increased in areas o f competence. The World 
Bank has established innovative mechanisms as a response and has assumed a new role 
in assisting the implementation of the MEAs in the developing countries. The BWIs 
employ both the existing and the innovative mechanisms to influence the developing 
countries, and legal and quasi-legal instruments are used in these mechanisms to enable 
the BWIs to play their roles more effectively. The next chapter will first examine the 
operations and effectiveness of the existing mechanism, the SAPs, o f the BWIs and the 
implications o f the relationship with the developing countries on these matters.
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CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM M ES
This chapter will focus on the existing mechanism, the structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs), that the BWIs employ to influence policy changes in developing 
countries. The SAP, with the application of its legal and quasi-legal instruments, has 
been an important part of the BWIs’ operations in developing countries since the early 
1980s. After a brief introduction on the concept of structural adjustment, this chapter will 
examine the operational and legal aspects o f the structural adjustment lending, including 
its leverage over member states of the BWIs. Programme and policy-based lending and 
the application of conditionality are arguably the most powerful legal and quasi-legal 
instruments associated with the SAPs employed by the BWIs to influence policy changes 
in the developing countries and will be analysed respectively in more detail. However, 
these instruments have been subject to controversial debate and their effectiveness in 
influencing developing countries attracts no less attention. By drawing on the existing 
literature from the BWIs and other academic institutions evaluating the operations o f the 
SAPs, this chapter will attempt to infer what makes the SAPs more effective at producing 
policy changes (an outcome) than achieving the desirable results (an impact) envisaged 
by the programmes. This chapter will conclude by looking at the implications the 
operations o f the SAPs have on the relationship between the BWIs and their developing 
country members.
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3.1 Structural adjustment: stabilisation and growth
Structural adjustment refers to a shift o f the economic policies o f a country in 
order to ameliorate specific economic difficulties, such as balance o f payments 
problems1. It is defined by the World Bank as “reforms of policies and institutions 
covering microeconomic, macroeconomic and institutional interventions; these changes 
are designed to improve resource allocation, increase economic efficiency, expand 
growth potential, and increase resilience to shocks.” (World Bank, 1990.)
The roots of the concept of structural adjustment are the global economic events 
o f the 1970s (Reed, 1992). The sharp increase in petroleum prices in the 1970s brought 
huge export earnings for oil-exporting countries, most of which had deposited large sums 
of so-called “petrodollars” in private commercial banks. The sudden influx o f cash 
compelled the private commercial banks to recycle “petrodollars”, which made external 
borrowing from private sources relatively easy and attractive2 for developing countries in 
the 1970s. When the export earnings of most of the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries began to deteriorate because of the falling prices of primary commodities other 
than oil, commercial loans started to dry up (Kolko, 1988) and debt-servicing became 
more and more difficult to maintain. Under these circumstances, the debt crisis o f the 
1980s began when Mexico first announced, in 1982, that it would cease to pay its debt3.
1 The process of adjustment actually involves two types o f policy response. The first is “stabilisation”, 
which refers to the reductions o f expenditures in order to bring about an orderly adjustment o f domestic 
demand to the reduced level of external resources (the so-called “demand-side” management). The second 
is structural adjustment, which refers to changes in relative prices in order to make the economy more 
efficient and better able to use resources and thereby to engineer sustainable long-term growth (the so-, 
called “supply-side” management) (World Bank, 1988a). However, since the discussion here is not 
economic-oriented, these two types o f polices involved will be termed “structural adjustment” as a whole.
2 Most of the financial resources from the IMF and the World Bank have a string o f “conditions” attached 
to them. Compared with this conditionality requirement, borrowing from the commercial banks appeared 
to be more favourable than from the official sources.
3 Of course, several other factors attributed to the debt crisis in the 1980s, the detail o f which will not be 
discussed here because they are not directly relevant to the thesis. For more discussion, see, for example, 
James, 1996.
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The debt crisis of the developing countries in the 1980s exposed the structural weakness 
o f the macroeconomic polices practised by these governments4, which could have had 
been reviewed and corrected earlier if  the external financing from the private commercial 
banks had been more difficult5.
The efficient economy6 as developed by neo-classical economics is commonly 
referred to in most of the development literature as the theoretical model towards which a 
country should be adjusting. As mentioned earlier, structural adjustment refers to a 
change of economic policies of a nation, in particular macroeconomic policies. It is 
contemplated that developing countries, through structural adjustment policies, can 
stabilise their macroeconomies and repay their external debts in the short run and, 
eventually, achieve economic growth and development (Zarsky, 1994). Several 
macroeconomic policy instruments, mainly monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, trade and 
external debt policies (Davis, 1992), are used by most governments to achieve these 
objectives.
Adjustment measures can be implemented either on a government’s own 
initiative or through structural adjustment lending from official financial institutions, 
such as the IMF and the World Bank. With a few exceptions7, most developing countries, 
in particular those burdened with external debt, implement the necessary adjustment
4 The need for adjustment stems from the unsustainability o f a country’s balance o f payments, which 
might arise from external or internal sources (Please, 1987). The debt crisis is only one o f the many factors 
affecting a country’s balance o f payments position.
5 In other words, most o f the countries confronting a debt problem failed to adopt the required adjustment 
measures when they were incurring their debts in the 1970s (Please, 1987).
6 An efficient economy, according to Daly, involves three main policies: adjustment o f prices to make 
them better measures of full social marginal opportunity costs, adjustment o f macroeconomic conditions to 
achieve monetary stability, and, adjustment of national markets and prices to world markets and prices 
(Daly, 1992).
7 For example, the success of the four East Asian countries are achieved mainly through the unilateral 
adoption o f most of the policy instruments deemed characteristic to the process of structural adjustment 
without the structural adjustment lending from official financial institutions. Taiwan, in particular, is an 
illustrative case in point since it is a member to neither the IMF nor the World Bank after 1980.
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measures accompanied by structural adjustment lending from the IMF and the World 
Bank. One of the reasons was that, when the commercial loans from private banks were 
no longer available in early 1980s, the indebted governments had only the IMF and the 
World Bank to turn to for financial assistance, which were normally attached with 
adjustment measures. The following section will discuss the structural adjustment 
lending of the BWIs.
3.2 SAPs in the BWIs: operational and legal aspects
The concept of structural adjustment and structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) supported by the adjustment lending from the BWIs are different, but related, 
subject matters. Structural adjustment refers to the process of restructuring and 
reformulating a country’s economic, mostly macroeconomic, situation. A SAP, on the 
other hand, is a set o f policy reforms with certain objectives to be achieved within a 
limited period of time and usually refers to the type of programme accompanied by 
adjustment lending from the IMF and/or the World Bank. The borrowing government, 
upon the agreement of such adjustment loan, negotiates and concludes a SAP with the 
IMF and/or the World Bank, and implements various policies prescribed in the SAP. In 
order to focus on specific policy reforms aimed at structural adjustment, rather than on 
the theoretical discussion of the process of structural adjustment, this section and the 
present study concentrates on the SAP
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3.2.1 Leverage over the member states
Structural adjustment lending was not introduced in either the IMF or the World 
Bank until the 1980s8. However, the increasing importance of this type o f lending has 
been attested both by the amount of financial sources provided and by the number of 
countries involved. For example, in the World Bank group, Structural Adjustment Loans 
(SALs) and Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECALs), as a share o f total Bank lending, 
expanded to an average of 26% in 1989-95 (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995). The loan 
commitment of SALs and SECALs amounted to 39% of all the World Bank’s 
commitments in FY 1998, despite some emergency assistance provided to East and 
South-east Asian countries (World Bank, 1998a). In the case o f the IMF, cumulative 
commitments under all Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF)9 and Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) arrangements approved since 1986 totalled SDR 9.9bn, and 
the cumulative SAF and ESAF disbursements amounted to SDR 8.1bn as o f 30 April 
1998. The IMF approved eight new ESAFs arrangements in 1997-98 totalling SDR 
1.7bn. In 1997-98, the percentage of the SAFs/ESAFs commitments (less than 10%) and 
disbursements (less than 5%) in total resources provided by the IMF seems insignificant. 
Nevertheless, this was due to the unusually large amount of emergence assistance 
provided by the IMF to Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. In fact, if  the amount of 
resources provided to these three countries was deducted from the total amount o f 
resources provided by the IMF, the percentage of ESAF commitments rises to 16% and
8 The first SAL of the World Bank was approved in 1980; the SAF and the ESAF o f the IMF were 
established in March 1986 and December 1987 respectively.
9 SAF has been phased out in 1993. IMF Decision No. 10531 -(93/70) SAF, 15 December 1993: “... from 
the date this decision becomes effective [the Fund] will no longer approve commitments to provide 
assistance from the SAF in conjunction with loans from the ESAF Trust.” The last annual SAF 
Arrangement expired in December 1996.
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the percentage of the SAF/ESAF disbursements jumps to 50% in total resources provided 
by the IMF (IMF, 1998a).
Not only has the structural adjustment lending become more important in the 
BWIs, it has also increased the leverage the BWIs have over their member states because 
of the following considerations. Firstly, after the two oil crises in the 1970s and the 
collapse of international commodity market in the 1980s, most of the developing 
countries, especially the low income countries encountering balance o f payments 
problems and/or huge debt-servicing obligations were virtually cut off from the 
commercial loans by 1982 (Ghai, 1991). These events have put these developing 
countries in a situation where official loans from the IMF and the World Bank were the 
only alternatives left. Secondly, it is often argued that further loans from other sources 
are usually conditioned upon reaching an agreement with the IMF first10 (George, 1988). 
This “seal o f approval” from the IMF indicates the importance of, in the eyes o f the 
international commercial community, the policy advice given by the IMF and its 
purported effect on the macroeconomic situation of debtor countries11. Thirdly, the IMF 
and the World Bank are able to gain access to the policy-making process, in particular 
economic policies, o f the borrowing government through the negotiation o f structural 
adjustment lending and the preparation of Policy Framework Papers (PFPs)12,13. The IMF 
and the World Bank, through their influences over policymakers in the borrowing
10 However, the catalytic effect o f the Fund in channelling the private lending has not been universally 
agreed upon. For example, Bird concluded in his empirical research that other factors, in addition to the 
IMF involvement, are at play in determining private lending (Bird, 1995).
11 For example, a developing country is required to obtain a stand-by arrangement with the IMF before it is 
qualified for a debt rescheduling agreement under the Paris Club. For more discussion, see: Edward, 1984 
-85.
12 The operations and implications o f the Policy Framework Papers will be discussed in more detail in the 
succeeding section.
13 Some commentators even went further in commentating that, the recipients of the World Bank’s SAL 
had to “relinquish important parts o f national sovereignty” in exchange for this huge and quick disbursing 
type o f lending (Rich, 1994).
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countries, also tried to generate profound changes in development policy and economic 
structure of the borrowing country (Reed, 1992). Fourthly, the ability to apply 
conditionality14 is another important tool for the BWIs to enjoy greater leverage over 
their developing country members. This tool is applied, for example, through the ways 
that a structural adjustment loan is disbursed. Adjustment lending, rather than a lump 
sum disbursement, is disbursed in several tranches. The release o f each tranche of 
adjustment lending is contingent on fulfilment of the pre-agreed conditions. As a result, 
the borrowing government needs to show that efforts have been made in implementing 
the adjustment policies negotiated with the IMF and/or the World Bank in a timely 
manner if it is to receive the subsequent disbursement o f the loan. It is, hence, fair to 
argue that the IMF and the World Bank can have immense leverage over the borrowing 
governments through the application of conditionality and that their respective 
management has used conditionality to advance the model o f “development” perceived 
by the institutions as ideal.
3.2.2 Operational aspects
When structural balance of payments deficits15 resulting largely from the increase 
of oil price and the decline of export earning occurred in the mid and late 1970s, 
countries usually negotiated with the IMF for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF)16 first 
because the IMF was the principal international financial institution responsible to
14 More discussion on conditionality will follow in the succeeding section.
15 Structural balance o f payments deficits refer to deficits that are not amenable to short-term financial 
measures (Mikesell and Williams, 1992).
16 The Extended Fund Facility was launched in 1975 in order to provide medium- to long-term assistance 
to developing countries. It was established to overcome structural balance of payments maladjustment with 
which the traditional one-year stand-by arrangement was inadequate to deal (Killick, 1995a; James, 1996).
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correct its member’s balance of payments position17. By the 1980s, faced with the debt 
crisis, and focusing particularly on the arrears problems of the heavily indebted poorest 
developing countries, the IMF recognised that the needed adjustments were o f a more 
fundamental kind than it had confronted previously (Bretton Woods Commission, 1994). 
Thus, SAF was set up in March 1986 to provide highly concessional loans to low income 
developing countries facing protracted balance of payments problems; and the ESAF was 
set up in December 1987 to support especially vigorous adjustment programmes with a 
larger scale of resources and a longer repayment schedule (Schadler et al, 1993).
Meanwhile, in the late 1970s the World Bank realised that acceptable rate of 
development was constrained by a large balance of payments deficit and the 
effectiveness of its ongoing project lending was threatened by the deteriorating 
macroeconomic environment. It decided that, in order to fulfil its responsibilities, it had 
little choice but to provide its own resources to support programmes o f structural 
adjustment (Reed, 1992; Williamson, 1982). As a result, SAL18 was set up in 1979 to 
stabilise a country’s macroeconomic situation and to increase overall economic 
efficiency; and SECAL was set up in 1980 to expand the focus of adjustment from 
macroeconomic reforms to sectoral reforms (Reed, 1992). With the introduction o f SAL
17 Article I o f the Articles o f Agreement of IMF states: “The purposes of the International Monetary Fund 
are [(vi)] to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances o f  
payments o f members.”
18 SAL is defined by the World Bank as: “non-project lending to support programs o f policy and 
institutional change necessary to modify the structure of an economy so that it can maintain both its 
growth rate and the viability of its balance of payments in the medium term.” (Jayarajah and Branson, 
1995.)
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and SECAL, the World Bank extended its main function of project lending19 into the area 
o f programme lending20.
With the introduction of respective adjustment lending in both institutions, the 
operations of the IMF and of the World Bank have become overlapped in certain aspect 
relating to structural adjustment. The IMF and the Bank had some early collaboration in 
the 1960s. However, the 1976 EFF introduced by the IMF and the 1979 SAL established 
by the Bank have moved these two organisations even closer (Gold, 1981-82)21. A SAP 
can be drawn up individually by the IMF or by the Bank. It goes without saying that 
different characteristics can be identified in the respective SAPs. For example, exchange 
and monetary policies are common elements in the IMF’s SAPs, while budget and 
pricing policies are more often dealt with by the Bank’s SAPs. However, with the 
increasing overlap in their respective operations and a closer collaboration between them, 
striking similarities can be found in the SAPs designed by the IMF or the Bank. For 
example, the following policy elements can be found in the majority o f the SAPs 
designed by both: trade policy, sectoral policies, public sector enterprises, and policies 
relating to debt management (Feinberg, 1988, Table 1). A SAP might even be a joint 
product o f the IMF and the Bank in some instances22.
19 Article III Section 4 of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD lays down the conditions on which the 
Bank may guarantee or make loans. Section 4, paragraph (vii) states: “Loans made or guaranteed by the 
Bank shall, except in special circumstances, be for the purpose of specific projects o f reconstruction or 
development.”
20 As a matter o f fact, the Bank had engaged in programme lending briefly in the 1960s and early 1970s 
(Mason and Asher, 1973). However, it is argued that there are some differences between the previous type 
of programme lending and the SAL (Williamson, 1982).
21 Literature abounds with regard to the relationship between the Bank and the Fund. See, for example, 
Gold, 1981-82; Feinberg, 1988. It has been widely perceived that the introduction o f adjustment lending in 
the two organisations is the main driving force behind an ever closer relationship between the Fund and 
the Bank. However, since the present thesis does not look at the respective role of the Fund and the Bank, 
this section will only focus on the overlapping function in the operation of adjustment lending and SAPs, 
rather than on the wider implication on the relationship between the Fund and the Bank.
22 For example, when cross-conditionality is applied. For more discussion on conditionality, see Chapter 
3.4.
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The process of applying for a SAL from the Bank begins with the submission of a 
“Letter of Development Policies” by the member country, meaning that the borrowing 
government has to initiate the procedure for the loan23. This Letter, which is similar to a 
Letter o f Intent in the case of the IMF’s stand-by arrangement, describes the specific 
economic development programmes and policies the borrowing country will pursue, and 
is explicitly referred to in the loan agreement24. This Letter of Development Policies, 
requesting a SAL, has to be scrutinised by the Bank and given a response by the 
Executive Directors. The approval o f the request and the granting o f a loan take the form 
of a loan agreement. This loan agreement with the borrowing member is an international 
agreement, a “treaty” in the broad sense, governed by international law and is registered 
with the UN as such (Broches, 1959).
The application of an SAF/ESAF25 from the IMF begins with the submission o f a 
“Memorandum of Economic Policies” (MoEP), which is similar to a Letter o f Intent, by 
the borrowing government. The government needs to outline the medium-term 
macroeconomic and structural adjustment programme and policies to be followed to 
achieve the objectives o f the programme. In the case o f ESAF, the borrowing 
government needs to prepare, in consultation with the staffs of the Bank and the IMF, a 
Policy Framework Paper (PFP), before it submits its MoEP. The policies and measures 
contained in the MoEP are usually similar to those prescribed in the PFP. The IM F’s
23 Paragraph 12 of Bank’s OP 7.01 of July 1994 on Contractual Agreement describes the Letter of 
Development or Sectoral Policy as setting out “the most salient elements o f the proposed adjustment 
programme and the borrower’s commitment to carry out the programme”.
24 The fact that this Letter o f Development Policies is referred to in loan agreement has its legal 
implication (Kremmydas, 1989), as shall be discussed later.
25 The application procedures and the required documents for a SAF are slightly different from those for an 
ESAF because of different operational procedures. For example, resources committed under the SAF and 
ESAF are both made available in the form of loans under three annual arrangements approved by the 
Fund. However, in the case of the SAF, one disbursement is made for each annual arrangement while in 
the case o f the ESAF, disbursement is divided into two instalments under each annual arrangement. 
Nevertheless, the operations prescribed here are applicable to both.
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Board of Executive Directors will then review and discuss the MoEP submitted by the 
government before it makes its decision on whether to grant an SAF/ESAF arrangement 
to the member. In contrast to the practice of stand-by arrangements, there is a SAF or 
ESAF loan agreement between the Fund and the borrowing government. Nevertheless, 
this form of loan agreement resembles a stand-by arrangement in various ways, in 
particular with regard to the legal consequences of failure to observe performance criteria 
or a member’s other departures from its programme26.
The PFP is another important operational aspect of a SAP. The IMF requires that 
member applying for an ESAF prepares a PFP describing the member’s medium-term 
objectives and the main outlines of the policies to be followed in pursuing these 
objectives. Although the scheme was not initiated until the introduction o f the ESAF in 
1987, the PFP has become an essential instrument in the SAP and, in particular, an 
important device for ensuring effective co-ordination and consistency between the policy 
advice given by the IMF and by the World Bank (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995). The PFP 
is drawn up in a collaborative effort by the borrowing government, the IMF and the 
World Bank, sets out the medium-term macroeconomic and microeconomic objectives, 
and identifies policies and measures for achieving these objectives. The IMF staff are 
responsible for the macroeconomic projections and policy design, while the World Bank 
staff provide complementary support for sector and sub-sector policies (Jayarajah and 
Branson, 1995). The PFPs are discussed but not voted upon by a committee o f the 
Bank’s Board o f Executive Directors, whose comments are then “taken into account”
26 According to Gold, question has never been raised regarding whether failure to observe performance 
criteria or other departures from a programme supported by the IMF under the SAF or the ESAF could be 
regarded legally as breaches of contract. In practice, though, it is suggested that, if  such questions were 
raised, the IMF would come to a conclusion that such events, lie:, failure to observe performance criteria or 
other departures from a programme supported under the SAF or the ESAF, might not be considered as 
breaches o f contract. (Gold, 1996)
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when the IM F’s Board of Executive Directors is presented with the paper (Feinberg,
1988)27. The PFPs serve some meaningful functions such as reducing the risk of 
conflicting advice from the Bank and the IMF, and streamlining the negotiation process 
between the borrowing government and the BWIs. However, a potential problem is that 
it may reduce a country’s policy-making options (Bradlow and Crossman, 1995). This, in 
turn, helps to give the BWIs an even greater tool to influence the borrowing governments 
by limiting the policy options available to them once they decided to make use of 
adjustment lending.
As we can see, a SAP associated with either the SAL/SECAL from the Bank or 
SAF/ESAF from the IMF contains economic policy suggestions for the borrowing 
government. There are various instruments, legal or quasi-legal associated with a SAP 
Whether the borrowing government is required28, legally or in practice, to carry out the 
specific economic policies in a SAP depends on the legal characteristics of these various 
instruments, to which policy recommendations are attached. The following section will 
examine the legal characteristics of these instruments.
3.2.3 Legal aspects (legal and quasi-legal instruments applied)
Various documents are prepared either by the borrowing government or by the 
BWIs’ staff in negotiating a structural adjustment lending from either the Bank or the 
IMF. Table 3-1 puts together all the relevant instruments in a descending order in terms
27 According to the Bank’s BP 2.20 of January 1997 on PFP, “PFPs are circulated to the Board for 
information only” and the IMF Board discusses the PFPs a week later after the Bank Board has its 
discussion (BP 2.20, para. 9).
28 The legal character of the specific economics policies in a SAP will determine the legal consequences o f  
the borrowing government when it fails to observe these policies. This, in turn, can have implications to 
the effectiveness of the SAP at influencing the borrowing developing countries. More discussion on the 
effectiveness of the SAPs and relevant issues will follow.
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of the legal effect of these instruments, followed by more discussion on the legal 
characteristics of these instrument.
Table 3-1: Structural adjustment instruments (SA instruments)
Legal effect Instruments used in structural adjustment lending
Legally binding international 
agreement
Loan agreement between the World Bank and the borrowing 
government on a SAL/SECAL.
Letter of Development Policies submitted by the borrowing 
government in applying for a World Bank SAL/SECAL.
Non-binding, but usually 
carry practical implications 
in the case of failure to 
comply29
Memorandum of Economic Policies submitted by the 
borrowing government in applying for an IMF SAF/ESAF, in 
particular for an ESAF30.
Policy Framework Paper prepared by the borrowing 
government, in consultation with the staff of the World Bank 
and the IMF, prior to the application of an IMF ESAF31.
Non-legal, indirect influence Debt rescheduling under the Paris Club in certain cases will 
only be undertaken on the basis of an IMF SAF arrangement 
between the debtor country and the IMF (IMF, June 1997, p. 
345).
The “seal of approval” effect32 of an IMF arrangement in 
influencing a government’s credit ranking internationally 
(applicable to all the IMF arrangements, including the stand­
by and other facilities).
The loan agreement between the Bank and the borrowing government for either a 
SAL or a SECAL is regarded as a binding international treaty (Head, 1996). In the case 
of the Letter of Development Polices, the described measures in this document are 
heavily negotiated between the Bank and the borrowing government in the majority of
29 For example, failure to comply might interrupt the disbursement of the subsequent tranche o f money.
30 The disbursement o f an annual ESAF is divided into two tranches. The disbursement o f the second 
tranche will depend on whether the performance criteria prescribed in the MoEP have been observed.
31 The measures and policies prescribed in the PFP are usually incorporated later in the MoEP submitted 
for requesting an ESAF.
32 The “seal o f approval” effect refers to the practice in which other external financing to a country is 
dependent upon reaching a prior agreement with the IMF.
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the cases, even though the Letter is later submitted by the borrowing government as its 
unilateral intent to implement these measures. Some commentators have argued that “the 
Letter of Development Policies constitutes a unilateral declaration o f intent with a 
binding or quasi-binding character” on the ground that, by submitting a request for a 
SAL, the government indicates an intention to be bound since the request leads to the 
approval of the loan agreement regarded as a contractual agreement (Kremmydas,
1989)33. In the Bank’s OP 7.01 on Contractual Agreement, the Letter o f Development 
Policies and the borrower’s commitments “are incorporated by reference in the Loan 
Agreement, which also includes an event of suspension that allows the Bank to suspend 
disbursements if  a situation arises that makes it ‘improbably that the Programme [ie the 
contents o f the Letter], or a significant part thereof, will be carried out’.” (OP 7.01, para. 
12.) This means that the Letter of Development Policies, and the economic measures and 
policies presented in it, are part and parcel of the Loan Agreement, which is itself a 
binding international legal agreement on both the World Bank and the borrowing 
government. As a result, the Letter and the economic policies prescribed in it, have a 
binding effect on the borrowing government.
In the case o f the IMF’s SAF/ESAF34, the MoEP is, as in the case o f the Letter of 
Intent, considered to be the document of the government35. According to Sir Joseph Gold,
33 Under this line of reasoning, the Letter o f Development Policies is to be regarded as an offer, while the 
approval by the Executive Directors o f the Bank constitutes an acceptance. However, an offer does not 
automatically become binding before an actual contract is concluded. For example, the offer, ie the Letter 
of Development Policies, can be rejected by the offeree (the Bank’s Executive Directors), or it might 
receive a counter-offer, ie some amendments proposed by the Executive Directors. Under all these 
circumstances, a contract, ie the SAL agreement, breaks down. As a result, it seems futile to argue the 
legality of the Letter o f Development Policies on the ground o f this unilateral intention since it might lead 
to nowhere when the negotiation breaks down.
34 Most of the information regarding the operational and legal aspects o f the Fund’s SAF/ESAF has been 
obtained through interview with a staff member from the legal department of the IMF.
35 The operations of the SAF/ESAF have lots of similarities with those o f a stand-by arrangement. The 
only distinctive difference is that currency swap is not practised in the case of an SAF/ESAF since
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that Letter is not regarded as having binding effect (Gold, 1970). By the same token, the 
MoEP is not considered as a binding document on the borrowing government. As a 
result, polices and measures prescribed in the MoEP do not seem to bind the borrowing 
government. However, non-observance with the performance criteria36 set down in the 
Letter of Intent can result in the delay or cancellation of the disbursement o f the 
subsequent tranche37. Since the resources committed under a SAF or an ESAF take the 
form of three annual arrangements, non-observance of conditions sets down in the MoEP 
will delay or affect the IMF’s decision on the second or third annual arrangement. 
Consequently, although the government is not bound in a strictly legal sense to follow 
the policies and measures set down in the MoEP, in practice, however, these policies and 
measures carry certain weight in the sense that failure to comply can interrupt the 
disbursement of the subsequent tranche.
As for the legal character of another important instrument, the PFP, it is the 
document of the borrowing government and does not have the same legal effect as, for 
example, a SAL agreement between the Bank and the borrowing government. A PFP is a 
statement by the borrowing government which sets out “its medium-term objectives, 
policies, strategies, and plans on economic development adjustment, and the related 
financing requirements for the next three years” (BP 2.20 of January 1997 on PFP, para. 
1). It is a unilateral declaration on the part of the borrowing government, even though it 
has been discussed and negotiated extensively with IMF and Bank staff. It does not have
resources committed under the SAF/ESAF take the form of a loan that is disbursed and repaid in a freely, 
usable currency or US dollars.
36 Performance criteria are “certain policies, targets, or intentions which a member states that it will 
observe and on the observance of which the member’s right to purchase has been made to depend” (Gold, 
1970, p. 140). Performance criteria are usually, but not restricted to, quantitative conditions such as the 
exchange rate or interests rate.
37 Nevertheless, in the IMF’s practice o f its stand-by arrangement, a new agreement is generally hammered 
out and IMF assistance continues when performance criteria and ratios cannot be met. The practice of
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the same legal character as that of a World Bank loan in the sense that failure to comply 
with the latter will entail legal consequences. As a result, failure to reach a specific 
objective or policy prescribed in a PFP does not necessarily have immediate legal 
consequence such as the suspension of the ESAF arrangement. However, to the extent 
that the PFP is a prerequisite of applying for an ESAF arrangement, the policies set out 
in the MoEP are usually those prescribed in the PFP, and it involves all parties, ie the 
borrowing government, the IMF and the Bank, in the process of drafting, it evokes a 
sense o f responsibility on the part of the borrowing government to take into consideration 
any policies, strategies and plans prescribed in the PFP.
Another aspect not directly related to the legal characteristics o f various SA 
instruments, but no less important is the informal and indirect influence o f the BWIs on a 
country’s ability to attract other external financing38. The conclusion o f an agreement, 
usually with the IMF, can provide assurance for other lenders that the country concerned 
has “formulated a program that the IMF considers satisfactory enough to justify support 
with its resources” (Gold, 1982, p. 10)39. In addition, as pointed out previously, a debtor 
country is usually required to reach an arrangement with the IMF and/or the Bank if  a 
debt-rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club is to be agreed upon. With the indirect 
influence of the BWIs’ adjustment lending in mind, governments, in particular poor and 
indebted developing countries, are usually under great pressures to reach an arrangement
either waiving or revising performance criteria has indeed become a wide-spread feature o f Fund 
flexibility in its stand-by arrangement (Pirzio-Biroli, 1983).
38 This informal and indirect influence is not an exclusive feature of structural adjustment lending. It 
applies to the normal stand-by arrangement from the Fund.
39 This observation is made in the context of the stand-by arrangement o f the Fund. Nevertheless, 
considering the equally important implications of a SAF/ESAF arrangement on a country’s economic 
state, the same observation seems applicable in the context of structural adjustment operation as well.
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with the BWIs for such an arrangement may serve to generate more resources from other 
sources (Feinberg, 1988)40.
As the preceding discussion shows, the legal effect o f various instruments 
associated with structural adjustment lending differs. More salient legal character, such 
as a legally binding loan agreement, is usually associated with the Bank. Both the'IMF 
and the Bank have legal duties to protect the interests of the member states by way of 
properly safeguarding their assets, which, in turn, can make sure that every member will 
have a pool of resources to draw from whenever needed41. In determining the legal 
character o f any of their mechanisms, the BWIs, in addition to the consideration of 
properly safeguarding their resources, must also take into account the following factor. In 
cases such as adjustment lending and SAPs where a country’s economy is under scrutiny 
and its population will be affected, the BWIs need to be very sensitive in deciding 
whether a strictly binding legal document is desirable, in particular where policy advice 
will be given to the borrowing government. As a result, not all o f the SA instruments are 
legal documents with binding effect. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 2 on the history 
and operations of the BWIs, this pragmatic attitude toward the legal character o f various 
SA instruments illustrates once again the flexibility of the BWIs in their operations. 
Nevertheless, the flexibility in their structural adjustment-related operation does not 
diminish the leverage the BWIs can have over the developing countries. Through the
40 Literature abounds regarding this indirect influence o f the BWIs in attracting other external finance for 
the borrowing countries, in particular in the context o f the IMF stand-by arrangement. See, for example, 
Gold, 1980a and 1982; and, Edward, 1984-85. Although most the analysis focuses on the stand-by 
arrangement, similar influence can certainly be extended to other IMF assistance, such as the SAF/ESAF 
where an even larger-scale economic restructure takes place.
41 In the case of the IMF, one of the purposes of the IMF is “to give confidence to members by making the 
general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards” (IMF Articles of  
Agreement, Article I para. [v]). In the case o f the Bank, when making a loan to any member, for example, 
the Bank is under an obligation to secure a full guarantee of the repayment o f the principal and the 
payment o f interests and charges on the loan from the borrowing government (IBRD Articles of 
Agreement, Article III Section 4 [I].)
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negotiation and involvement of almost all SA instruments, the BWIs have gained 
considerable access to the decision-making process of the borrowing government. In fact, 
regardless of the legal characteristics o f these SA instruments42, the BWIs possess a 
considerable degree of influence on their developing country members through the 
application o f conditionality and programme and policy-based lending, which we will 
now turn to.
3.3 Program m e and policy-based lending
There is no universal definition on what a programme, or policy-based, lending 
is. Professor Mosley, et al, defined the term as follows: “Programme lending divorces 
development finance from specific items o f investment; it is given as general support for 
a deficit balance of payments to facilitate imports that should increase economic growth 
and, hopefully, development.” (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1996a, p. 27.) Another 
definition is given by Mason, et al: “ ... the only term that could pretend to encompass 
this variety [of all the loans and credits committed by the Bank and the IDA that have 
been called programme loans] is the negative one: ‘non-project’.” (Mason and Asher, 
1973, p. 290.) Table 3-2 highlights some of the differences between a project and a 
programme and/or policy-based lending.
42 Considering this degree of influence where developing countries’ interests are greatly at stake, the 
operations o f the BWIs in the process of negotiating, drafting and granting a loan should proceed in such a 
way that allows participation to the greatest possible extent from the borrowing developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the governance structure of the BWIs is not exactly designed to allow such participation. For 
example, in the Executive Board where the decision of loan is made, the five biggest donors hold more 
than one-third of votes among themselves and have the ability to veto decisions relating to a particular 
loan. More discussion on the implications o f the governance structure on the implementation o f SAPs by 
the borrowing developing countries will follow in Chapter 3.5.
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Table 3-2: Differences between project and programme and policy lending
Project lending Programme and policy lending
What the loan 
supports
Specific projects (eg 
dam, road).
General policy reform (eg correction of 
macroeconomic policies).
How the money is 
spent
Mostly specified in the 
loan.
Left at the discretion of the borrowing 
government.
The expected 
results of the loan
A  completed project that 
is fully operational.
A  change of economic environment 
conducive to growth
As Table 3-2 illustrates, the essence of a programme and policy-based loan is to 
seek a change of policies in the borrowing government. The “policy intent” is what 
distinguishes a programme lending from a project lending. A project loan does not 
concern the policy framework in which the project, or the borrowing government, 
operates. Programme and policy-based lending, on the other hand, encourages the 
borrower to conduct a thorough examination of its policy framework in which the 
government operates. The programme accompanying such policy-based lending then 
offers advice on the kind of transformation that will be required to change this policy 
framework.
As laid down in its Articles of Agreement, the IMF financing has always been of 
a policy-based nature for it does not finance any specific project or item of investment43. 
The World Bank, on the other hand, can only, in principle, make loans to its members 
“for the purposes o f specific projects of reconstruction or development” (IBRD Articles
43 One o f the purposes of the IMF, as laid down in Article I(v) o f the IMF Articles o f Agreement, is to 
“give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them 
under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to coirect maladjustments in their
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of Agreement, Article III, Section 4[vii]). Only in “special circumstances” can the Bank 
engage in non-project lending. Prior to the 1980s, the division of labour between the IMF 
and the World Bank was clear in terms of the type o f finance each was engaging in44. 
However, since the introduction of adjustment lending in both of the BWIs after the 
1980s45, both began to engage in this type of “non-project” lending. The purpose of 
programme lending is to improve the borrowing country’s balance of payments situation 
by supporting changes in such things as government spending, services, borrowing and 
subsidies (Head, 1991). To the extent that programme dollars are worth more to a 
borrowing country than project dollars46, programme loans can offer the possibility of 
increased leverage for the BWIs. In addition, the balance of payments support given in 
the programme loan directly affects the macroeconomic policy choices open to the 
borrowing country (Mason and Asher, 1973).
Recalling Table 3-1, most of the instruments applied in structural adjustment 
lending represent classic examples o f how the BWIs are able to gain access to the policy­
making process of the borrowing governments through their programme loans such as 
the Bank’s SAL/SECAL and the IMF’s SAF/ESAF. For example, the PFP, prepared by 
the borrowing government in consultation with the staffs of the Bank and the IMF, needs 
to set out the medium-term objectives and the outlines o f the policies to be followed in 
achieving these objectives. Since the purposes of an adjustment-type loan is restructuring 
and reformulating a country’s economic, mostly macroeconomic, situation, the process
balance o f  payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.” 
(emphasis added.)
44 The Bank has had some limited experiences with programme lending in the 1950s. For further 
discussion, see Mason and Asher, 1973, chapter 9.
45 For more discussion on the introduction of adjustment lending in both of the BWIs, see Chapter 3.1.2.
46 Since it is more difficult to dictate how the money should be spent in a policy-based loan, the borrower 
might find the dollars borrowed from a programme loan more desirable than from a project loan.
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of joint drafting the PFP gives the BWIs the opportunities to influence the borrowing 
country’s choice of economic and other development policies.
Policy-based lending has had its problems, however. From the perspective o f the 
borrowing countries, it is often difficult to agree to wide-ranging policy conditions as 
part o f a lending programme, even when the government may perceive many of these 
policies as beneficial. From the perspective o f the donor countries, they have been 
subjected to growing pressure to add new policy objectives that such lending must 
achieve whenever a new fad emerged (Singh, 1995). Nevertheless, these problems do not 
diminish the importance o f the policy-based structural adjustment lending o f the BWIs, 
to which many developing countries still turn to as a last resort in the attempt to solve 
their long-term, structural balance of payments difficulties. As a matter of fact, in 
combination with the special tranching policies of the BWIs’ adjustment lending47, 
programme and policy-based lending has served as a useful tool to increase the influence 
of the BWIs over the borrowing developing countries.
3.4 Conditionality
The application of conditionality is closely associated with programme and 
policy-based lending. When funding agencies and/or donors wish to promote policy 
reform, conditionality is their most coercive tool. Conditionality has been defined by 
some commentators as “the exchange of financial assistance for policy reform” (Fairman, 
and Ross, 1996). Both programme and policy-based lending and the application of 
conditionality seek a change o f behaviour in the borrowing governments and give 
leverage to the BWIs in influencing their developing country members.
47 The tranching policy and its implication will be discussed in the section on conditionality (Chapter 3.4).
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The issue of conditionality has generated most debates in the experiences o f the 
SAPs. Conditionality, in the context of the IMF operations, refers to “the principle ... 
that IMF resources are not automatically available to member countries, but instead are 
available only in cases where the member agrees to follow IMF-approved policies that 
are intended to help the member overcome balance-of-payments difficulties.” (Zamora, 
and Brand, 1990, p.391.48) The use of the IMF’s resources is temporary in nature and 
should be subjected to certain polices and programmes adopted by the IMF49. 
Conditionality refers to the pragmatic and flexible body of these policies and 
programmes and is used to govern the use of the IMF’s resources in a manner consistent 
with the Articles of Agreement (Guitian, 1981). Conditionality in the context o f the IMF 
is, hence, not limited to the operations of the SAF/ESAF50. The World Bank, on the other 
hand, employs conditionality as an important instrument to improve both the design and 
the effectiveness o f its adjustment programmes (Reed, 1992). The SALs and SECALs 
are usually disbursed in several tranches. The borrowing government needs to comply 
with certain pre-agreed policy targets in order to receive the subsequent tranche. The 
discussion of conditionality relating to the World Band lending is, therefore, most 
relevant to the implementation phase o f SAL/SECAL (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995).
Traditionally, IMF conditionality is distinguished from World Bank 
conditionality. The IMF draws up demand-side conditionality while the World Bank
48 The “Guidelines on Conditionality” was adopted by the IMF Executive Board (Decision No. 6056- 
[79/38]) on 2 March 1979.
49 Article V Section 3 prescribe the conditions governing the use o f the Fund’s general resources; and para, 
(a) states: “The Fund shall adopt policies on the use o f  its general resources ... in a manner consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use o f  
the general resources of the Fund.” (emphasis added.)
50 The IMF Board’s decision of the Guidelines on Conditionality provides guidelines in the use o f Fund’s 
general resources and stand-by arrangement. These guidelines are applicable in the operations of the ESAF 
because of the requirement that: “... the Fund in administering the [ESAF]Trust shall apply the same rules 
as apply to the operation of the General Resources Account o f the Fund.” (Section VII, para. l[b],
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focuses on supply-side conditionality51. However, it is difficult to distinguish between 
demand and supply measures. Similarly, there has been an increasing overlap between 
the roles o f the IMF and of the World Bank during the past two decades, in particular 
regarding the operations of the SAPs. Consequently, the line between this categorisation 
has blurred gradually. For example, it has been recognised within the IMF that the policy 
coverage of programmes should be broadened to include more supply-side measures 
(Killick, 1995a). Thus, instead of dwelling upon such categorisation, the discussion here 
will refer to all types o f conditionalities, be they designed by the IMF or the Bank52.
In addition, another type of conditionality known as “cross conditionality” refers 
to a situation in which an SAL will not be approved by the Bank unless an agreement 
with the IMF on adhering to IMF conditionality is reached53 (Mukheijee, 1994) or vice 
versa. This form of conditionality has attracted no less attention54. There are various 
definitions and forms of cross-conditionality. The type used between the Bank and the 
IMF themselves, referring to a situation where the approval o f the Bank’s SAL is 
conditioned upon the approval of an IMF arrangement, or vice versa, is probably the 
most controversial. The Bank and the IMF themselves claim to have avoided cross­
conditionality in the narrow, legalistic sense of exercising vetoes or requiring formal 
concurrence on each other’s loans (Feinberg, 1988). The IMF, for example, has a strict
Instrument to Establish the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust, Decision No. 10530-[93/170] 
ESAF, December 15, 1993.) (IMF, June 1997, p. 40.)
51 Demand-side policies seek to control total demand by using economic policies, primarily monetary and 
fiscal. Supply-side policies aim to achieve efficiency through economic policies and measures designed to 
stimulate production by relying heavily on the direct use of incentives (Shim, and Siegel, 1995).
52 For more discussion on the differences of the types and operations o f conditionality between the IMF 
and the Bank, see Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1996a, pp. 65-67.
53 It is not a legal requirement for a government to have a prior arrangement with the Fund before it can 
apply for a SAL to the Bank. However, this “cross conditionality” exists in certain SAPs since adhering to 
a Fund programme is often an indication for the Bank that this government has begun to implement certain 
necessary adjustment policies.
54 Literature abounds regarding the practice of the various form o f cross-conditionality in the BWIs. See, 
for example, Feinberg, 1988, pp. 552-56; Gold, 1982, pp. 16-17; and, Rremmydas, 1989.
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definition of cross-conditionality and has stressed that “Cooperation [with the Bank] is of 
the essence, but it will be conducted in a manner that will not give rise to cross 
conditionality. ” (emphasis added) (IMF, June 1997, p. 339.)55 However, as the IMF and 
the Bank have worked harder to define a joint package of policy advice and with the 
introduction of the ESAF within the IMF, cross-conditionality is transformed from an 
informal or indirect form to a more explicit linkage between the IMF stand-by and the 
Bank policy-based operations56 (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1996a). Under such 
circumstances, the borrowing government needs to negotiate with the IMF and Bank 
almost simultaneously for a set of policies satisfactory to both. This phenomenon serves 
to further increase the leverage of the BWIs over the borrowing developing country 
members.
In terms of the legal implication of conditionality, failure to comply with 
conditionality often bears the consequence of being unable to receive the release o f the 
subsequent tranche. In the case of the ESAF, failure to comply with conditions can result 
in the suspension of the disbursement of the second instalment in an annual 
arrangement57. In the case of World Bank SAL/SECAL, the typical loan is disbursed in 
two tranches, and disbursements depend on satisfactory compliance with some essential 
conditions and with the implementation of the programme in general (World Bank, 
1988a). In addition, albeit not a legal requirement, poor implementation o f conditionality
55 This remark was made at the Chairman’s summary of the discussion on special disbursement account at 
an Executive Board Meeting on 26 March 1986, and in the context o f PFP and the SAF.
56 For example, up until 1989, not one of the Bank’s SAL was agreed without an IMF stand-by 
arrangement already being in place (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1996a).
57 In the IMF’s “Instruments to Establish the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust”, it is stated 
specifically that: “Disbursements under each annual arrangement shall be made in two instalments, the 
first after approval of the corresponding arrangement, and the second after the conditions established 
under the arrangement fo r that disbursement have been m et” (emphasis added.) (IMF, June 1997, p. 30.)
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has often resulted in the country being unable to obtain another fresh loan until there has 
been a clear shift in attitude toward adjustment (Webb, and Shariff, 1992).
As illustrated, failure to comply with conditionality does have its legal 
consequences58 in either the IMF’s SAF/ESAF or the Bank’s SAL/SECAL, the most 
important one being the cancellation of the disbursement o f the subsequent tranche of 
money. In practice, however, failure to comply does not necessarily trigger this legal 
consequence immediately. For example, in the World Bank’s 1988 evaluation on its 
adjustment lending, “ ... almost all tranches have eventually been released, even though 
almost all tranches are experiencing tranches release delays as a result o f insufficient 
progress in fulfilling conditions” (World Bank, 1988b, p. 7). Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that conditionality has no influence on the borrowing government at all. Although 
cancellation rarely happens in either the Bank’s or the IMF’s case, failure to observe the 
conditions causes a delay in the subsequent disbursement. In addition, the government 
usually needs to undertake another round of negotiations with either the Bank or the 
IMF, or both, in cases when conditions are not met in order to receive the subsequent 
disbursement. This fresh round of negotiation often means new set o f conditionalities. 
For example, in.cases where conditions for the second disbursement in an annual ESAF 
arrangement are not met, the borrowing government will be unable to receive the 
subsequent disbursement unless “consultation has taken place between the Trustee [IMF] 
and the member [borrowing government] and understandings have been reached 
regarding the circumstances in which the member may request the disbursement o f that 
instalment.” (Instrument to Establish the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust,
58 The legal consequences are derived from the following. In the case o f the Bank, it is derived from the 
loan agreements between the Bank and the borrowing government. In the case of the IMF, it is derived 
from the decisions of the Board of Executive Directors regarding the establishment o f the ESAF Trust.
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Section II para. 3[b], Decision No. 10530-[93/l 70] ESAP, December 15, 1993) (IMF, 
June 1997, p.30.)
In addition to the conditions regarding the tranching policies o f the adjustment 
lending, the BWIs can also set down pre-conditions for the government to implement 
before an adjustment lending is approved. In the case of the IMF, its Guidelines on 
Conditionality states that, “A member may be expected to adopt some corrective 
measures before a stand-by arrangement is approved by the IMF .. .” (para. 7) (emphasis 
added). In the case o f the World Bank, “the front-loading o f conditionality, ie the 
requirement that key conditions are fulfilled in advance of the release o f any part o f the 
loan” has been identified as some of the trends developing in the Bank’s adjustment 
lending in the second half of the 1980s (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1996a, p. 45). The 
legal implications of failure to comply with pre-conditions might be less severe than that 
with conditions regarding tranching policies. This, however, does not diminish the 
effectiveness o f these conditions in influencing the borrowing government. Considering 
the indirect effect of the BWIs adjustment lending in influencing the borrower’s ability to 
attract other external financing, the government is usually under pressure to reach an 
agreement with either the IMF or the Bank in order to bring in other financial resources. 
Under these circumstances, the chances are pretty high59 that the borrowing government 
will try to implement these pre-conditions in order to reach an agreement with either the 
IMF or the Bank, or both, for a loan.
As a result, although failure to comply with conditionality does not always trigger 
legal consequences, conditionality does, to a certain degree, empower the BWIs to
59 For example, exchange rate is identified by Killick as a classic example o f a pre-condition stipulated by 
the IMF (Killick, 1998, pp. 6-7). Strong association between the IMF programmes and significant 
exchange rate depreciation has been identified by Killick (Killick, 1995a, p. 127).
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influence the borrowing developing country members. In cases where the legal 
consequences of non-observance are specifically provided in either the decisions o f the 
BWIs or the legal or quasi-legal instruments relating to an adjustment lending, the 
borrowing government is legally required to implement the conditions agreed. Simply to 
let these legal consequences to be known to the borrowers or potential borrowers can 
itself serves as a very effective tool for the BWIs to influence the borrowing developing 
countries.
A number o f considerations have rendered the assessment o f conditionality and a 
general conclusion with regard to the implementation o f conditionality difficult. For 
example, different yardsticks by which to gauge the results o f policy implementation are 
adopted by the BWIs, on the one hand, and research institutions and NGOs, on the other 
hand60. In addition, various methodologies exist in evaluating the programme outcomes 
(Killick, 1995a). As a result, the degree of implementing conditionality in various 
countries has been inconclusive61. The uncertainty and lack o f consensus in evaluating 
the effectiveness of conditionality do not diminish the important role conditionality has 
played in influencing the developing countries. Apparently, from the continuous 
application of conditionality in the adjustment lending operation, in spite o f the 
uncertainty and lack of consensus over their effectiveness, the BWIs still regard it as an 
effective tool to employ in influencing their developing country members. Moreover, 
factors influencing the compliance with conditionality have been identified without
60 The difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of conditionality is a reflection o f the pitfalls encountered 
in determining the effectiveness of the SAPs, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.5.
61 For example, the IMF has conducted a research reviewing the experience under the ESAF, and the 
conclusion o f this research is broadly positive (Schadler et al, 1993). However, Killick identified certain 
methodological issues o f which the IMF research had not taken into consideration (Killick, 1995a). This is 
only one example illustrating the degree of differences in conclusions reached by different institutes. The 
differences will be bom in mind throughout the present study when references are made to certain results 
in the various research conducted by different institutions.
difficulties by various institutions. The domestic political consensus for the reforms and 
the institutional capacity of the administration to carry out the conditionalities are among 
those factors (Reed, 1992; Jayarajah and Branson, 1995). The former factor, branded as a 
variable affecting “programme ownership”, will be subjected to more examination in 
Chapter 3.5.2. In addition, as pointed out in the external evaluation o f the ESAF 
operation, “ ... all the available evidence suggests that conditionality-intensive programs 
seldom succeed in achieving their objectives” (IMF, 1998b, p. 36). Considering the weak 
institutional capacity in some of the developing countries, it is not surprising to see the 
conclusion reached by the IMF itself.
Limited environmental considerations have been taken into account in some of 
the more recent Bank SAPs, partly as a response to the criticisms from environmental 
NGOs and some of its member states. However, most of these considerations are dealt 
with under project loans and institution building (Shihata, 1995, chapter l )62. The World 
Bank has begun to pay attention to the environmental aspect of SAPs63. Nevertheless, no 
evidence is yet available to show that environmental aspect has received systematic 
attention in the Bank’s SAP. As far as the IMF is concerned it has maintained its position 
that it lacks the expertise to incorporate environmental conditionality and it, instead, will 
leave any relevant issues or policies to the Bank. In one of its early facilities, however, 
the IMF took into account energy conservation issues. Under the 1975 Oil Facility, the 
policy statement, in which the members intended to pursue in achieving a medium-term 
solution to their balance of payments problems, was required to contain a specific aim to
62 Loan covenants relating to the environment have been incorporated in some o f the World Bank .and 
Asian Development Bank project loans. The effectiveness o f the environmental loan covenants, however, 
has raised concern within these multilateral development banks themselves for they have been reluctant to 
suspend disbursements except in the direst o f circumstances (Head, 1991).
63 For example, o f the 34 adjustment operations approved in FY 1989, 7 contained conditions directly 
related to environmental management (Webb and Shariff, 1992).
89
conserve energy. Members were expected to take particular measures to conserve 
petroleum or to develop alternative sources o f energy, even though these measures were 
not made performance criteria (Guitian, 1981). In addition, considerations other than 
purely economy wide, such as military expenditure, good governance and social impact 
of the programme, have been incorporated, or taken into account, in more recent ESAF 
(IMF, 1995 and 1997; Uvin and Biagiotti, 1996). In fact, the IMF might begin to pay 
limited attention to the environmental impact of its adjustment programme, as attested by 
some of the recent PFPs published that contain environmental conditions.6465
Just to conclude briefly, conditionality in its various forms and with its legal 
implications in the lending process has become an effective tool in the operations o f the 
SAPs, enabling the BWIs to gain leverage over their borrowing developing country 
members. In conclusion, the BWIs are equipped with various legal and quasi-legal 
instruments associated with their operations in, but not limited to, structural adjustment, 
including the application of conditionality and programme and policy-based lending, to 
influence the developing countries. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, 
innovative mechanisms of the World Bank have begun to employ similar legal and quasi- 
legal instruments in their operations in order to promote a new goal: assisting the 
implementation of the FCCC. Before we determine whether the BWIs, in particular the 
Bank, can play this new role effectively, we need to know for sure that these legal and 
quasi-legal instruments in the existing operations o f the Bank have been effective. Thus,
64 More discussion on the environmental aspect of the SAPs, including suggestions o f “SAP with a climate, 
safety net” will be conducted in Chapter 5.3.
65 For example, the following PFPs published by the governments all contain sections referring to 
environmental policies: Mali (20 May 1998), Central African Republic (29 May 1998), Cameroon (28 July 
1998), Republic of Mozambique (10 August 1998), Uganda (28 October 1998) and Malawi (3 December 
1998). In addition, in the Letter of Intent submitted by Indonesia in July 1998, “environment” along with 
other policy areas such as fiscal, monetary and banking issues, is concluded as one o f the policy actions
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the next section will investigate whether these legal and quasi-legal instruments have 
been effective in actually changing the behaviour of the borrowing governments and in 
achieving the desirable result envisaged by the SAPs
3.5 Effectiveness66
“Effectiveness” is a difficult concept that can have many meanings and has been 
subject to extensive discussion under other disciplines such as international relations (eg 
Bemauer, 1995; Underdal, 1992). In order to determine whether the BWIs, by employing 
the SAPs, have been effective in influencing their developing country members’ choice 
of development path, the present study proposes to look at two different questions. First, 
have the legal and quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs to promote structural 
adjustment been able to result in changes in a country’s relevant domestic laws and 
policies? That is, have these instruments been effective in producing an outcome ? If  the 
answer to the first question is Yes, the second question will be: “Has the resulting change 
in laws and policies improved the country’s economic conditions as the SAP intended?” 
In other words, has the resulting policy changes been effective in producing an impact'?67 
Only when we are able to have a positive answer to both these questions can it be 
ascertained in definite that the BWIs are indeed effective in influencing their developing 
country members through the SAPs.
Detail analysis for the two questions is difficult to conduct because o f the lack of 
the relevant counterfactual knowledge, ie what would have happened if the BWIs had not
that need to be taken. All these documents can be found at the official website o f the IMF: http: 
//www.imf.org.
66 Note that, due to the limited scope of the present thesis, all the empirical evidence used to support the 
analysis in this section draws from the existing literature in mostly economic discipline on research carried 
out by either the BWIs or other institutions to evaluate the implementation of the SAPs and conditionality.
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intervened. In addition, it might be even more difficult to provide conclusive empirical 
evidence in answering the second question relating to the economic performance of a 
country with a SAP —  there are simply too many factors at play in affecting the 
economy of a country68. Studies have been conducted by the BWIs and other institutes in 
evaluating the results of the SAPs and conditionality (eg Killick, 1995a and b, 1996, 
1998; Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1996b; Schadler et al, September 1993; World Bank, 
1988a). Most of these studies have been unable to reach definitive conclusions as to the 
effectiveness of the SAPs in inducing policy changes (an outcome) and in achieving 
policy results (an impact)69. In addition, the limited conclusions reached in these studies 
even conflict with each other at times70. Furthermore, the interpretation o f statistical data 
can be very subjective and can easily be manipulated in conveying messages the 
interpreter would like the readers to believe71.
It seems, thus, difficult, if  not impossible to have a definite empirically accurate 
answer to the two questions previously proposed from the existing literature72. Does this 
mean that there is no way to determine the effectiveness o f the BWIs’ influence on the 
developing countries? Not necessarily. The discussion that follows will attempt to infer
67 As pointed out in Chapter 1, the terms outcome and impact are borrowed from the school of
international relations, in particular its discussion on international regime.
68 For example, it is difficult to determine whether the improvement of a country’s balance o f payments 
situation is the result o f the amendment o f its foreign trade law that has been requested under a SAP, or is 
simply resulted from an increased export of its raw materials that will take place regardless o f any SAP.
69 Note that the distinction between outcome and impact are not always made in some o f the studies. For 
example, in the latest study by Killick, there is no indication as to whether the programme effect evaluated 
is about outcome or impact (Killick, 1998).
70 For example, according the a World Bank study: “conditionality in adjustment loans has been 
implemented to a substantial extent . . .” (World Bank, 1988a). On the other hand, according to another 
study by Killick, “there is little evidence of a strong connection between SAPs and implementation o f  
policy reform” (Killick, 1995b).
71 For example, just by playing with the order of words can convey different meaning. Compare the 
following two sentences and we can have two completely different pictures. “The import of energy 
conservation machinery has been temporarily cut back in 1997; however, the BOP deficit has been greatly 
reduced by 10% in the same year.” “The BOP deficit has been reduced by 10% in 1997; however, the
import o f energy conservation machinery has been completely cut off in the same year.”
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from the available empirical evidence and arguments proposed in the preceding sections 
answers as conclusive as possible to the two questions proposed. Difficult as it is, 
effectiveness of these legal and quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs in 
advancing structural adjustment merits further examination for these instruments might 
have, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, been gradually adopted by GEF in its 
practice. Thus, attempt should not be aborted to establish the effectiveness of these 
instruments in producing an outcome and an impact to the extent that even inconclusive 
insights may be helpful in improving the effectiveness o f these legal and quasi-legal 
instruments.
3.5.1 “Outcome”
As demonstrated so far in this chapter, the legal and quasi-legal instruments associated 
with SAPs have enabled the BWIs to gain immense leverage over the borrowing 
developing countries. It has also been pointed out that conditions and policy 
recommendations set down in various SA instruments, notwithstanding their legal 
characteristics, have certain effects on the borrowing governments in the sense that 
failure to comply with these conditions could trigger consequences, such as the 
suspension o f loan disbursement. In other words, the borrowing governments cannot 
afford to totally disregard conditions and policy recommendations in the SAPs if  they 
wish to receive further financial resources. However, this does not imply that the 
borrowing government will necessarily adopt and implement such conditions as are 
required by the BWIs, as can be seen from a significant programme failure rate73.
72 The same difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of BWIs’ programmes will again be illustrated in 
the case study of South-east Asia conducted in Chapter 6.
73 For example, in Killck’s study, the uncompleted programmes represented about 53% of all IMF 
programmes examined between 1979-93 (Killick, 1995a, pp. 61-62). In the evaluation conducted by the
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Nonetheless, the leverage of these legal and quasi-legal instruments have certain 
ramifications on the effectiveness of the SAPs in terms of the ability to induce changes of 
domes laws and policies, ie the outcome, as the following discussion will seek to 
demonstrate.
There is no single set of statistical data illustrating the effectiveness o f the SAPs 
in producing an outcome. In other words, there is no direct empirical evidence that 
reveals the relationship between the changes of domestic laws and policies and the 
introduction of a SAP. It might be possible to obtain from the empirical data some 
indirect evidence as to the effectiveness of the SAPs in inducing domestic policy 
changes. The implementation of certain conditions prescribed in the loan agreement 
might entail legislative procedures74. For instance, in the process of reforming public 
expenditure, the passage of budget requires parliamentary actions. By examining the 
extent of implementation of these types o f conditions might give us a clue as to how 
effective are the programmes of the BWIs in inducing legislative changes. For example, 
in the 1992 report on the experiences of adjustment lending conducted by the World 
Bank, the implementation o f conditions in adjustment loans by policy area was 
illustrated75 (Corbo et al, 1992, Table 5-3). In this set o f statistical data, full 
implementation on conditions in “rationalisation o f government finance and 
administration”, including the reallocation of public expenditures, which might involve 
legislative process such as budget appropriation, is estimated at 63%. This is quite 
significant in comparison with the rate of implementation of all types o f conditions in the
Bank in 1992, about 47% of the SAL agreements and 40% of the SECALs agreements concluded between 
FY 1979-89 were not “fully implemented” (Corbo et al, 1992, Table 5-4).
74 The case study on South-east Asia in Chapter 6 will reveal some limited empirical evidence in this 
aspect: for example, in Thailand where tax legislation was adopted to implement conditions under the two 
SALs from the World Bank.
75 The adjustment loans being evaluated in this report are those implemented between FY 1979-89.
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programmes under evaluation, which is only about 66%. Thus, it might be able to infer 
from this empirical data, albeit indirectly, the effectiveness o f the SAPs in producing an
outcome.
However, such an interpretation might be too indirect and too weak to support the 
conclusion that the SAPs have been effective at producing policy change. Admittedly, 
such an interpretation simplifies actions involved in the operations o f a government. 
Take the previous example o f public expenditure reform again. The reallocation o f 
budget is only one element in the process of public expenditure reform. Other elements 
can be implemented without involving legislative process, such as reforming the public 
employment system and/or eliminating unproductive subsidies. As a result, by looking at 
the implementation of “rationalisation of government finance and administration” does 
not necessarily give a full picture as to whether the existence of the SAP has produced a 
change of domestic laws and policies. Consequently, it is difficult to present empirical 
evidence, even indirectly, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the SAPs in influencing 
policy changes. However, by looking at this question from the legal and political 
perspectives, as opposed to empirical perspective, in the context o f the leverage from the 
legal and quasi-legal instruments of the BWIs programmes might offer other indications.
As long as the required legislative and policy change are mandated and set down 
specifically in one or more of the SA instruments, the chances are considerably high that 
the BWIs can be effective in producing an outcome. For example, “conditionality” in the 
Bank’s adjustment loans often includes the preparation or adoption o f certain laws and 
regulations reflecting the policies agreed upon with the Bank (Shihata, 1995, chapter 3). 
Recalling the tranching policy in the Bank’s adjustment lending and the legally binding 
effect o f Bank’s loan agreement on the borrowing government, conditionality of such
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nature will have to be implemented if  the borrowing government is to receive the 
subsequent tranche of a adjustment loan. Furthermore, as the preceding sections 
demonstrates, the borrowing government cannot afford to totally disregard conditions 
and policy recommendations in the SAPs if it is to receive subsequent tranche in a loan76 
or to attract other external financing77. What can best demonstrate the government’s 
action in implementing the SAPs than the promulgation of new legislation? The 
administrative branch in the borrowing government, which has the main responsibility to 
negotiate and deal with the BWIs, might in some instances put pressure on78 the 
legislative branch for speedier legislative process in order to show the “goodwill” o f the 
government that it is committed to the structural reform required by the BWIs79,80. It 
might do so prior to the application of an adjustment loan in order to boost its case in 
getting the loan8'. It might also do so prior to the disbursement o f the subsequent tranche 
of money in order to demonstrate that the government is adopting the appropriate 
measures and is eligible to receive the next disbursement, even though some o f the 
economic indicators have not been met82. Either of these cases can serve to demonstrate
76 That was the result from either loan agreement (in the case of the Bank SAL/SECAL) or decisions o f the 
BWIs relating to lending operations (in the case of the Fund ESAF, ie Instrument to Establish the ESAF 
Trust Fund), see Chapter 3.2.3 for more discussion.
77 That was the result from the informal and indirect influence of the BWIs. See Chapter 3.2.3 for more 
discussion.
78 By examining the political climate for reform within countries under the BWIs programme, Nelson 
observed that: “With the approval o f top-level political authorities, the same small circle o f high-level 
economic officials can put into effect most of the key measures. Where legislative approval is required, the 
measures are often pushed through with little debate, in a crisis atmosphere.” (Nelson, JM, 1996, p. 1555.) 
(emphasis added.)
79 This exercise o f power is based on a government model with divisions o f power among administration, 
legislation and judiciary. It does not apply to other forms of government such as country in absolute, 
monarchy or countries that are politically anarchic because of civil war.
80 This scenario does not equally apply to all the developing counties that turn to the BWIs for adjustment 
loans. It is more likely to happen, for example, in countries where legislative branch is weaker than the 
administrative branch.
81 For example, in the Bank’s adjustment loans, a change o f legislation is, in some instances, made a 
condition for the presentation of a loan to the Board of the Bank (Shihata, 1995, chapter 3).
82 In the case of the IMF assistance, when the performance criteria has not been observed, the government 
will need to either negotiate for a waiver, or show that corrective measures have been adopted. In the latter
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the possible correlation between the existence of the SAPs and the change o f domestic 
laws and policies.
Therefore, in cases where conditions are set to require preparation or adoption o f 
certain laws and regulations, it seems plausible to argue that SAPs can be effective at 
producing an outcome, although empirical evidence cannot directly support this 
conclusion. Apart from this lack of empirical evidence, there are other possible flaws in 
the preceding arguments, however. For example, most of the conditions set down in 
these legal or quasi-legal instruments are limited to purely economic indicators, rather 
than a list o f laws that require legislature or amendment. As far as the IMF conditions are 
concerned, they are usually quantified and precise, relating to macroeconomic 
performance indicators that are already in place and being monitored (Mosley, Flanigan, 
and Toye, 1996a). Nonetheless, these possible flaws and lack of direct empirical 
evidence do not invalidate or contradict with the arguments proposed in the preceding 
paragraphs. For example, it is established that the legal and quasi-legal instruments, in 
particular the applications of conditionalities and policy-based lending have certain 
leverage over the bonowing government. Conditions and policy recommendation, which 
are mostly relating to economic policies in any case, are usually respected by the 
government for fear o f the consequences that might occur in cases where compliance is 
not observed. To sum up, although direct empirical evidence is patchy, the effectiveness 
of the SAPs in producing an outcome can arguably be demonstrated from legal and 
political perspectives in the context of leverage the BWIs have on the borrowing
case, the adoption o f some relevant laws might serve the purpose of demonstrating the government’s 
commitments to reform.
developing countries through the legal and quasi-legal instruments employed in the 
SAPs83.
3.5.2 “Impact”
After offering a moderately positive answer to the first question o f determining 
the effectiveness of the SAPs in producing an outcome, we will now turn to the second 
question to investigate the effectiveness of the SAPs in actually producing a desirable 
impact™. The lack of counterfactual knowledge, ie what would have happened in the 
absence of the BWIs intervention, prevents a conclusive determination o f whether the 
induced policy changes have resulted in the kind of economic conditions as the BWIs 
and their SAP intended85. Most of the empirical data has been unable to agree on the 
improvement of the economies of countries under the SAPs, as the SAP intended to 
achieve86. This might be explained by the unimpressive record o f programme and/or 
conditionality implementation87,88. The empirical research conducted by the BWIs and
83 Similar conclusion also emerged from some of the existing literature. For example, it is stated by Nelson 
that: “Whether damned or covertly welcomed, conditionality was widely viewed as tremendously powerful 
in altering recipients’ policies and behaviour.” (Nelson, JM, 1996, p. 1551.) (emphasis added.) 
Nevertheless, Nelson offers no empirical evidence either to support this claim.
84 Impact here will refer only to economic aspect since the intended goal o f a SAP is to improve the 
borrowing country’s economic state. As a result, the unintended impact on the poor or on the environment, 
as has been debated in a lot o f the existing literature on structural adjustment, will not be subject to detail 
examination in this chapter.
85 For example, it is admitted in Killick’s study that: “Analytically, it can be very difficult to disentangle 
the several determinants at work in order to isolate the precise effects of an [international financial 
institution] programme.” (Killick, 1998, p. 19.) He then proceeds to discuss difficulties associated with 
various methodologies used in conducting research relating to examining the effect o f IFI programmes 
(Killick, 1998, pp. 19-21).
86 For example, the IMF study on evaluating its SAF and ESAF programmes notes that: “ESAF countries 
remain among the poorest in the world” (IMF, December 1997, p. 33). Although the average 
improvements in growth and the resources balance were greater for countries under the Bank’s adjustment 
programmes, the “improvements, in several countries, have not been sustained” (World Bank, 1988a, p.
3).
87 For example, in the IMF study on evaluating its SAF and ESAF programmes between 1986 and 1994, it 
is noted that: “Only one-fourth of all three- or four-year arrangements were completed without significant 
interruption.” (IMF, December 1997, p. 42.) In the World Bank study on evaluating its adjustment 
programmes between FY 1979-89, the “fully implemented” “all conditions or actions” in the SALs is 53%
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outside institutions do not agree on the degree of programme implementation or o f the 
effect on the economy of countries under SAPs, although there is overwhelming 
evidence supporting the correlation between the two89. In other words, it has been 
established that conditions and policy Suggestions of the SAPs, if  .properly implemented, 
can produce the intended impact on the country’s economy90. The problem lies with 
implementation. Therefore, rather than investigating the impact of the SAPs on the 
country economy, this section will examine why such an impact has not been observed in 
the majority of the borrowing countries, ie why SAPs have not been implemented.
If, as the preceding arguments suggest, the leverage derived from the legal and 
quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs has affected the government’s attitude 
towards the conditions and policy suggestions prescribed in these instruments, and has 
certain ramifications on the effectiveness of the SAPs in producing an outcome, why, 
then, has there been such a patchy record in programme implementation that results in 
the lack o f an impact? Could the perception of developing countries toward the BWIs
and 60% in the SECALs (Corbo et al, 1992, Table 5-4). The implementation problem in both the IMF and 
the Bank have also been pointed out in the study by Killick (Killick, 1998, pp. 29-32).
88 Note that some of the studies attribute the lack of economic performance or interruption o f programme 
implementation to external factors, rather than to the failure of the BWIs programmes. For example, the 
IMF study on its ESAF programmes concludes that “most program interruptions have been the result o f 
factors outside the IMF’s control —  that is, major political upheavals ... and flagging commitment” (IMF, 
December 1997, p. 45). Admittedly, it is difficult to distinguish between effect resulting from external 
factors and from the BWIs programmes. Nevertheless, the methodology and analysis in the reports o f the 
in-house evaluation by the IMF and the Bank have been challenged in other studies (eg Killick, 1995b and 
1998) and have to be read “with a degree of caution” (Killick, 1998, p. 21). In another study by Mosley et 
al on the Bank’s policy-based lending, for example, whether the policy reform changes are actually 
implemented are identified as one of the three elements determining the ultimate impact o f adjustment 
lending on the economic performance o f the borrowing countries (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1996a, 
chapter 5).
89 For example, after reviewing all relevant literature from both the BWIs and outside institutions, Killick 
concluded that: “Overall, a positive correlation between programme implementation and economic 
performance could be expected ... In other words, the problem is not with the general thrust o f the policies 
the IFIs are promoting but with the poor executive o f these [policies].” (Killick, T, 1998, p. 43.)
90 As the case study on South-east Asia in Chapter 6 will demonstrate, policies prescribed by the BWIs for 
structural adjustment purposes have proved instrumental in the impressive economic growth in South-east 
Asia in the 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, as one research on South-east Asia showed, these policies 
were adopted on the governments’ own initiatives, in particular in country like Malaysia that did not 
borrow from the BWIs (Ana Marr, 1996).
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and their governance structure play a part in explaining the weak implementation of the 
outcome, ie the changed laws and policies resulting from the existence of the SAPs, and, 
as a result, affect the effectiveness of the SAPs in producing an impact?
Elements that affect the implementation of SAPs have been identified and 
“borrower or programme ownership”91 has been suggested as one major element. For 
example, one of the World Bank reports identified that “of the total 81 operations 
considered in the statistical analyses, 36 highly satisfactory or satisfactory program 
outcomes were associated with a very high or high degree of borrower ownership. 23 
very unsatisfactory or unsatisfactory program outcomes corresponded to a very low or 
low degree of borrower ownership.” (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995, p. 15.) There is no 
equivalent or comparable statistical data on the IMF operations relating to the ownership 
problem and failure of programme implementation. Nevertheless, the problems of 
“ownership” have been subject to rigorous examination in the recently concluded 
external evaluation of the ESAF by a group o f independent experts commissioned by the 
IMF (IMF, 1998b). The correlation between the degree of ownership and successful 
programme implementation has been observed in several country studies carried out by 
the external evaluators. There is broad agreement that “ownership is a necessary 
condition o f successful policy reform and program implementation” (IMF, 1998b, p. 21). 
If correlation between borrower ownership and governance structure o f the BWIs can be 
identified, the argument of the present study that the governance structure o f the BWIs 
perceived as asymmetrical by developing countries92 has affected the effectiveness o f the
91 Neither the BWIs nor other research institutions provide clear definition as to what “ownership” is, in 
particular its legal implications. More discussion to follow in the succeeding paragraphs.
92 See Chapter 2 for more discussion on the governance structure of the BWIs and its implications to the 
relationship between the BWIs and their developing country members.
100
SAPs can then be verified. This following discussion will thus attempt to establish such 
correlation.
There is no definition of “borrower ownership”. A World Bank report attempts to 
identify four dimensions o f programme ownership: locus of initiative, level o f 
intellectual conviction among key policymakers, expression o f political will by top 
leadership, and efforts toward consensus building among various constituencies; and four 
levels within each dimension reflecting the intensity o f ownership were proposed 
(Johnson and Wasty, 1993, pp. 4-5). Nor does the External Evaluation o f the ESAF 
where the problem of ownership is identified clearly define “ownership”. It only notes 
that “one common theme that runs through perceptions of ESAF at the [recipient] 
country level is a feeling of a loss of control over the policy content and the pace of 
implementation of refonn program” (IMF, 1998b, p. 20). However, this report looks at 
the perception of ownership from the donors’ perspective and suggests that donors tend 
to see ownership as an acceptance by the recipient country o f donor-driven priorities and 
programmes.
Nevertheless, none of these reports from the BWIs offers a clear definition o f 
“ownership”. As for studies carried out by academic institutions, they either indicate that 
“ownership of, or commitment to, policy reform may be necessary for the BWIs 
programmes to succeed, it is by no means sufficient” (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 
1996a, p. 149), or suggest that “ownership explanation is superficial because it is not set 
within a framework which explicates why ownership should exert so decisive an 
influence” (Killick, 1998, p. 98) (original emphasis). Nor do these outside studies 
provide a precise definition or criteria based on which to gauge the intensity of
ownership93. Nevertheless, most of them acknowledged the overwhelming evidence 
supporting the link between programme implementation and borrower ownership 
(Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1996a, chapter 5; Killick, 1998, chapter 4).
On the one hand, no indication is given as to what “ownership” entails. On the 
other hand, from the existing literature that touches upon the issue of “ownership 
problems,” the focus is mainly on the domestic political economy of and political climate 
in the borrowing countries, including the internal conflict within the administration or 
among domestic interests group (eg IMF, December 1997; Johnson and Wasty, 1993; 
Killick, 1998; and, Nelson, JM, 1996). In addition, the discussion on the legal 
dimensions o f “ownership” are absent from the existing literature. It seems, thus, difficult 
to establish the correlation between the problem of ownership and the governance 
structure of the BWIs perceived as asymmetrical by developing countries. Nevertheless, 
theories on fairness and legitimacy of rules articulated by Franck (Franck, 1995) might 
provide some clues as to how the asymmetry perceived by the developing countries in 
the BWIs might be one factor affecting the implementation o f the policy 
recommendations o f the BWIs programmes. This can also enable us to examine the issue 
o f ownership from a legal perspective.
According to Franck, fairness discourse is partly “embedded in the decision­
making processes of numerous treaty-based organizations”, (Franck, 1995, p. 478) and 
rules that are perceived as “unfair” or illegitimate or unjust are unlikely to be complied
93 Killick attempts to define an ideal case definition: “Government ownership is at its strongest when the 
political leadership and its advisers, with broad support among agencies o f state and civil society, decide 
o f their own volition that policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when 
they should be introduced, and where these changes become built into parameters o f policy and 
administration which are generally accepted as desirable.” (Killick, 1998, p. 87.) This, however, is drawn 
from the set o f four-dimension analysis provided by one o f the World Bank research (John and Wasty, 
1993).
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with94. Admittedly, in Franck’s study, the governance structure o f the international 
institutions and how it affects the legitimacy or fairness o f rules set down by these 
institutions was not discussed extensively. Nonetheless, he observed that: “ ... the 
fairness of international law ... will be judged, firstly by the degree to which the rules 
satisfy.the participants’ expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and 
secondly by the extent to which the rules are made and applied in accordance with what 
the participants perceive as right process.” (Franck, 1995, p. 7.) Recalling the asymmetric 
treatment perceived by the developing countries in the governance structure as well as 
the wider operations of the BWIs95, Franck’s observation seems to provide some 
explanations as to how the governance structure o f the BWIs might affect the 
implementation of the BWIs programmes. Firstly, one of the asymmetries perceived by 
the developing countries has been that the costs and consequences o f adjustment fall 
almost exclusively on the borrowing developing countries. This might fail to satisfy the 
participants’, ie developing countries in this case, “expectations o f justifiable distribution 
of costs”. Secondly, decisions relating to lending operations and conditionality attached 
have been designed in a governance structure that has been perceived as ignoring the 
need of developing countries since early 1970s. Under the circumstances, the extent to 
which decisions and conditionalities are made and applied does not seem to be in 
accordance with “what the participants perceive as the right process”. As a result, it 
might be arguable that, the perceived asymmetry in the governance structure and 
operations of the BWIs by developing countries undermine the perception o f the
94 According to Franck, the concept of “fairness” has two aspects: legitimacy as procedural fairness and 
distributive fairness in a moral and substantive sense. Franck identified four variables according to which 
legitimacy is perceived: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence. Nevertheless, these 
variables apply to the rules themselves, rather than to how these rules are made (Franck, 1995, chapter 2).
95 See Chapter 2.1.3 and 2.2.1.
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“fairness” of rules96 set down by the BWIs from the developing countries’ viewpoints97. 
This, in turn, might have affected the compliance and implementation of these rules and 
conditions prescribed by the BWIs programme by the borrowing governments.
In addition to the aforementioned discussion on the legal aspect o f ownership, 
some existing literature also seeks to identify how the governance structure o f the BWIs 
and its implications on the relationship with developing countries might have affected the 
intensity of borrower ownership. To start with, none o f the research explicitly concludes 
that such relationship has no impact at all on the intensity o f government ownership 
toward a programme98. There are some indications implying how the relationship 
between the BWIs and the developing countries might affect borrower ownership. For 
example, according to Killick, the issue of ownership matters because conflicts exist 
between the interests or objectives of the donors, including the BWIs, and the recipient. 
These conflict of interests are expected because, inter alia, donors and recipient 
governments are answerable to contrasting constituencies (Killick, 1998, chapter 4). 
Referring to the BWIs as a specific case on the donor side, it was stated that: “they 
[international financial institutions] have to remain within the policy parameters set by
% Admittedly, the term “rules” here refers to “legal” ones while the conditions prescribed in the BWIs 
programmes are economic ones in the majority of the SAPs. Nevertheless, it does not invalidate the 
application o f Franck’s theory to analyse the implementation of the BWIs programmes since it is the 
process of decision-making that is o f concern in both cases.
97 Note that the present study does not focus on the fairness of the BWIs as international institutions per se. 
It merely tries to demonstrate that, based on Franck’s theory of “fairness,” rules and conditions prescribed 
by the BWIs might be perceived as “unfair” by developing countries because of the perception of 
asymmetry and might, as a result, undermine the compliance and implementation o f these rules and 
policies.
98 Although the World Bank study on borrower ownership suggests that the “nature of govemment-Bank 
interaction” has only a limited significance for borrower ownership, it does recognise that the importance' 
of govemment-Bank interaction for the ownership issue “varies from region to region and from country to 
country, depending on both the specific technical needs and capabilities o f the particular region and 
country and the prevalent political situation affecting the Bank-country relationship” (Johnson and Wasty, 
1993, pp. 9-10). Nevertheless, the reference to “govemment-Bank interaction” in this report is made in the 
context of how the specific technical needs and capability of, and the prevalent political situation in a 
country affect the Bank-country relationship. In other words, this reference to the Bank-govemment
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their boards. These in turn (particularly in the case o f the IMF) are dominated by the 
governments o f the G7 industrial countries, which means that IFI management and staff 
are obliged to try keeping the representatives o f these important countries ‘on board’.” 
(Killick, 1998, p. 92.)" (emphasis added.) In addition, “moral hazard aspects” are also 
identified as one of the reasons conflicts of interests arise and, in turn, affect the intensity 
of government ownership. One version where moral hazard is created is when “one party 
to a transaction does not bear the full consequences of its actions. One of the long-standing 
complaints about donor-recipient relationship is that the costs of mistakes fall almost exclusively 
on recipient governments and peoples.” (Killick, 1998, p. 93.) (emphasis added.) Both o f these 
aspects remind us of the asymmetric treatment perceived by the developing countries 
under the BWIs: a decision-making process dominated by developed countries, and 
unequal distribution of costs and consequences of decisions and programmes made by 
the BWIs.
Furthermore, the present study also infers that the governance structure o f the 
BWIs, and the resulting asymmetric treatment perceived by their developing country 
members, might be able to affect some of the four dimensions identified by the World 
Bank as mostly relevant to determine government ownership. One such dimension 
identified by the Bank is the “level of intellectual conviction among key policymakers” 
(Johnson and Wasty, 1993, p. 4). From the Bank’s report, the “key policymakers” are 
understood to refer to “domestic” policymakers. The level of intellectual conviction 
among key policymakers presumably includes that o f  key policymakers. The level of
interaction is different from the BWIs-developing country relationship examined in the present study that 
looks at the role of developing countries in the decision-making process in and operations o f BWIs.
99 Killick later developed 15 hypotheses to test the applicability of agency theory in conditionality 
problem. One of the hypotheses is to inquire the correction between programme implementation and this 
conflict of interests between donors, including the BWIs, and recipient. The survey in all 21 cases studied
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intellectual conviction o f  key policymakers about the nature o f the crisis and the 
necessary remedial actions can be affected by the perception o f the borrowing 
government toward the BWIs, which play no small roles in providing policy advice 
regarding, for example, the necessary remedial actions to the borrowing government. 
When the developing countries feel that their needs are not adequately reflected in the 
decision-making process of the BWIs100, such policy advice might be deemed inadequate 
from the borrowing governments. As a result, it seems doubtful that the level of 
intellectual conviction o f  key policymakers in the borrowing government will be high.
Another dimension determining borrower ownership is the “efforts toward 
consensus-building among various constituencies” (Johnson and Wasty, 1993, p. 5). The 
constituencies here, again, presumably refer to “domestic” agencies within or out the 
central government. Arguably, the efforts toward consensus-building among various 
constituencies cannot even begin if  consensus cannot be built between the government 
and the BWIs in the programme and conditionality design. With tools such as 
conditionality and policy-based lending that entail a certain coercive element, 
“consensus” seems difficult to build. As one commentator puts it: “Whether publicly 
acknowledged or not, coercion is often applied to make a country accept what, in the 
opinion of the country, is not in its interest. Needless to say, this coercion, an inherent 
element in a conditionality package, undermines 'ownership’.” (Dasgupta, 1998, p. 86.) 
(emphasis added.) Furthermore, considering decisions relating to conditionality and 
policy-based lending are made and approved by the Board o f Executive Directors, where 
developing countries’ need are not adequately addressed from developing countries’
showed that in 17 cases “programme implementation is prejudiced when the objectives o f donors and 
governments differ, resulting in conflicts o f interest” (Killick, 1998, Table 5.1).
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viewpoint, it seems even more difficult to reach a consensus between the BWIs and the 
borrowing government.
Another way to look at borrower ownership is, as suggested in the report of 
External Evaluation of the ESAF, to look at the perception of ownership from the 
donors’ perspective. This report notes that donors tend to see ownership as an acceptance 
by the recipient country of donor-driven priorities and programmes. Putting the donors’ 
perception of ownership in the context o f the governance structure o f the BWIs where 
donors have the majority decision-making power, the present thesis proposes that the 
intensity o f ownership over the BWIs’ programmes might be undermined because of 
conflict of interests between donor and recipient. Under the present governance structure 
of the BWIs, donors have the ability to push through decisions relating to lending 
operations in the Executive Boards, and the application and impact o f these decisions fall 
largely on developing country members. In the actual negotiation process where policies 
and programmemes are drawn up, recipient developing countries will also bear in mind 
the fact that final decision of the loan lie at the hand o f Executive Directors and, 
consequently, has to take into account possible donor priorities when concluding policies 
and programmemes. As a result, the borrowing governments might agree to a set o f 
policies that they might not regard as reflecting their own priorities.
The reference to the limited existing literature and analysis inferred by the present 
study so far have revealed that the governance structure of the BWIs and its reflection on 
the relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries can affect the intensity 
of ownership of a BWIs programme. In addition, through examining the legal aspect of
100 This dissatisfaction is voiced, for example, at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the G-24 as early as in 
1974: “Present quotas and voting power in the Fund do not reflect adequately the needs or the importance 
of the developing countries in the world economy.” (reprinted in: Sauvant, 1981, Vol. V, p. 307).
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ownership based on Franck’s theory o f “fairness”, the present study is able to 
demonstrate how the asymmetric governance structure and operations o f the BWIs might 
have affected the implementation of the programme. I f  we recall the evidence stated at 
the beginning of this sub-section, correlation has been established between programme 
implementation and the impact o f the SAP. Thus, although direct empirical evidence is 
not readily available, the governance structure of the BWIs has arguably undermined the 
effectiveness of the SAPs in producing an impact through its various implications on 
borrower ownership. Admittedly, it has not been possible to gather empirical data to 
support the possible correlation between the intensity o f ownership and the governance 
structure o f the BWIs. In addition, there are other factors at play in determining the 
intensity of borrower ownership. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that, from the 
aforementioned examinations, the relationship between the BWIs and the borrowing 
developing countries, which is influenced by the governance structure o f the BWIs, does 
have its ramifications on “ownership” and might have, as a result, undermined 
programmes and conditions implementation and the effectiveness in producing an 
impact.
To conclude, the effectiveness of the SAPs in producing an impact and the 
implications of the governance structure of the BWIs on this effectiveness might be 
impossible to ascertain empirically. Nevertheless, empirical evidence has been provided 
to demonstrate the correlation between effectiveness in producing an impact and the 
extent to which SAPs are implemented, as well as the relationship between programme 
implementation and borrower ownership. In addition, the preceding arguments presented 
in the present thesis manage to provide some rudimentary correlation between 
governance structure and borrower ownership. Thus, the relationship between the BWIs
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and the developing countries, governance structure being an important part o f that 
relationship, seems to have its implications on the effectiveness o f the SAPs in producing 
an impact. The following section will continue this discussion and examine the 
relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries and how this relationship 
have affected the effectiveness of the legal and quasi-legal instruments employed in the 
SAPs to influence developing countries.
3.6 Relationship with the developing countries
From the preceding sections, this thesis has shown a significant correlation 
between the effectiveness of the legal and quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs 
to influence the developing countries, and the relationship between the BWIs and their 
developing countries. On the one hand, these instruments, such as conditionality and 
programme and policy-based lending, because o f and/or despite o f their legal 
characteristics, have enabled the BWIs and their SAPs to gain certain leverage over the 
borrowing governments. That is to say, the borrowing governments have to seriously 
take into account conditions and policy recommendations prescribed in these 
instruments. This leverage has its implications on the effectiveness of the SAPs by 
increasing their likelihood of inducing changes in domestic laws and policies, ie o f 
producing an outcome.
On the other hand, the leverage that results in such effectiveness probably has, 
ironically, decrease the likelihood of achieving the intended results o f the SAPs, ie of 
producing an impact. To put this leverage of these legal and quasi-legal instruments in 
the context of governance structural o f the BWIs might help us to perceive the 
asymmetry problems in the BWIs more clearly. Decisions relating to the design and
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approval of these legal and quasi-legal instruments have been made under a governance 
structure long perceived by developing countries as unable to reflect their needs or 
importance in the world economy101. On the other hand, the costs and consequences of 
these BWIs programmes fall mostly, if  not exclusively, on the developing countries. 
Both o f these perceptions have affected the perception of “fairness” of the rules adopted 
under the BWIs from developing countries’ viewpoint, and rendered the voluntary 
compliance of these rules difficult. Furthermore, these perceptions have also affected the 
relationship between the BWIs and their developing country members102, and had 
implications on factors influencing the degree of programme ownership. It is, thus, 
understandable how the governance structure perceived as asymmetric by developing 
countries can affect “borrower ownership,” one of the key elements required for 
successful programme implementation and result. Although the preceding section cannot 
provide direct empirical evidence to support such association between governance 
structure and the effectiveness in producing an impact, indirect evidence, reference to 
existing literature and rigorous analysis have nevertheless depict the possible correlation.
When the ideal model of development was perceived as economic growth and 
industrialisation and was promoted by the BWIs through SAPs and the legal and quasi- 
legal instruments employed, the relationship between the BWIs and the developing 
countries has been anything but harmonious. As a consequence, the effectiveness o f the 
SAPs has been, on the one hand, observed in producing an outcome but, on the other 
hand, undermined in producing an impact. When sustainable development emerged as a
101 See, for example, Communique o f the Seventh Ministerial Meeting o f the G-24, 9-10 June 1974.
102 Calls for international monetary reform and a new international economic order, including the proposal 
to reform voting power and quota allocation in the Fund, have been expressed by developing countries 
since the 1970s (eg UN General Assembly Resolution 3347[XXIX], “Reform o f the international 
monetary system”, 1974; Resolution 3362[S-VII] “Development and international economic co-
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new development paradigm and the World Bank began to embark on a new role in 
assisting the implementation of MEAs in developing countries and establish innovative 
mechanisms as a response, the relationship between the Bank and its developing country 
members has undergone certain transformations. As the next chapter will demonstrate, 
GEF, one of these innovative mechanisms, might have begun to adopt the legal and 
quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs in the SAPs, but in combination with 
their own novel governance structure different from that o f the BWIs. How will this new 
development affect the relationship between the World Bank and the developing 
countries and, in the process, affect the effectiveness o f these legal and quasi-legal 
instruments adopted to achieve a new objective are to be investigated in the next chapter.
operation”, 1975.) Nevertheless, as the governance structure of the BWIs is concerned, these calls for 
reform have yet to be materialised two decades later.
CHAPTER 4: WORLD BANK’S INNOVATIVE MECHANISMS
The previous chapter looked at the existing mechanism, the SAPs, employed by 
the BWIs to influence the developing countries. This chapter will focus on the innovative 
mechanisms established, or in the process of being established by the World Bank, after 
the 1990s, in response to the new role assumed by the Bank to assist the implementation 
of the FCCC. After an introduction to the establishment and operations o f all these 
innovative mechanisms, GEF will be subject to closer examination. The novel 
governance structure will be delineated firstly, followed by discussion on whether certain 
legal and quasi-legal instruments, conditionality and policy-based lending in this case, 
similar to the SAPs have begun to develop in GEF operations. The chapter will conclude 
by investigating the new relationship between the Bank and its developing countries in 
the light of these new mechanisms and, more specifically, how GEF has injected a new 
dimension into this relationship.
4.1 Introduction, establishment and operations
4.1.1 Reasons fo r  the new mechanisms
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the World Bank entered into a different relationship 
with its developing country members in the 1990s when it undertook to channel funding 
to the developing countries for their domestic compliance with the MEAs. That partially 
resulted from the changing socio-economic and political environment after the 1990s 
when sustainable development had been actively promoted in various international 
forums. In addition, as MEAs proliferated, developing countries found it more difficult to 
implement these MEAs with their limited resources and were in need for external
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assistance1. In addition, the interaction between the BWIs and the MEAs, in particular the 
FCCC became more extensive because of the increasing overlap in their areas of 
competence2. As these developments unfolded, the management o f the Bank began to 
initiate innovative mechanisms either within the Bank itself or in collaboration with other 
international bodies in the 1990s. As Sir Joseph Gold observed: “the tendency o f the 
Bank has been to establish new international organisations3, with structures tied to the 
structure of the Bank, when new purposes have been undertaken, rather than to amend 
the Articles of the Bank.” (Gold, 1981-82, p. 505.) The same tendency can be observed 
in the way in which the Bank set up new mechanisms, such as various new types of 
loans, and borrow from other legal concepts, such as the concept o f a trust fund. When 
the new demand for resources needed to implement the FCCC, the management of the 
Bank, rather than amending the existing mechanisms, created some innovative 
mechanisms after the 1990s, which we will now examine.
4.1.2 Establishment and operations
4.1.2.1 GEF P and I: establishment and operations 
A. ESTABLISHMENT
When sustainable development was called for in the Brundtland Report in 1987, a 
significant increase in financial support from international sources for developing 
countries had already been identified as crucial for achieving sustainable development. 
For example, it was suggested that “a special international banking programme or facility
1 Nevertheless, developing countries do not want an environmental-related financial mechanism to be 
linked to the World Bank, as we can see from the heated debate between developed and developing 
countries over whether GEF P should become the financial mechanism o f the FCCC and CBD. See the 
following paragraphs for further discussions.
2 This interaction will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.2.2.
3 The new international organisations here refer to the IDA, the IFC, and, later, the ICSID.
113
linked to the World Bank” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987, p. 338) should be considered to provide loans for the development and protection 
of critical habitats and ecosystems. Since that time, ie the late 1980s, governments, 
international institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have proposed 
various proposals4. The proposal put forward to the Development Committee o f the IMF 
and the World Bank by the French government in September 1989 proved to be the most 
feasible5 and led to the establishment of the GEF pilot phase (GEF P)6. The French 
proposal was considered and studied by the World Bank7 before a serious o f negotiations 
began in 1989-91. The negotiations8 mainly took place between and among the World 
Bank and the donor countries, ie the developed countries. The participation and the role 
of the recipient countries, ie the developing countries, were considered only at the final 
meeting in November 1990 (Sjoberg, 1994).
GEF P was set up by a Bank Resolution, (Resolution No. 91-5) which was 
approved by the Board of Directors on 14 March 1991. GEF P, administered jointly by 
the Bank, UNEP and UNDP, was to operate for three years from July 1991 to June 1994. 
It was to provide “new and additional financial resources9” to finance the “incremental 
costs10” of projects in developing countries that addressed four global environmental
4 For an historical account and the various proposals produced, see Sjoberg, 1994.
5 The French initiative gained the greatest momentum for, as one commentator notes “putting money on 
the table before the purpose was specified” (Sjoberg, 1996, p. 150) —  the French Finance Minister pledged 
FFr 900m support over a three-year period to back up its proposal.
6 The abbreviations used here follow the ones used in all the official documents o f GEF: the restructured 
GEF is referred to as GEF I while the pilot phase is referred to as GEF P.
7 For more information on the World Bank’s investigation of this proposal, see Sjoberg, 1994.
8 The negotiations leading to GEF P can be characterised as part o f the North-South position in negotiating 
the UNCED documents, including the two binding conventions, ie the FCCC and the CBD For further 
discussion on the climate change negotiation in the context o f different perspectives from the North vs. the 
South and its ramification on GEF negotiation, see Hyder, 1992; and Paterson, 1996.
9 The “financial resources” refers to those from official development assistance (ODA). The financial 
resources provided under the GEF P are to be new and additional to the existing ODA flow to developing 
countries.
10 “Incremental cost” is defined as: “the difference between the costs of a project undertaken with global 
environmental objectives in mind, and the costs o f an alternative project that the country would have
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problems: global warming, pollution of international waters, destruction o f biodiversity, 
and depletion of stratospheric ozone. Various controversial issues" surrounding the 
negotiations of GEF P remained unsettled even after the pilot phase became operational12 
and continued to be subject to intensive negotiation leading to the restructuring and 
replenishing of GEF.
By early 1992, pressure to reform the experimental GEF P came from both the 
donor and the recipient countries, as well as from NGOs. In addition, an independent 
evaluation team, commissioned by the World Bank in 1992, which published its report in 
1993, turned out to be critical of GEF P ’s operations (UNEP, UNDP, and World Bank, 
November 1993)13 and added strength to the calls for reform (Jordan and Werksman, 
1994a). Furthermore, restructuring was called for before and during the negotiations of 
the UNCED if GEF was to serve as the financial mechanism for the two Conventions14
implemented in the absence of global environmental concerns” (GEF, July 1995). Nevertheless, the term 
has yet to be clearly defined and has attracted keen debate among NGOs and academics. See, for 
example, Jordan, 1994; Jordan and Werksman, 1994b; and, Werksmans, May 1993a.
11 For more detailed discussions on some o f these controversial issues, see Gan, 1993 (for the individual 
roles o f the three implementing agencies and the roles played by governmental agencies and NGOs), 
Jordan and Werksman, 1994b (for the discussion on additionality and incrementality), Mintzer, 1993 (for 
the discussion on incremental costs), Reed, 1991 (for the relationship between GEF and NGOs), 
Werksman, 1993a (for the legal analysis on incremental costs under the FCCC), Werksman, 1995 (for the 
discussion on the relationship between GEF and the Conventions for which the restructured GEF P was to 
serve as the interim financial mechanism), and World Wildlife Fund for Nature, 1993 (for the four focal 
areas for which GEF P was to provide its financial support).
12 Despite some controversies surrounding the operations o f GEF P, the speedy negotiation leading to its 
establishment was nevertheless held to be a remarkable achievement in creating a mechanism within the 
existing international institutions to provide funding for developing countries in pursuing sustainable 
development. This characteristic o f “speed” in the negotiations o f GEF P can also be identified in the 
current operations o f GEF I. However, this speedy operation was questioned to have been carried out at 
the expense of the quality and sustainability of the projects proved (Jordan, 1994). In addition, the 
expedited process o f project approval should not be used alone as evidence demonstrating that GEF I has 
been fundamentally reformed in terms of its project qualities and performances.
13 For the assessment o f this independent evaluation report, see Fairman, 1994. More discussion on this 
independent evaluation report will be conducted in Chapter 5.4.
,4 Article 21.3 of the FCCC designates GEF as its interim financial mechanism only after GEF P was 
“appropriately restructured and its membership made universal to enable it to fulfil the requirements o f  
Article 11 [financial mechanism]”. Article 39 of the CBD also designates GEF as its interim financial 
mechanism on the condition that “it has been fully restructured in accordance with the requirements of 
Article 21 [financial mechanism]”.
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and Agenda 2115. That was the compromise between the developed countries, which 
preferred GEF over a new international financial mechanism for the greater control they 
have had over the GEF P 16, and the developing countries, which argued for a new funding 
mechanism separate from the World Bank'7.
The negotiations to restructure and replenish GEF P began in December 199218. 
The negotiations completed in Geneva on 16 March 1994 when the Instrument for the 
Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility (GEF Instrument) was 
accepted by the participants and was to be adopted by the Implementing Agencies (IA) 
according to their respective rules and procedural requirements19. The negotiations 
focused on what may be regarded as the “unfinished business” o f GEF P (Silard, 1995), 
such as attracting universal participation and reforming the governance system of GEF 
P20. The donor countries have pledged just over US$ 2bn during 1994-97 for the 
restructured GEF (GEF I), which was less than the US$ 3-4bn mooted at Rio (Jordan 
and Werksman, 1994a). The latest negotiation round for replenishment finished in March 
1998 and member governments agreed to replenish US$ 2.75bn to cover the period 1998 
- 2001 .
15 Chapter 33 of the Agenda 21 requires that GEF should be restructured for, inter alia, a “universal 
participation” and “transparent and democratic governance”, with “a balanced and equitable representation 
of the interests of developing countries” and “due weight to the funding efforts o f donor countries”.
16 GEF was established by a World Bank Resolution and all the decision-making powers for GEF were 
vested in the Bank, which was also reflected in the procedural arrangements for operational co-operation 
among the UNDP, UNEP and the Bank (Werksman, 1995).
17 Much of the scepticism of GEF P concerned the close relationship it has had with the World Bank,, 
whose decision-making process, ie the Bretton Woods style weighted voting system, has given the donor 
countries far greater voice in the operations o f the World Bank.
18 For further discussion on the negotiations of GEF restructuring and replenishment, see Sjoberg, 1996.
19 GEF Instrument was adopted by the World Bank’s Executive Directors on 24 May 1994, by the UNDP’s 
Executive Board on 13 May 1994, and by UNEP’s Governing Council on 18 June 1994.
20 For further discussion on GEF I, see Silard, 1995 (from the perspective o f one o f the Implementing 
Agencies, the World Bank), and: Jordan and Werksman, 1994a; and Werksman, 1995 (both from a more 
critical perspective delineating issues that have not been resolved by GEF I).
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b . O p e r a t i o n s
GEF P consisted mainly of the Global Environment Trust Fund (GET), Co- 
financing Arrangements with the GET and Ozone Projects Trust Fund21 (Resolution 91- 
5, para. 1). GEF I has a single trust fund, the GEF Trust Fund, into which the GET is 
merged (GEF Instrument, para. 8)22. The operations of GEF P mainly focused on the 
expedited project identification,, assessment and money allocation, rather than actual 
money disbursement (Jordan, 1994). During GEF P, a total o f 115 projects were 
approved with the committed funding of US$ 733m, o f which 41 projects with the 
committed funding of US$ 259m (representing approximately 35% of the total 
committed funding) was allocated for climate change. During GEF I, the amount of 
approximately US$ 2.1 bn was approved between February 1995 and October 1998, of 
which approximately US$ 776m, or 40% of the total committed funding was allocated 
for climate change (FCCC/CP/1998/12/Add.l). Compared with the three-year pilot 
phase, GEF I has been operating at a more expedited speed in terms of project approval23. 
However, that alone should not be regarded as evidence demonstrating the improvement 
of GEF I compared with GEF P, the evaluation o f which has to be based on the qualities 
of the projects implemented. That evaluation is still difficult to conclude since the actual
21 For further discussion on utilising the concept of “trusts” in common law to establish new international 
financial mechanisms to provide financial resources to assist developing countries implementing 
international environmental agreements, see Sand, 1995. As for the Bank’s operation in establishing trust 
funds, see the following section for further discussion.
22 The Multilateral Fund o f the Montreal Protocol is under a separate governance body, the Executive 
Committee, and is continued under formally separate arrangements (World Bank Executive Directors’ 
Resolution No. 94-3, May 24 1994, cited in Silard, 1995). The legal relationship between the Protocol and 
GEF no longer exists; however, an operational relationship still exists between the Protocol and GEF P in 
that staff o f the Implementing Agencies who work on GEF projects also provide technical assistance in the 
development o f Protocol Project (Reed, 1991). For further discussion on the Multilateral Fund o f the 
Montreal Protocol, see Patlis, 1992.
23 Of the total projects approved as o f June 1996, 42% (86 out of 201) were approved between FY 1995— 
96 with 38% (US$ 454m out of US$ 1,187m) of the total funding committed.
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disbursement has been slower than expected24 and, as a result, not many implemented 
projects are available for evaluation.
Regarding the scope of GEF I funding, the four focal areas, ie climate change, 
biological diversity, international waters and ozone layer depletion, remain the same as in 
GEF P, with the inclusion of land degradation, primarily decertification and 
deforestation, as they relate to the those areas (GEF Instrument, paras. 2 and 3). This is 
yet another compromise between donor countries, advocating a more “global agenda” 
such as climate change; and recipient countries, focusing more on the “local agenda” 
such as decertification. GEF I remains to provide “new and additional grant and 
concessional” funding to meet the “agreed incremental costs” of measures to achieve 
“agreed global environmental benefits” (GEF Instrument, para. 2) without giving clear 
definitions to any of these terms which have been controversial from the start o f the pilot 
phase negotiations25.
The tripartite arrangement of GEF P continues in GEF I, with the responsibilities 
of each of the IAs remaining mostly the same26. After the extensive restructuring 
negotiation, the governance structure of GEF I and its link with the FCCC have, on the 
other hand, greatly improved, as we shall see in the following discussion.
24 The reason for this slower-than-expected implementation is recognised by the GEF Council and the 
explanation given is “due to the complexities encountered when implementing GEF projects” (GEF, April 
1997).
25 For some of these controversial issues, see Jordan and Werksman, 1994b.
26 For the respective responsibilities of the three Implementing Agencies, see Annex C “Procedural 
Arrangements among the IBRD, the UNEP, and the UNDP” to the World Bank Resolution 91-5  
establishing GEF, and Annex D “Principles of Co-operation among the Implementing Agencies” to the 
Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured GEF.
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4.1.2.2 Joint implementation-related mechanisms: AIJ and GCI/PCF
In addition to GEF, the World Bank has either participated or begun to promote 
new mechanisms specifically designed for assisting its members to implement the FCCC. 
These mechanisms are the Bank’s Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) programme, and 
the Global Carbon Initiative (GCI) and its Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF). They operate 
differently from GEF and the SAP, two other mechanisms employed by the BWIs to 
influence their developing country members. These new mechanisms are either bilateral in 
nature, or market-based instruments and the participation from private parties are 
encouraged. The ways in which they influence developing countries are different from 
those used by GEF and the SAP, as the following chapter will point out. Nevertheless, 
their significance in addressing the relationship between the World Bank and its 
developing country members in the context of implementing the FCCC is no less 
important.
The Bank AIJ programme entered into a three-year pilot phase in April 1996. The 
PCF is still under negotiation with potential participants. Both of which seek to explore the 
possibility o f joint implementation27 (JI) as a potential implementation technique under the 
FCCC. The establishment, operations, and the latest development o f these two 
mechanisms are delineated in the following two sections. Their possible link with the 
FCCC will be addressed in the end.
27 After the Kyoto Protocol, JI in the FCCC and its Kyoto Protocol has a more limited application referring 
to JI between Annex I Parties. However, the term JI is used here in a broader sense that includes JI 
between developed and developing countries.
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a . A c t i v i t i e s  I m p l e m e n t e d  J o i n t l y  (AIJ)
COP 1 to the FCCC in 1995, adopted the decision, as required by Article 4.2(a) of 
the FCCC28, to establish a pilot phase of “activities implemented jointly” (AIJ) between 
Annex I parties and non-Annex I parties (Decision 5/CPI, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add. 1). On a 
voluntary basis, AIJ involves governments and private companies contracting with parties, 
governments or private companies, in another country to carry out activities that reduces 
GHGs in that country. According the decision of the COP, no credits shall accrue to any 
parties participating in this pilot phase AIJ (Decision 5/CPI, para. l[f]). COP 2 in 1996 
decided to continue the pilot phase AIJ. COP 3 in 1997, again, reaffirmed its decision 
5/CPI on AIJ under the pilot phase (Decision 10/CP3, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1). COP 4 in 
1998 decided to continue the pilot phase as well as to begin preparations for a review 
process of the pilot phase “with a view to the COP taking a conclusive decision on the 
pilot phase” (Decision 6/CP4, FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add. 1).
Following the COP decisions, the World Bank initiated a three-year programme on 
AIJ in collaboration with the Norwegian government in April 199629,30. The Bank helped 
to implement AIJ pilot projects with the funding from that government. Three AIJ pilot 
projects, in Mexico, Poland, and Burkina Faso, have received US$ 6.4m in total from the 
Norwegian government31. Co-financing agreements are established between host country 
parties and donor. The agreements may, at the request o f the host country, include
28 Article 4.2(a) of the FCCC sets down the commitments for the Annex I countries. It stipulates that 
Annex I Parties “may implement such policies and measures jointly with other parties . . . .” (emphasis 
added).
29 Prior to its own AIJ programme, the World Bank and the Norwegian Government have partnered a 
demonstration programme during 1993-96, in which two projects are carried in Poland and Mexico.
30 Note that the Bank AIJ programme does not represent the AIJ pilot phase authorised by the COP to the 
FCCC. Other bilateral AIJ projects have been undergoing and undertaken at the same time.
31 At least two more projects are near the stage o f approval from the host governments and the Norwegian 
government: an Integrated Agricultural Demand-side Management with the Anhfra Pradesh Electricity 
Board, India; and the Barbados Queen Elizabeth Hospital Fuel Cell Installation Project. For the update o f  
the latest information, see the official AIJ website at: http://www-esd.worldbank.org/aij.
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provisions that address institutional and political concerns related to AIJ matters. For 
instance, some host countries may wish to have an explicit clause stating that the present 
project is “for demonstration purposes only and does not constitute a sale o f future 
emission rights for GHGs” (World Bank, March 1997).
It seems that the Bank AIJ programme involves only the host and donor countries 
that are parties to the FCCC. In addition, the COP did not designate any implementing, or 
administrative, agency responsible for carrying out the pilot phase AIJ. The World Bank 
became involved in a rather incidental manner. Initially, it was GEF that was looking for a 
co-fmancing partner in arranging JI projects. Norway showed great interest in 
participating. GEF later withdrew and the Bank took over and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the Norwegian government. Thus the World Bank assumed 
this facilitative role in assisting host countries implementing AIJ pilot projects32. The 
massive experiences in project identification and implementation the World Bank has 
accumulated during the past might be an important consideration for Norway to accept the 
Bank as its partner. Despite the presumably bilateral nature of the AIJ between host and 
donor countries, the World Bank has undertaken a pivotal role in its AIJ programme.
The overall jobectives of the AIJ programmes have ben identified by the Bank. The 
World Bank in accordance with the FCCC requirements and these overall objectives has 
designed the project selection criteria33. The pilot projects are expected to be linked to 
regular Bank and IFC investment projects (World Bank, May 1997a). In the three AIJ 
projects carried out as of March 1997, two of them —  the Polish Coal to Gas Conversion 
Project and the Mexican ILUMEX Project —  have received GEF funding at the same
32 Personal communication with a staff member at the World Bank.
33 The objectives of the AIJ programme have been identified by the Bank as follows: to maximise learning 
about AIJ, to promote the long-term objective of the Climate Change Convention, to promote client
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time34 while the other —  Sustainable Energy Management in Burkina Faso —  has been 
linked to a Bank Project. AIJ projects that are associated with projects o f either the Bank 
(including the IFC) or of GEF are subject to all the Bank’s operational procedures and 
policies, including the competence of the Inspection Panel.
There is no formal governance structure in the Bank AIJ programme since it is 
essentially bilateral in nature. A Steering Committee that meets semi-annually consists of 
representatives from Norway and the Bank. The host country does not attend the Steering 
Committee. The Committee mainly serves as a reporting body to the Norwegian 
government as to how the AIJ programme is proceeding and how the money is spent. The 
Bank’s AIJ programme is co-ordinated by a small team, relying heavily on input from staff 
members throughout the Bank, in the Global Environment Division (World Bank, May 
1997a).
All pilot projects must be approved and endorsed by the host country government. 
However, as seen from the preceding discussion, the World Bank has taken most o f the 
responsibility in selecting and identifying AIJ projects in its AIJ programme. The input 
from the host countries, developing countries as well as economies in transition (EIT), in 
developing, for . example, project selection criteria is unclear. The affect o f the AIJ 
programme on the relationship between the World Bank and the recipients will be 
examined after introducing another of the Bank’s innovative mechanisms —  the Global 
Carbon Initiative.
country development, to explore solutions to the methodological issues, to promote partnerships and 
private sector participation, and, to identify and select AIJ pilot projects (World Bank, May 1997a).
34 However, there is no formai link between GEF and the AIJ funding. The project reports both pointed out 
specifically that: “The GEF funding is separate from the AIJ financing.”
122
b . G l o b a l  C a r b o n  I n i t i a t i v e  (GCI) a n d  i t s  P r o t o t y p e  C a r b o n  F u n d  (PCF)
In February 1997, James D Wolfensohn, the President o f the World Bank, tasked 
the Environment Department with exploring the idea of setting up a Carbon Investment 
Fund (CIF)35, including obtaining feedback from potential investors, as investigating the 
methodological issues of and a legal framework for a CIF. The Global Carbon Initiative 
(GCI)36 with the CIF, was first introduced at an internal meeting in the Bank in May 1997, 
in which various issues relating to the design and content o f this mechanism were 
discussed. Mr. Wolfensohn expressed in public the willingness o f the Bank to launch the 
CIF, should the parties to the FCCC find it helpful, at his speech to the so-called “Rio+5 
summit”: the UN General Assembly Special Session on 25 June 1997, New York.
Before COP 3, the Bank had already anticipated that a protocol with binding 
emissions reductions would be concluded and that collaboration between the parties, at 
least between Annex I Parties, ie developed countries and EIT, would be allowed to 
achieve these targets. The Bank, thus, spotted a potentially huge market for carbon trading 
(“carbon offsets market”) and wanted to position itself as an honest broker between 
“buyers” and “sellers” by forwarding the CIF. The CIF would act as a market intermediary 
by obtaining funds from investors (both governments and private sector) and investing in 
projects which would result in carbon emissions reductions (World Bank, June 1997). The 
idea was that the Bank, through the GCI and the CIF, would be able to provide a 
mechanism whereby buyers and sellers of “carbon offsets” (carbon reduction units) could 
efficiently invest in a pool, or fund, of carbon investments managed by the Bank. In
35 The CIF was renamed as the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) after the FCCC COP 3 in 1997.
36 The GCI is to investigate the potential o f market mechanisms to reduce global GHGs emissions and to 
support environmentally sustainable growth for developing countries. The establishment o f the CIF is one 
such market mechanisms the Bank is exploring under the GCI.
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addition to the CIF, the GCI has been considering other products, including carbon-neutral 
products, specific-purpose funds and specific services37.
The GCI has not begun operating yet and the CIF is still obtaining pledges of 
support from governments and businesses. Several MOUs have been signed with some 
OECD governments and private companies since early June 1997, in which initial pledges 
to invest in the CIF are made. After the FCCC COP 3, the CIF has been renamed as the 
Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), and will be presented in the Bank’s Executive Board 
Seminar in February 1999. It will seek endorsement from the Bank’s Executive Board in 
its April meeting in 1999, and, if  approved by the Board, will be established and open for 
contribution from governments and private entities in July 1999.
Most of the EIT (economies in transition) countries and some Latin American 
countries have expressed strong interest in participating in the PCF. In fact, several EIT 
have already shown great interest in hosting CFP projects (World Bank, March 1998)38. 
The response from China and the G77 countries are not yet clear at this stage. Therefore, 
the participation of the developing countries in the prepartion o f the PCF is not yet 
noticeable. However, with the emissions trading sanctioned by COP 3 in Kyoto, even the 
Kyoto Protocol only allows Annex I Parties to participate at the present stage, more 
positive response to the PCF from other members of the Bank, in particular developing 
country members, can be expected. In addition, as will be discussed in the following 
sections, the design of a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol
37 These products have not been developed as fully as the CIF and, thus, will not be discussed in more 
detail here.
38 In fact, in the initial “Terms of Reference for a Feasibility Study on World Bank Carbon Investment 
Fund,” the CIF was intended to invest in EIT. For the Terms of Reference, visit the website at: http//www- 
esd.worldbank.org/cc.
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will also affect the perception of the developing countries in participating in the 
GCI/PCF39.
The Bank’s Managing Director at the first GEF Assembly presented the PCF in 
April 1998. The potential overlap between GEF projects and PCF projects40 is another 
issue o f concern. One of the political risks identified by the Bank staff working on the GCI 
is that the Bank may be perceived as undermining GEF replenishment, which was under 
negotiation at the time. The Bank has the following responses to this concern over the 
potential conflict between GEF and the CIF/PCF. First, the Bank intends to fully honour 
its commitment to channel GEF resources for eligible investments. Secondly, GEF and the 
World Bank Group have agreed on their method of collaboration in moving forward on the 
establishment of the initial PCF. Lastly, the Bank views GEF and PCF funding of climate 
friendly investments to be complements rather than substitutes (Koch-Weser, April 1998). 
Nonetheless, this concern might be less of a problem now that the negotiation o f the 
second GEF replenishment has been completed. In addition, distinction will have to be 
drawn eventually because the two mechanisms serve different objectives. GEF mainly 
intends to transfer financial and technical resources to the Bank’s developing country 
member, while the GCI/PCF, at its initial stage, will concentrate on EIT countries.
The PCF will develop into another trust fund managed by the Bank. Agreements 
will need to be signed between the potential donors and the Bank. It is interesting to 
observe whether contentious issues that occupied the negotiation of GEF P and its 
restructure will emerge again in the process of setting up the GCI/PCF. Similarities can 
already be identified between GEF and the GCI: both came from the initiatives within the
39 For further discussion, see Chapter 4.1.2.2.
40 According to personal communication with a staff member of the Bank working on the AIJ/GCI, GEF 
has felt “threatened” by the PCF for potential “competition” from the PCF, in particular with GEF 
operation in the category o f short-term response measure.
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Bank, both of their initial negotiations took place between the Bank and the donors (the 
developed country members) with minimum participation from the developing country 
member. In the case of GEF, developing countries entered into the negotiation at rather a 
later stage. However, they managed to secure their interests in GEF I. At the moment, the 
participation of the GCI from the Bank’s developing country members seems rather 
insignificant. The perception o f how beneficial it will be in participating in the GCI will 
influence developing countries’ decisions as to whether to take part in its negotiation. 
When market-based mechanisms such as emission trading were sanctioned by the Kyoto 
Protocol as some of the implementation tools under the FCCC, it might be in developing 
countries’ own interests that they take part in the negotiation o f the GCI as early as 
possible in order to safeguard their own interests41.
Another comparison worth noting is the decision-making structure o f the Bank, the 
GEF Trust Fund, and the PCF. The Bank’s policies are guided by the decisions of its 
Executive Boards, in which its developed country members hold the majority o f the votes. 
In the GEF Trust Fund, the Bank is the Trustee of the fund and is accountable to the GEF 
Council, which has a more balanced representation from both the developed and 
developing countries42. This, as the following section will show, has in part mitigated the 
asymmetric treatment perceived by developing countries under the BWIs regime. In the 
GCI, the decision-making structure is not yet clear. However, in its initial stage of 
development, it appears that the Bank has been taking the lead in designing the framework 
o f the GCI. The Bank is very likely to serve as the trustee in the PCF or any trust fund 
created thereof. Since the idea of GCI/PCF was based on the potential market for carbon
41 Developing countries, for example, can instruct the elected Executive Directors from their constituencies 
to put into the agenda of the GCI/PCF negotiations interests relating to developing countries, such as the 
design of the governance structure o f the GCI.
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trading under the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, it might be possible that the GCI could 
enter into an agreement with the FCCC similar to the one between GEF and the FCCC. If 
that is the case, the Bank as trustee of PCF may have a similar role to that o f the GEF 
Trust Fund. This can be a positive development in the Bank’s favour in terms of 
improving its relationship with the developing countries and increasing its ability to play a 
new role in assisting the implementation of the FCCC more effectively.
C. LINK WITH THE FCCC43
Unlike GEF, neither the Bank AIJ programme nor the GCI has established any 
formal relationship with the FCCC. Since the basic ideas behind their design have 
progressively been sanctioned by the Kyoto Protocol44 and the purpose o f their 
establishment in the Bank was to assist the implementation o f the FCCC, it might be 
expected that some forms of co-operation would emerge eventually.
The Bank AIJ programme is implemented under the auspices o f the FCCC, which 
sets out guidance for the operations of the pilot phase. Nevertheless, the Bank AIJ 
programme does not play any formal role under the FCCC AIJ pilot phase, or vice versa. 
Although the Bank designs the project selection criteria, they are, according to the Bank, 
set in accordance with FCCC requirements. A uniform reporting format for the pilot phase 
AIJ projects was adopted by the FCCC and reiterated in COP 3. The Bank assists the host 
countries participating in its AIJ programme to prepare their reports to the FCCC
42 More discussion on the governance structure of GEF and the role o f the Bank in GEF will follow in 
Chapter 4.2.
43 “Link” with the FCCC refers to formal but not necessarily legal agreements between the FCCC and any 
of the mechanisms under the World Bank in arranging the relationship between the two. Examples o f this 
type o f “link” include the MOU between the FCCC COP and the GEF Council as discussed in Chapter 
4.2.2 and 4.3.
44 The AIJ is based on the concept of JI. A pilot phase JI (AIJ) was approved at the COP 1. At COP 3, JI 
was officially endorsed by the Kyoto despite on a smaller scale limited among developed countries (Kyoto
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Secretariat. Because of these arrangements, the relationship between the Bank AIJ 
programme and the FCCC remains close, notwithstanding the lack of formal link or 
agreement between them.
As for the GCI and its PCF, no similar arrangement with the FCCC exists. The 
“Project Selection Guidelines”, on which the Bank will base its investments in projects 
funded by the PCF, will be developed in consultation with the participants and hosts. At 
present, thus, the relationship between the PCF and the FCCC does not seem to be as close 
as that between the GEF and the FCCC. However, it needs to be noted that a mechanism 
very similar to the GCI was established under the Kyoto Protocol: the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, non-Annex I Parties, ie 
developing countries, will benefit from project activities resulting in certified emission 
reductions, and Annex I Parties may use the certified emission reductions accruing from 
such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3 of the Protocol. The relationship 
between the Bank’s GCI/PCF and the CDM remains to be seen45. At the moment, the Bank 
does not seem to envisage a formal relationship between the PFC and the CDM. Whether 
the Bank will be designated as the operational entity to certify emission reductions (Kyoto 
Protocol, Article 12.5) or whether the PCF will serve as the fund that will be assisted by 
the CDM for funding the certified project activities (Kyoto Protocol, Article 12.6) are 
some of the developments that need to be observed closely46.
Protocol, Article 6). The GCI/PCF intends to tap into the potential market for emission trading, which is 
also sanctioned by the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto Protocol, Article 17).
45 More discussion on the relationship between the GCI/PCF and the CDM will be conducted in 
Chapter 5.4.2.2.
46 Whether it is desirable from developing countries’ perspective that such link is to be established will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.4.2.2.
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In short, the World Bank’s two innovative mechanisms do not have such a close 
link with the FCCC as GEF. However, they enable the Bank to provide additional 
resources for the developing countries to implement the FCCC, which makes them no less 
important than GEF in the Bank’s effort to play its new .role. Nevertheless, the 
mechanisms, unlike GEF, have less operational experiences and operate differently from 
the existing mechanism of the Bank such as the SAP. The following two sections will thus 
turn to GEF for further discussion. The distinctive governance structure o f GEF, which has 
a positive effective on the relationship between the Bank and the developing countries, 
will be examined first.
4.2 GEF: distinctive characteristics
4.2.1 Decision-making
The operations of GEF P were largely influenced by the Bank and have been 
criticised by both academics (eg Werksman, 1995) and the independent evaluation team 
(UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank, November 1993). In GEF I, although the tripartite 
arrangement among the UNDP, UNEP and the Bank continued, the dominating role the 
latter played during GEF P was diminished in the domain of policy making47. In terms of 
governance, GEF I had an improved structure based on universal participation, as required 
by the two Conventions and Agenda 21. GEF P was administered by the World Bank as 
the trustee of GET in accordance with the applicable provisions o f the Articles of 
Agreement, by-laws, rules and decisions o f the Bank (Resolution 91-5, para. 1). The Bank 
reported semi-annually to the participants’ meeting (Resolution 91-5, para. 7).
47 During GEF P, the operating policies were set by the World Bank with the collaboration o f the UNDP 
and the UNEP; while in GEF I this policy-making power has been transferred to the FCCC and the CBD 
by their respective COP and to the GEF Council (Silard, 1995). For a more detailed discussion on this
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Participants48 did not have formal power to determine GEF P policy or to approve GEF P 
projects, which remained the responsibilities of the World Bank (Werksman, 1995).
The governance structure was reformed in GEF I in response to the demand by 
developing countries for more participatory and universal decision-making arrangements49. 
Any UN state members or any of the UN’s specialised agencies may become a participant 
in GEF I (GEF Instrument, para. 7)50. GEF I has an Assembly, consisting o f 
representatives of all participants; a Council, consisting of 32 members representing 
constituency groupings, and a Secretariat, headed by a Chief Executive Officer (GEF 
Instrument, paras. 11, 13, 16, and 21). The Assembly is to meet once every three years to 
review the general policies, operation and membership of GEF I and to consider 
amendments to the GEF Instrument (GEF Instrument, paras. 11 and 12). There is no 
voting procedure prescribed for the Assembly in matters relating to amendments to the 
GEF Instrument. “Consensus” is to be sought when considering approval o f any 
amendments to the Instrument on the basis of Council recommendations (GEF Instrument, 
para. 12). Compared to the IBRD, the equivalent of the GEF Assembly in the IBRD will 
be the Board of Governors. Under the Articles of Agreement o f the IBRD, unless 
otherwise specified, decisions are to by made by a majority of the votes cast. The number
transformation and the legal relationship between and among the World Bank, the COPs, and the GEF 
Council, see Werksman, 1993b and 1995.
48 In order to become a participant, governments are required to make a minimum contribution of SDR 4m 
either to the GET or to establish a co-financing relationship with the Fund; a country, however, did not 
have to be a participant in order to be eligible for funding. This “entrance fee” has been heavily criticised 
by developing countries and by the NGOs, in spite of the financial assistance to some governments 
provided by bilateral agencies and the IBRD. This fee was waived by the World Bank altogether in 
December 1992 (Jordan, 1994).
49 The fundamental conflict between donor and recipient countries about the governance and decision­
making process of GEF mirrors the debate between developed and developing countries over the decision­
making process o f international institutions in general. Developed countries prefer the Bretton Woods style 
voting system in which voting power is determined by the financial contribution of the country; while 
developing countries value the UN style voting system in which votes are equal among countries. See, for 
example, Jordan, 1994; and, Silard, 1995.
50 The “entrance fee” requirement for membership has been waived in GEF I. However, this requirement 
was still retained in the replenishment negotiations (Silard, 1995).
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of votes each governor has depends on the contribution his government makes to the 
Bank51 (IBRD Articles o f Agreement, Article V, Sections 2 and 3). Formal vote does not 
take place in the GEF Assembly and rarely takes place in the IBRD Board o f Governors in 
practice. Compared with the developing country Governors in the IBRD, developing 
country Representatives in the GEF Assembly can be more confident to voice the concerns 
o f developing countries and secure their interests because, under the rules o f the GEF 
Assembly, developing countries will not be “outvoted” by developed countries in reaching 
important decisions. The restructured GEF, thus, has a governance structure that represents 
a more collective decision-making process in which more significant participation from 
the developing countries is secured.
The Council will determine the operational policies o f GEF I and the COP to the 
FCCC, on the other hand, will decide on policies, programme priorities and eligibility 
criteria for GEF I operations in relation to climate change (GEF Instrument, paras. 5 and 
6). The 32 Council members will be selected from constituency groupings, 16 of which 
will be from developing countries, 14 from developed countries, and 2 from the countries 
o f Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (GEF Instrument, para. 16). 
The Council is to adopt regulations by consensus. Unless otherwise provided, decisions
requiring a formal vote by the Council are to be taken by a double-weighted majority, ie an
/
affirmative vote representing both a 60% majority of the total number o f participants and a 
60% majority of the total contributions (GEF Instrument, para. 25). The novel design 
represents a middle ground between the Bretton Woods weighted voting system and the 
UN one-country-one-vote system. The GEF Instrument mandates the number o f Council 
members representing developing country participants, which is half the total Council
51 The IMF and the IDA have similar governance structures as those of the IBRD (IMF Articles o f
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members, while the BWIs do not have similar requirements for elected Executive 
Directors.
In addition, when circumstance arise when voting is required, developing 
countries’ individual votes can be counted more significantly within the GEF Council than 
in the Boards of Executive Directors of the BWIs since affirmative votes from individual 
participants constitute half the majority votes required by the GEF Council. Therefore, 
compared with the Boards of Executive Directors o f the BWIs, which are also responsible 
for making operational decisions and proving loans, the GEF Council has the framework 
to incorporate different views of developed and developing countries. Although decisions 
are usually reached upon through consensus, when it comes down to voting, GEF I 
provides safeguards for developing countries by partially adopting the UN voting system.
As a result the decision-making process was visibly clarified in GEF I. While most 
o f the decisions are made by the World Bank during GEF P, the GEF Instrument set down 
clear provisions for decision making in GEF I. As a result, this governance structure might 
begin to balance the asymmetry problem perceived by developing countries in at least the 
World Bank when it is acting as an IA of GEF I. In addition, the closer link with the 
FCCC also helps to tilt the balance, as we will now discuss.
4.2.2 Links with the FCCC
In terms of links with the FCCC, we will now examine the relationship between 
GEF52 and the FCCC as set down in the GEF Instrument. Compared with GEF P, the GEF 
Instrument provides clearer provisions regulating the relationship and co-operation
Agreement, Article XII, Sections 2 and 5; IDA Articles o f Agreement, Article VI, Sections 2 and 3).
52 Unless otherwise specified, the term “GEF” used in this section refers to the restructured GEF: GEF I.
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between the two Conventions53 to which GEF serves as an interim financial mechanism, 
and with other bodies (GEF Instrument, paras. 26-28). According to Article 11.3 o f the 
FCCC, arrangements are to be made by the COP to govern the relationship between the 
FCCC and the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism, 
which, in the present case, will be GEF. Similarly, para. 27 o f the GEF Instrument also 
stipulates that co-operative arrangements or agreements with the COPs to the two 
Conventions shall be considered and approved by the Council. As a result, a Memoranda 
of Understanding (MOU) between the COP to the FCCC and the GEF Council was 
drafted, following the request by a decision made during COP 1, jointly by the two 
secretariats of the FCCC and GEF.
The GEF Council approved the MOU at its meeting in July 1995 (GEF/C5/8) and 
by the FCCC COP 2 in July 199654 (Decsion 12/CP2, FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.l). The 
Annex to the MOU on the determination of the funding necessary and available for the 
implementation of the Convention, approved by the GEF Council, at its meeting in April 
1996, (GEF/C7/11) has also been approved at the FCCC COP 3 (Decision 12/CP3, 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. I)55. The purpose of the MOU is to describe the respective roles 
and responsibilities of the COP and of GEF (MOU, para. 1). It also provides the 
reporting procedures o f GEF to the COP (MOU, paras. 6-8). It reaffirms that the GEF 
Council will ensure that the operations and funding activities o f GEF will be in 
conformity with the guidance of the COP (MOU, para. 4). It further bestows the COP the
53 For further discussion on the legal relationship between GEF and the COP to the FCCC, see, Werksman,' 
1995.
54 A similar arrangement has also been reached between the COP to the CBD and GEF, which will not be 
discussed here.
55 Paragraph 9 o f the MOU stipulates that “the COP and the Council shall jointly determine the aggregate 
GEF funding requirements for the purpose of the Convention”. The Annex to the MOU is to lay down the 
procedures to facilitate such a joint determination. This Annex attracts controversies for it needs to 
determine what is the amount of funds “necessary and available” for implementing the Convention as
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right to consider a specific project decision of the Council which is considered by any 
party to be in violation of the guidance from the COP, and to ask the Council for a 
reconsideration of that decision (MOU, para. 7). This MOU clarifies certain issues 
regarding the relationship between the COP and GEF, and confirms the authority o f the 
COP over most o f the operations of GEF
The relationship between GEF and the COP to the FCCC can be analysed from 
two levels based on the types of GEF operations the Council is to decide: one relates to 
GEF operations in the focal area of climate change; and the other relates to non-climate 
change GEF activities. For the climate change-related GEF operations, GEF shall 
“follow the policies, programmes priorities and eligibility criteria decided by the FCCC 
COP” (GEF Instrument, paras. 26 and 6). Article 11.3 o f the FCCC also stipulates 
similar provision reiterating the authority of the COP in developing “policies, 
programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to this Convention”. The MOU 
approved by the FCCC COP 2 and the GEF Council further asserts the authority o f the 
COP to decide on the climate change-related GEF operations. As a result o f these mostly 
legal requirements56 that brings closer relationship between GEF and the FCCC, the 
developing countries, through the numerical majority and the UN-style voting system in 
the COP to the Convention57, have theoretically gained more leverage over decisions 
relating to the operations of GEF in climate change-related area.
guidance for the negotiation of GEF replenishment (Werksman, 1995). More discussion on this Annex to 
the MOU will follow.
56 Note that the MOU is a relatively informal document without legally binding effect for the narrow legal 
capacity granted by GEF Instrument (Werksman, 1995). It has been reiterated further by the GEF Council 
as follows: “A memorandum of understanding is a form of arrangement that is often used to denote a firm, 
but not legally binding, commitment between two or more organisations.” (emphasis added.) (GEF/C5/8.)
57 Although the recipient countries have a numerical majority in the COP, they do not necessarily get a 
“upper hand” over the decision-making process since “consensus building” is what most o f the new MEAs 
opted for in their decision-making process. For further discussion on the COP to the MEAs, see 
Werksman, 1996a. Nevertheless, the mechanism does exist in the COP that provides a fairer voting system 
from the recipient countries’ perspectives.
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In the second category, ie the non-climate change-related activities58, it is the GEF 
Council that is responsible for developing, adopting and evaluating the operational 
policies and programmes for GEF-financed activities (GEF Instrument, para. 15). The 
structure o f and the decision-making process in the GEF Council have, as previously 
mentioned, been greatly improved compared with that of the pilot phase and, in 
particular, to that of the BWIs. The recipients are presented more equally as donors in the 
GEF Council, representing one-half of all Council members. The governance structure 
provides a framework59 in which the developing countries have more chances to voice 
their priorities and needs on a more equal footing than the donors60. In addition, in GEF 
report to the FCCC COP 2 (FCCC/CP/1996/8) which, noted by the Secretariat, should be 
seen as an initial implementation of the relevant provisions o f the MOU, it was indicated 
that when GEF provided assistance to countries outside the Convention’s financial 
mechanism, it ensured that the activities were fully consistent with the guidance provided 
by the COP. The report, albeit a non-legal instrument, demonstrated that the GEF 
Council is willing to defer to the guidance from COP to the FCCC, and bring a close 
relationship between GEF and the FCCC. In short, not only does the GEF Council have 
to comply with COP guidance in its climate change-related activities, it also needs to 
take into account the same guidance in its non-climate change-related activities.
58 The “non-climate change-related GEF activities” referred to here exclude activities in the focal area of 
biodiversity, the reason being that, as in the case o f the FCCC, the COP to the CBD is to decide the 
policies, programme priorities, and eligibility criteria in relation to the biodiversity-related GEF activities' 
(CBD, Article 21.1 and GEF Instrument, paras. 6 and 26).
59 The implications of this novel governance structure o f GEF on the actual day-to-day operations o f GEF 
are more difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, with this more balanced governance structure in place, 
developing countries can be sure that their votes can be counted more significantly in the GEF Council 
that in the Executive Boards of the BWIs.
60 Although the one-country-one-vote UN system, preferred by the recipients, was not adopted by GEF 
Instrument, the present system seeks a middle ground between the weighted voting system and the UN 
style voting system. See para. 25 of GEF Instrument.
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Another important aspect of the relationship between GEF and the FCCC is the 
decision to determine the amount of money donors will contribute. In the case of GEF, 
the amount of funding necessary and available for the implementation o f the Convention 
has proven to be a very controversial issue. Should the COP bears the main responsibility 
of determining the “necessary and available” funding GEF is to provide, the recipient 
countries, ie the developing country Parties, through their numerical majority in the 
COP, might, and are able to, set the funding at such a huge amount that might, as one 
commentator puts it, “quickly outstrip donors’ willingness to contribute.” (Werksman, 
1995, p. 59) On the other hand, should the donor countries continue to dominate GEF 
replenishment negotiations, the amount o f funding might be deemed insufficient by the 
recipients to implement the Convention and might, eventually, render the implementation 
ineffective. Consequently, this aspect o f the relationship between GEF and the recipients 
is no less important than that regulated in the MOU and will be examined briefly now.
The MOU lays down the principle o f determining the necessary and available 
funding by stipulating, in para. 9, that: “ ... the COP and the Council shall jointly 
determine the aggregate GEF funding requirements for the purpose o f the Convention. 
Procedures to facilitate such a joint determination will be developed by the COP and the 
Council and annexed to this Memorandum.” (emphasis added.) The “Annex on the 
determination o f funding necessary and available for the implementation o f the 
Convention” proves to be more controversial than the MOU itself because o f the 
differences between the recipients and the donors. It was drafted jointly by the FCCC and 
the GEF Secretariats in August 1995 and the draft text was approved by the GEF Council 
at its meeting in April 1996 with one revision, which gave the COP a bit more leverage
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over determining the adequacy of the resources available61. However, COP 2 did not 
approve the Annex along with the MOU and decided to refer the text adopted by the 
Council and the draft annex submitted by the G-77 and China for consideration by the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) at its subsequent session (Decision 13/CP2, 
FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add. 1).
At the SBI’s fourth session, when comments on the Annex from the Parties were 
received, both the US and the EU, representing the majority o f the donors, saw no point 
o f re-drafting the text since the Annex has been approved in the GEF Council “by 
governments that take part in the work o f the Convention” (FCCC/SBI/ 1996/MIS 1 
Paper No. 3: comment by the US). However, the Annex adopted by the Council met 
objections from the recipients, representing largely by the G-77 and China, which put 
forward a rather radical proposal at the fourth session o f the SBI62 (FCCC/SBI/1996/ 
L4/Rev.l). The different perspectives between the donors and the recipients are clearly 
reflected in the large discrepancies shown in the Annex adopted by the Council and the 
draft annex submitted by the G-77 and China in November 1996.63
61 The original draft states that: “The COP may, in its action on GEF reports, comment on the adequacy of 
the resources available for the implementation o f the Convention.” (emphasis added.) The adopted text by 
the GEF Council reads: “The COP may, in its action on GEF reports, consider the adequacy o f the 
resources available for the implementation o f the Convention.” (emphasis added.)
62 One cannot help but to notice the forum at which the G-77 and China chose to voice their opinion. The 
G-77 and China have their own Council Members who can also put forward revisions to the draft 
proposed by the two Secretariats during the Council Meeting o f April 1996. Instead, they chose to promote 
their own draft Annex through the SBI, a subsidiary body o f the FCCC that is to report to the COP. There 
might be several explanations for this choice o f forum. One o f the reasons could be that the G-77 and 
China, representing the majority o f the recipients, are still suspicious o f  the “neutrality” o f GEF 
operations. If that is the case, then the restructuring o f GEF in relation to its decision-making process 
might turn out to be less comprehensive as has been suggested by some commentators.
63 The draft annex submitted by the G-77 and China clearly designated the COP as the sole authority in 
guiding the GEF replenishment negotiations and determining the necessary and available funding for 
implementing the Convention. On the other hand, the Annex adopted by the Council urged the COP to 
take into account “other sources o f funding” available for the implementation o f the Convention, which 
could be interpreted as an intention o f the donors to rid the GEF as the only source o f funding to assist 
developing countries to implement the Convention.
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Considering the large discrepancies in these two texts, it should be held as a 
remarkable achievement that an annex was approved by the SBI at its fourth session in 
December 1996 and the recommendation by the SBI for its adoption was accepted at 
COP 3 (Decision 12/CP3, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1). The GEF replenishment 
negotiations will continue to take place within GEF, as commanded by the donors. 
Nevertheless, the GEF will fully and comprehensively take into account the assessment 
of the COP during the replenishment negotiations, as an assurance that the donors cannot 
disregard the assessment by the COP. As for the financial resources needed, the relevant 
provision provides that: .. the COP will make an assessment o f the amount o f funds
that are necessary to assist developing countries ... taking into account ... (b) financial 
resources needed by developing country parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs 
of implementing measures that are covered by Article 4.1 o f the Convention that are 
agreed between a developing country party and the international entity or entities 
referred to in Article 11 o f the Convention.” (emphasis added.) This language is similar 
to Article 4.3 of the Convention which stipulates that the agreed full incremental costs of 
implementing measures covered by Article 4.1 are to be agreed between developing 
country Parties and the international entity or entities entrusted with the operation o f the 
financial mechanism.
Overall, judging from the text adopted by the SBI and the COP, it seems fair to 
conclude that, although the donors still managed to keep the GEF Council, rather than 
the COP, as the main forum for GEF replenishment negotiations, the recipients also 
managed to put in enough safeguards in the Annex to ensure that the donors could no 
longer dominate the process of determine the amount o f GEF funding and that their
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interests and needs can be guarded by the COP64. This demonstrates that a delicate 
balance between the donors and the recipients has been reached and this Annex could 
further improve the relationship between GEF and the recipients, and adjust the 
imbalance usually associated with the traditional relationship between donors and 
recipients in similar type o f international financial institutions.
In the first GEF Assembly held in New Delhi, India in April 1998, the 
participants adopted a New Delhi Statement, which contains 10 preambular and 12 
operative paragraphs. Relationship is further clarified between GEF and the LAs, 
including the World Bank. The Statement specifies that: “GEF Implementing Agencies 
should promote measures to achieve global environmental benefits within the context o f 
their regular programs and consistent with the global environmental conventions while 
respect the authority o f the governing bodies o f the Implementing Agencies.” (New 
Delhi Statement o f the First GEF Assembly, para. 9.) This Statement reiterates the 
importance of “mainstreaming” the existing operations and programmes o f the Bank, 
which could, indirectly, enhance a still closer link between the Bank and GEF by 
appealing to the Bank to “mainstream” its regular programmes so that these programmes 
would be consistent with the global environmental conventions65.
In conclusion, as a result o f the clearer provisions in the GEF Instrument, the 
MOU between the GEF Council and the COP to the FCCC, and in the New Delhi 
Statement, a closer link between GEF and the FCCC was established. GEF should follow 
guidance from the COP in climate change-related project and take into account guidance
64 How this formula works in practice and whether the interests o f the recipients can be guaranteed are 
difficult to evaluate at the moment. The latest round o f negotiation o f GEF replenishment took place 
between 1997-98 when the Annex to the MOU was still under debate in the GEF Council and the FCCC 
COP. Although the negotiation round continued in 1998 after the FCCC COP 3 has approved the Annex to 
the MOU, it remains unclear whether this formula has had any impact on this round o f replenishment 
negotiation.
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from the COP in non-climate change-related project. The COP to the FCCC has a UN- 
style voting system where developing countries can feel more confident to put forward 
their environmental and developmental agenda. This closer link between GEF and the 
FCCC might be able to change the traditional relationship between the developing 
countries and the World Bank as one of the IAs o f GEF. The following discussion will 
examine more specifically the implications of GEF for the World Bank.
4.2.3 Implications fo r  the World Bank
By taking a major part in the establishment of GEF P, the Bank has embarked on 
a new role, one that was identified in Chapter 266. During the negotiation o f GEF P and 
its restructure, contentious issues were developed almost along the line o f different 
perceptions o f the Bank between its developed and developing country members. The 
negotiation o f GEF P was concluded mainly between and among the donors and the 
Bank, which reminds us o f the negotiation history o f the IBRD that mainly took place 
between the developed countries. In addition, the formal power to determine GEF P 
policy or to approve GEF P projects remained the responsibilities o f the World Bank 
(Werksman, 1995). It is, thus, not difficult to understand why the perception o f GEF P 
have been as adversarial as that o f the Bank in the eyes o f developing countries and why 
they have argued for a new funding mechanism separate from the Bank67.
65 More discussion on the issues o f “mainstreaming” will be conducted in Chapter 5.4.2.1.
66 The experiences o f the Bank as one o f the implementing agency o f the Multilateral Fund o f the Montreal 
Protocol can be said to have witnessed this shift to a new role. However, the involvement o f the Bank in 
the Multilateral Fund in terms o f the negotiation process and decision-making process is not as extensive 
as that in GEF P.
67 Literature abounds regarding the positions o f developed and developing countries in the negotiation of  
. the FCCC and whether GEF was to serve as the financial mechanism o f the Convention. See, for example,
Hyder, 1992; andNitze, 1994.
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For the same reason, the donor countries, sensing the similarities between GEF P 
and the Bank, preferred GEF P to act as the financial mechanism to several Rio 
documents, including the FCCC, because they felt they could have more control over the 
financial mechanism operated by the Bank, a financial institution whose decision-making 
procedure has been more favoured by developed countries68. As a result, although it was 
GEF P that has been subject to keen debate as to whether it should serve as the 
Convention’s financial mechanism, it was actually the role o f the Bank, including its 
BW-style governance structure69, that has been under scrutiny.
A compromise was reached at the end o f the FCCC negotiation where GEF was 
accepted as the Convention’s financial mechanism on an interim basis, and on the 
condition that it would be “appropriately restructured and its membership made universal 
to enable it to fulfil” the Convention’s requirements (FCCC, Article 21.3). This final 
compromise and the subsequent structure o f GEF I following the restructure should shed 
some light on the Bank in respect to its relationship with developing country members. 
The fundamental concerns of the developing countries include the governance structure 
of the Bank and how the resulting asymmetry problem might flow to the new financial 
mechanism of the FCCC if GEF P was to serve as that mechanism. With the increasing 
bargaining power of the developing countries in the negotiation o f international 
environmental problems70, developing countries were able to air their dissatisfaction of
68 For example, as one commentator notes, the role o f the UN ECOSOC was played down by the rich 
countries in comparison with the World Bank and the IMF, and part o f the reasons for Western preference 
for the BWIs over ECOSOC “was its decision-making procedures” (Dasgupta, B, 1998, pp. 72-73.)
69 As one commentator puts it “... the struggle was argued in terms o f legitimacy versus efficiency.” 
(Sjoberg, 1996, p. 156). Legitimacy is associated with universality, democratic decision-making and 
transparency while efficiency usually refers to cost-effectiveness, efficient management and operational 
criteria. These two sets o f principles corresponded to different governance models: UN-style as legitimate 
and BW-style as effective.
. 70 International environmental problems such as climate change require an international solution. Without 
the participation of the developing countries, unilateral efforts by the developed countries are certain to
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the Bank and to secure a compromise in the end. The governance structure of GEF I no 
longer follows the Bretton Woods style weighted-voting system. A closer link has been 
instituted between GEF and the FCCC, in which the COP to the FCCC is bestowed with 
the authority to decide a major part o f GEF operations, as the preceding section 
illustrated.
All these improvements could have deep ramifications for the World Bank in the 
context of re-evaluating its relation with the developing countries. On the other hand, to 
the extent that the developed countries and the Bank itself endorsed the structure o f GEF 
I, it might have suggested a degree of tolerance within the Bank and the donors in terms 
of their willingness to accommodate the demand o f governance structure reform from the 
developing countries. Under the circumstances, the structure o f GEF I can provide a 
good model for the future reform within the Bank when dealing with the governance 
structure reform71. Furthermore, the Bank can better assist the implementation o f the 
FCCC by its developing countries through its involvement in GEF as one o f the LAs and 
as the Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund72, as the following investigation will reveal.
In addition to the significant implication o f the outcome o f GEF negotiation, 
another important ramification for the World Bank in the operation of GEF is the Bank’s 
role as the Trustee o f the GEF Trust Fund. GET and OTF were established under the 
Bank’s Resolution 91-5 to be a part o f GEF P (Resolution 91-5, para. 2-4 ,16-18). After 
the restructure, a new the GEF Trust Fund was established under the GEF Instrument to
fail. The potential “ability” o f the developing countries to undermine the success o f the MEAs becomes a 
source o f leverage and bargaining power for the developing countries (Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992).
71 It needs to be noted that calls for reforming decision-making procedures o f the BWIs have been placed 
as early as in the NIEO period in the 1970s and no actions have been taken within the BWIs two decades 
later. The governance o f GEF I no doubt serves a theoretical model if  the Bank decides to take up 
governance structure reform. Nevertheless, whether the reform can be materialised is another matter and 
the discussion of which is outside the scope o f the present study.
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replace the GET in GEF P (GEF Instrument, para. 8 and Annex B). The Bank is the 
Trustee of both trust funds. It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that the Bank had established 
a trust fund as early as in 1960 and had hosted more than 1,500 trust funds established by 
agreements between the Bank and the donors. Setting up trusts becomes one o f the legal 
mechanisms whereby the Bank could be more flexible in its operations that might go 
beyond what have been prescribed in its Articles o f Agreement. The Bank has fiduciary 
responsibilities as the trustee of these funds. In addition to the applicable provisions of 
the GEF Instrument, the Bank as Trustee to the GEF Trust Fund also needed to comply 
with the applicable provisions o f its Articles o f Agreement, by-laws, rules and decisions 
when administering the GEF Trust Fund. For example, projects funded by GEF can be 
subject to the competence of the Bank’s Inspection Panel (Shihata, 1994b) as well as 
most of its operational procedures regarding environmental practices. From this 
perspective, one can argue that the concept of a “trust” is really not as innovative as one 
would have liked and some of the flaws in the operations o f the Bank could be passed on 
to GEF when the GEF Trust Fund is administered by the Bank73.
However, the Bank is subject to certain legal constraints when acting as the 
Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund, thereby restricting it when it carries out its regular 
operations. Firstly, after the restructuring o f GEF, the Bank, as Trustee o f the GEF Trust 
Fund, is accountable to the Council, which has a balanced representation from the
72 For example, “mainstreaming” the normal lending operation o f the Bank has been one positive by­
product the Bank and the environmentalists hope to see from the Bank’s involvement in GEF (World 
Bank, March 1995).
73 A good example would be to compare the exceptionally quick approving and disbursement process of  
GEF P with the “pressure to lend” staff culture o f the Bank as has been identified in the Wapenhans Report 
(Wapenhans et al, 1992). The Wapenhans Report criticised that the Bank staff are usually under pressure 
to lend, in order to meet the desirable “targets” expressed in the volume o f money lent, and, as a result, 
that the qualities o f Bank loans can sometimes be sacrificed. Under GEF P, it is unclear whether the 
unusually quick process o f proving grants has been resulted from Bank staffs working on GEF P grants 
under similar pressure to disburse GEF money quickly. In any case, the possibility remains.
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developed and developing countries74 for the performance o f its fiduciary responsibilities 
(GEF Instrument, Annex B, para. 2). In addition, if  inconsistency arises between the 
decisions of the Council and the rules of the Trustee (the Bank), the Council and the 
Trustee shall consult each other with a view to avoiding that inconsistency (GEF 
Instrument, Annex B, para. 12). Therefore, the operations o f GEF, or any other trust 
funds the Bank is contemplating to establish for similar purposes to those for GEF75, 
might be less affected by some of the Bank’s practices that have been under criticisms 
from, for example, environmental NGOs.
In addition, the fact that the GEF Trust Fund could be set up by the Bank in the 
first place indicates that the Bank might begin to re-think the promotion of the traditional 
development model that fails to take physical environmental factors into account. 
According to the Bank’s OP 14.40 of February 1997 on Trust Funds, the Bank does not 
accept Trust Funds that may present a conflict o f interest76 (OP 14.40, para. 4). If  the 
Bank has not recognised the merit o f sustainable development, it would not be able to 
accept the GEF Trust Fund that is to be established at the Bank. For example, the 
prospect o f “mainstreaming” the Bank’s operations through its participation in GEF 
reflects a crucial aspect o f designing climate change policies: global environmental 
externalities should be internalised in national economic and sector development policies 
and programmes (World Bank, March 1995).
The main purpose o f GEF is to assist developing countries to implement MEAs 
such as the FCCC. As a result, through acting as a Trustee o f the GEF Trust Fund and as
74 The Council consists o f 32 members, o f which 16 shall be from developing countries, 14 shall come 
from developed countries and 2 from the economies in transition (GEF Instrument, para. 16).
75 For example, the Bank is now exploring the possibility o f a Prototype Carbon Fund to create a market 
for carbon trading. See Chapter 4.1.2 for further discussion.
76 Operations that have certain “conflict o f interests” with the Bank can be interpreted as including 
operations that are incompatible with the Articles o f Agreement o f the IBRD.
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a GEF IA, the Bank has been able to explore its new role o f assisting the implementation 
of MEAs in its developing country members. Whether the Bank and GEF can play this 
new role effectively is, however, a different matter and will be examined in succeeding 
sections. GEF has developed closer links with the FCCC. Nonetheless, the role o f the 
Bank in GEF operations remains instrumental and the regular operations o f the Bank 
might influence GEF operations as a result. As discussed in Chapter 3, the application of 
conditionality and policy-based lending have been regarded as powerful tools o f the 
SAPs employed by the BWIs to influence developing countries and have been, to a 
certain extent, effective at influencing developing countries. The next section will 
attempt to identify whether these legal and quasi-legal instruments associated with the 
SAPs have begun to develop in GEF operations in order to determine whether the Bank 
and GEF can play their new role effectively.
4.3 GEF: similarity with the SAPs
4.3.1 Programme and policy-based lending
4.3.1.1 GEF
Unlike the IBRD’s Articles o f Agreement, which provide that “loans made or 
guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special circumstances, be for the purpose of 
specific projects o f reconstruction or development” (emphasis added) (Article III Section 
4[vii]), the World Bank Resolution 91-5 did not specify the conditions upon which GEF 
P may provide funding. It seems, judging from the references made in all the 
documentation, to have assumed that the funding would be for specific projects. The 
operations of GEF P, which concerned only projects, have verified this assumption. In 
GEF I, however, provisions in the GEF Instrument refer to both programmes and
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projects (GEF Instrument, para. 4)77. It is unclear whether the negotiators o f this 
particular language had in mind the experiences o f the Bank’s involvement in 
programme lending in early 1980s78. In addition to the references in the GEF Instrument, 
Article 4.1 o f the FCCC also determines the scope o f GEF financing as GEF is 
designated as the interim financial mechanism of the FCCC. Article 4.1(b) stipulates that 
all Parties shall “formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change” 
(emphasis added). It is anticipated, hence, that GEF will be called upon to finance the 
agreed full incremental costs o f such “national or regional programmes” undertaken by 
developing country Parties to the FCCC. Consequently, unlike the IBRD, GEF is free 
from legal constraints to undertake funding other than for specific projects.
As o f October 1998, all the money committed until FY 1998 were for specific 
projects. However, this does not preclude GEF I from engaging in programme-type 
funding in its later operations. Further investigations should be made by examining the 
operational strategy that serves as a “road map” guiding its actions. The the GEF Council 
approved the Operational Strategy at its meeting in October 1995 (GEF, February 1996) 
setting out the broad strategic considerations and the programming o f GEF79 operations. 
In view of the initial limited resources o f GEF and the finite capacities o f recipient 
countries and of the LAs, the Operational Strategy indicates that GEF operations will be 
programmed in three broad, interrelated categories: operational programmes, enabling
77 Para. 4 of GEF Instrument provides that: “The GEF ... shall fund programmes and projects which are 
country driven and based on national priorities designed to support sustainable development and shall 
maintain sufficient flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in order to achieve its purposes.”
78 For the discussion o f why the World Bank decided to involve itself in programme-type lending in late 
1970s and early 1980s, and the relevant operations o f the SALs and SECALs, the two most important 
programme lending, see Chapter 3.2.
79 Since the discussion follows will concentrate on the operations o f GEF I, the term “GEF” will be 
referring to GEF I unless otherwise indicated.
146
activities and short-term response measures. An operational programme is “a conceptual 
and planning framework for the design, implementation, and coordination of a set of 
projects to achieve a global environmental objective in a particular focal area”. Enabling 
activities, including inventories, compilation o f information, policy analysis, and 
strategies and action plans, refer to “a basic building block o f GEF assistance to 
countries”. Short-term response measures include projects that would “yield short-term 
benefits at a low cost” (GEF, February 1996). Among the three types o f GEF operations 
designated in the Operational Strategy, Operational Programme provides an interesting 
insight as to the future direction of GEF funding.
On the basis o f guidance from the two Conventions, o f extensive consultations, 
and of technical and scientific review, 10 initial operational programmes in the focal area 
of biodiversity, climate change, and international waters are proposed in the Operational 
Strategy (GEF, February, 1996)80. The development and implementation o f projects in 
recipient countries are required to meet the objectives o f operational programmes 
developed in each operational programme. For climate change, three initial Operational 
Programmes have been identified: removing barriers to energy conservation and energy 
efficiency (OP No. 5), promoting the adoption o f renewable energy by removing barriers 
and reducing implementation costs (OP No. 6), and, reducing the long-term costs o f low 
GHG-emitting energy technologies (OP No. 7) (GEF, June 1997)81. These three 
programmes were adopted on the basis o f the recommendations o f the Scientific and
80 There is no operational programme for the focal area o f ozone layer depletion. Activities in this focal 
area will be focused on short-term response measures and enabling activities consistent with the Montreal 
Protocol (GEF, February 1996). The Multilateral Fund o f the Montreal Protocol provides funding for 
projects in this focal area.
81 The development o f operational programme is an ongoing process, in which the Council, the two 
Conventions, and STAP will provide important guidance.
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Technical Advisory Panel (STAP)82. The emphasis, according to the Operational 
Strategy, will be two-pronged. Firstly, to remove barriers to implementation of climate 
friendly, commercially viable technologies and secondly, to reduce the cost o f 
prospective technologies that are not yet commercially viable, in order to enhance their 
commercial viability (GEF, February 1996).
The Operational Programme per se does not receive GEF funding. It refers to a 
conceptual framework in which a set o f projects will be designed, implemented and co­
ordinated to achieve a global environmental objective in any o f the focal areas. In the 
case of climate change, the largest share of GEF climate change portfolio will go to long­
term measures, which will be prepared in the context o f operational programmes (GEF, 
February 1996). The three initial Operational Programmes concentrate mainly on 
removing implementation barriers for technologies and reducing the costs o f promising 
technologies. In other words, the Operational Programmes seek to create an environment 
in which specific projects eligible for GEF funding can be carried out more efficiently 
and successfully —  an environment in which the macroeconomic and policy situation are 
such that allows and encourages fair competition for the removal o f barriers. The 
rationale behind these Operational Programmes recalls the socio-economic background 
in late 1970s when the implementation o f the World Bank projects were so severely 
hampered by the macroeconomic environment in the member states that the Bank 
decided to undertake programme and policy-based lending to create an environment in 
which its projects could be implemented more efficiently83. In other words, a policy-
82 STAP was formed under the guidance o f the UNEP in response to GEF P participants’ request that 
outside expertise be used to guarantee the scientific and technical qualities o f GEF P operations. STAP 
continues to operate in GEF I according to GEF Instrument (para. 24), with the UNEP continuing to 
provide the STAP’s Secretariat. Its role has been handicapped due to the lack o f full-time professional 
staff (Reed, 1991).
83 For a detailed discussion of World Bank’s adjustment lending, see Chapter 3.2.
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driven project will not succeed unless it is developed within the appropriate policy 
framework.
Prior to the experience of GEF I, the Multilateral Fund o f the Montreal Protocol 
has, to some extent, already shown similar development toward a programme-oriented, 
though much narrower, operation. In the funding for developing country report, the 
Multilateral Fund provides a programme-type financing without the restrictions usually 
associated with this particular type o f financing, such as conditionality in adjustment 
lending. In the case of Multilateral Fund, although funding is still approved and 
disbursed on a project basis, the approach the Multilateral Fund adopted in this type of 
financing is less fragmented than traditional lending decisions in the financing o f specific 
projects (Paths, 1992).
Even with the experience of the Multilateral Fund, it is difficult to identify a 
general trend moving from project to programme lending in the funding activities for 
achieving global environmental benefit. In the case of GEF, it remains unclear whether 
the drafters of these Operational Programmes had in mind the previous World Bank 
experiences when this fabric of GEF operations is laid down. The same ambiguity goes 
to the statement that GEF will start, or has started, the type o f lending operation similar 
to adjustment lending of the BWIs in terms o f targeting the macroeconomic policy 
framework. However, the rationale is indeed similar when it comes to the idea of 
providing a macroeconomic and policy environment conducive enough to facilitate 
project implementations. The following section will continue this discussion in more 
detail.
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4.3.1.2 Comparison with the SAPs
As the preceding section indicated, the Operational Programmes per se are not 
eligible for GEF84 funding. Hence, the present funding activities o f GEF are not directly 
comparable with the adjustment lending o f the BWIs. In addition, GEF provides most o f 
its resources in the form of a “grant”, which does not require repayment as in the case of 
an adjustment “loan”. In addition, the “policy content”, an important feature of 
programme and policy-based lenidng, embedded in the adjustment lending has not yet 
emerged in the GEF operation. Nevertheless, the whole idea o f GEF and the rationale 
behind the recent development o f its funding activities bear some resemblance to the idea 
o f adjustment lending in the BWIs.
With respect to institutions, similarities as well as differences can be identified 
between the BWIs and GEF, which are illustrated in Table 4-1. In terms o f funding 
activities, the comparison between structural adjustment lending and GEF funding 
activities can also be drawn and will be illustrated in Table 4-2.
Table 4-1: Institutional comparison between the BWIs and GEF
INSTITUTIONAL
WISE
BWIS GEF
Similarities Both are established on initiatives from developed countries: the 
architects for the BWIs are US and UK, and GEF came from a French 
proposal.
Both are established to safeguard “global” interests: economic stability 
for the BWIs and environmental protection for GEF.
Both have weighted-voting system: the BWIs is based on quotas and GEF 
partially adopted similar principle of weighted voting.
84 In the following discussion, the term “GEF” will refer to both GEF P and GrEF I; while “GEF P” and 
“GEF I” will be used respectively when references are made to the pilot phase and the restructured GEF.
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Differences BWIs are international 
institutions with full legal 
personality.
GEF P was not an international 
institution; the legal capacity of GEF I 
is still in doubt (Werksmans, 1993b and 
1995).
Board of Governors as the 
supreme decision-making 
body.
GEF Assembly as the supreme decision­
making body, but is to receive guidance 
from the FCCC and CBD85.
Table 4-2: Comparison between funding activities of the BWIs and GEF
FUNDING
ACTIVITIES
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
LENDING
GEF LENDING AND GRANTS
Similarities World Bank involvement: either as a major source of lender (in the case 
of the SA lending) or as an IA (in the case of GEF grant).
Programme and policy-based lending: SAL/SECAL from the Bank and 
ESAF form the Fund, Operational Programmes in GEF operation.
Differences Direct funding goes to non-project, 
policy-based lending.
Directing funding goes to specific 
projects.
Loans are disbursed in several 
trances in each loan.
Loans are disbursed in full in each 
project.
Some relevant issues can be observed from these two tables. Firstly, the 
weighted-voting system of the BWIs that is based exclusively on financial contribution 
has been mitigated in GEF I. A double-majority system that takes into account individual 
country’s vote was adopted by the GEF Council. In addition, the two COPs to the MEAs 
are charged with deciding on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria in 
the focal areas o f climate change and biodiversity o f GEF operations. This results in the 
differences between the BWIs and GEF I in terms o f governance structure. This
85 Guidance is given by the two COPs in the areas o f climate change and biodiversity. However, for the 
other two areas where GEF has the sole responsibility to reach decisions, policies can not contradict with 
the guidance from the two COPs. For further discussion, see Chapter 4.2.2.
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difference might bring an impact on the operations o f the World Bank, as we shall see in 
the succeeding section.
Secondly, although not directly comparable, the programme and policy-based 
lending operations, in terms of its aim to seek policy change, can be found in both GEF 
funding activities and the adjustment lending o f the BWIs. The structural adjustment 
lending o f the BWIs seeks to correct the macroeconomic and policy framework in which 
other regular activities o f the BWIs and the borrowing government operate. The 
Operational Programmes, as identified in the Operational Strategies, o f GEF I envisaged 
an environment in which GEF projects could be implemented more effectively and 
successfully, and attempted to gear GEF operations toward achieving such a conducive 
environment. However, as seen from Table 4-2, money provided by GEF is still used for 
the purpose o f specific projects, while adjustment loans are for the purpose o f promoting 
policy changes. Nevertheless, the provisions laid down in the GEF Instrument do not bar 
such “programmes” from being eligible for future GEF funding (GEF Instrument, 
para. 4).
Lastly, the differences between adjustment loans and GEF grants in the process of 
disbursement will affect the issue o f “conditionality,” one o f the biggest controversies in 
adjustment lending. Since tranching policy reinforces the application o f conditionality, it 
might be tempted to conclude that the issue o f conditionality does not exist in GEF 
operation since disbursement does not depend on borrower’s fulfilment o f the conditions 
laid down by GEF. Is this really the case? The following discussion will explore the issue 
o f conditionality in more detail.
152
4.3.2 Conditionality
4.3.2.1 GEF
As indicated, the disbursement o f GEF funding is not divided into several 
tranches. It has been, hence, suggested that the controversies surrounding 
“conditionality” does not exist in the operations o f GEF86. However, conditionalities are 
associated not only with the disbursement process, but also with the wider environment 
in which a loan is identified, approved, implemented, and monitored87. In fact, 
conditionality refers to the exchange of financial assistance for policy reform. The 
disbursement process and tranching policy are only means to reinforce the “effect” of 
conditionality, namely, to ensure that the money provided is for genuine policy reform. 
The forms o f conditionalities associated with GEF might differ from those with the 
BWIs. The consequences of not complying with conditionalities in the context o f the 
BWIs might carry different degrees o f legal implications from those in the case o f GEF 
operations88. Nevertheless, conditionalities might begin to develop in the operations of 
GEF, as the following discussion will demonstrate.
At the stage o f pre-approval, a potential recipient o f GEF grant needs to comply 
with two sets of eligibility. In terms of country eligibility, only “countries that are Parties 
to the Convention”, which refers to developing country Parties to the FCCC, are eligible
86 During the negotiation o f the financial chapter in Agenda 21, conditionality, applied in the form o f the 
“tranching policy” in the case o f GEF, proved to be the thorniest issue. The G -77 countries would not 
accept the attachment o f conditionalities to loans. In the end, the issue o f conditionality in GEF section had 
a rather easy solution with the unanimous acceptance o f the expression used in Resolution 44/228: 
without introducing any new forms o f conditionality” (Ricupero, 1993). However, as we shall see later, 
this does not bar the subsequent practice of GEF in developing conditionality in various forms.
87 In the context of the IMF operations, conditionalities refer to the pragmatic and flexible body of policies 
and programmes approved by the Fund for assisting its member to overcome the balance o f payments 
difficulties (Guitian, 1981). It is mostly within the context o f the World Bank’s SAL/SECAL operations 
that conditionalities are applied in the disbursement process.
88 The legal implications o f “violating” conditionalities in the BWIs are discussed on the operational and 
' legal aspect o f the SAP in Chapter 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
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to apply to GEF funding for climate change-related projects89. In terms o f project 
eligibility, the following conditions will need to be met. Firstly, an eligible GEF project 
must carries with it the “agreed global environmental benefit”, as stipulated in para. 2 of 
the GEF Instrument. Secondly, a project must comply with the guidance from the COP to 
the FCCC, as stipulated in Article 11.1 of the Convention and para. 26 of the GEF 
Instrument. Thirdly, an eligible project needs to comply with the measures and activities 
enumerated in the Operational Strategy. Lastly, the proposed project must fall within one 
of the three Operational Programmes in the focal area o f climate change identified in the 
Operational Strategy (OP No. 5-7). In addition to these substantive conditions, certain 
procedural requirements must be followed in the preparation o f submitting a project90. 
These conditions, however, do not seem to be directly comparable to the so-called pre­
conditionalities, ie the type o f conditionality applied prior to an adjustment lending o f the 
BWIs. The pre-conditions required in the adjustment lending usually entail certain policy 
changes to be undertaken by the borrowing government; while the eligibility conditions 
do not have such requirement on the part of the recipient governments.
These conditions relating to eligibility are not the type o f pre-conditions as 
applied in the adjustment loans. However, the possibility o f similar type o f conditionality 
cannot be ruled out. In the independent evaluation report on the first three years o f GEF 
I, the evaluation team noted that: “macroeconomic or sectoral policies and economic 
activities may undermine GEF projects . . .” (GEF, March 1998, para. 181). The team 
found that IAs, including the World Bank, have generally identified policy issues or 
sectoral activity that could pose significant risks to the project in the project document.
89 For the guidance from the COP in relation to country eligibility, see Decision 11/CPI, FCCC/CP/1995/ 
7/Add. 1: “Initial guidance on policies, programme, priorities and eligibility criteria to the operating entity 
or entities o f the financial mechanism.” (Para. l[c][I].)
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The I As have raised the issues with the recipient governments during project design. The 
team recommends that: “GEF should adopt a policy requiring that Implementing 
Agencies obtain clear, formal commitments from recipient country governments 
regarding policies and sectoral activities identified as increasing the risk of project 
failure before proceeding with project implementation.” (emphasis added.) (GEF, March 
1998, para. 193.) What the finding of this evaluation report shows is that GEF has started 
to concern itself with the policy framework in which its projects will operate before such 
project is included and has attempted to raise such issues with the recipient governments. 
Furthermore, the report recommends that formal commitment should be obtained from 
the recipient government to change its policy framework that could undermine GEF 
projects.
At the GEF Council Meeting following the publication o f this GEF evaluation 
report, a report was adopted relating to the actions taken or considered to take in 
responding to the recommendations proposed in GEF evaluation report. In relation to the 
recommendation that seeks to improve the policies environment in the recipient 
countries, the GEF Secretariat reports that it will “request the Implementing Agencies to 
facilitate this review process by making explicit reference in the project briefs to 
‘specific policies or sectoral economic activities that could negatively affect project 
success’” (GEF, September 1998, p. 9). Although the GEF Council does not yet decide 
to seek formal commitment from the recipient government to change its policy 
framework, the implication of this action taken by the GEF Secretariat means that the 
World Bank as one o f the LAs can look into the policy framework o f GEF recipient 
countries by ways o f this review process. If GEF in the future decides take up such
90 See, for example, the “operational guidance for the preparation and approval o f medium-sized projects,”
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recommendation as to seeking formal commitment from the recipient governments in 
this aspect, it will then begin to practice the type of “pre-conditionality” as those applied 
in the adjustment lending o f the BWIs.
After a project is approved by the GEF Council, conditionality is not applied in 
the same manner as in the context o f disbursement process o f an adjustment loan since 
the disbursement o f GEF funding for the project is not divided into several tranches. The 
“post-approval conditionality” in GEF operations takes a slightly different form from that 
in the BWIs. Instead o f setting out conditions to be complied in one single loan, the post­
approval conditionality of GEF appears in a series of projects, proposed either by GEF or 
by the recipient government, under one Operational Programme. In other words, the 
preparation and approval o f a subsequent project, which falls within the same 
Operational Programme as the previously one, is contingent upon the fulfilment o f 
certain conditions by the recipient government. Two examples will be discussed as an 
illustration: one relates to a series of ozone grants to Russia in 1995 and the other relates 
to two energy conservation grants to China in 1996.
The purpose o f a series o f ozone grants is to provide financial assistance to 
Russia to comply with its obligations under the Montreal Protocol. The non-compliance 
o f the Montreal Protocol by Russia is considered and decided by the Montreal Protocol 
Implementation Committee. However, the GEF Council has played an important role in 
pressing for Russia’s implementation o f the decisions o f the Montreal Protocol 
Implementation Committee and the Meeting o f the Parties91. The co-operation between 
the Implementation Committee and the GEF Council has allowed conditionality to arise. 
In order to assist Russia to comply with its obligations under the Montreal Protocol, the
and “medium-sized project brief,” both can be found at GEF website at: http://www.gefweb.com
156
GEF Council has designed a series of projects divided into three separate tranches92 to be 
released only upon the fulfilment o f specified conditions. The first tranche of GEF grant 
to Russia under its ozone programme with the amount o f US$ 8.6m was approved by the 
Council in 1995. The second tranche of funds is approved on the condition that GEF’s 
Chief Executive Officer “has received confirmation from the Ozone Secretariat that it has 
received satisfactory responses to the queries posed by the Implementation Committee of 
the Montreal Protocol to the Russia Federation” (Joint Summary o f the Chairs, the GEF 
Council Meeting, 2-4 April 1996; GEF/C7/3: World Programme Proposed for Council 
Approval).
The second example concerns one particular project in the Work Programme 
Proposals o f 31 March 1997 for the GEF Council approval (GEF/C9/3). The Chief 
Executive Officer93 recommended to the Council, for its consideration and approval, a 
proposed work programme containing 21 projects at the GEF Council Meeting94 during 
30 April to 1 May 1997 (GEF, 31 March 1997a). In this Work Programme Proposal, 
similar type o f post-approval conditionality is identified in the project financing of 
Project B-16 on Energy Conservation in China. Project B-16 is to “achieve large, 
sustained and growing increases in energy efficiency, and associated reductions in the 
rate of growth in carbon dioxide emissions and other pollutants, through the introduction, 
demonstration, and dissemination o f new project financing concepts and the 
establishment of Energy Management Companies to promote energy efficiency measure
91 For a detailed discussion o f Russia’s non-compliance and the Montreal Protocol, see Werksman, 1996b:
92 The term “tranche” used here is different from the one used in the adjustment loans o f the BWIs. It 
refers to different GEF projects (grants) rather than instalments within one loan.
93 The position o f the CEO was created in GEF I. The CEO heads the GEF Secretariat and is to be 
appointed to serve for three years on a full time basis. The CEO is responsible for the organisation, 
appointment and dismissal o f Secretariat staff and is accountable for the performance o f the Secretariat 
functions to the Council (GEF Instrument, para. 21).
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in China.” (GEF, 31 March 1997a.) This project complies with the objectives o f OP No. 
595 is to be executed by the World Bank, and complements other GEF projects96 
addressing the same set o f barriers to energy conservation in China. It should be pointed 
out from the outset that GEF funding for this particular project, as described in the 
“project information document” would be disbursed in full once the project is approved 
by the GEF Council. Nevertheless, a possible subsequent GEF grant is proposed as well. 
It is stated in the project information documents that: “GEF financing for the project will 
be sought in two tranches. The first tranche includes GEF financing support for Phase I 
components ... A second tranche of GEF financing, the size o f  which will be determined 
during implementation o f Phase /, will be sought for the Phase II Expansion 
Component.” (emphasis added.) (GEF, 31 March 1997b.) The conditions for submission 
of the Phase II request to the GEF Council are also delineated in the same document. In 
addition, key performance indicators for all components97, as well as key indicators in 
evaluating Phase I results before the submission o f a Phase II request to the GEF 
Council, are specified.
4.3.2.2 Comparison with the SAPs
This type of “phasing” o f a GEF grant does not amount to “conditionality” 
requirements as in the case o f adjustment lending o f the BWIs. Though the legal 
implication o f conditionality in adjustment lending is ambiguous, one o f the practical 
implications is that it affects the disbursement o f the next tranche o f an adjustment loan.
94 The Council is to meet semi-annually or as frequently as necessary at the seat o f the Secretariat, which is 
located in Washington DC (GEF Instrument, para. 17).
95 Operational Programme No. 5 is the removal o f barriers to energy conservation and energy efficiency.
96 These projects include two UNDP-implemented technical assistance projects and two World Bank- 
implemented investment projects (GEF, 31 March 1997b).
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In the two examples o f the types of post-approval conditionality in GEF operations, the 
“second tranche” refers to the funding o f a future project that is not yet prepared by GEF, 
rather than to the second disbursement of the same project. As a result, the recipient 
governments, ie the Russian and the Chinese governments in these cases, could, 
theoretically, afford to ignore the conditions on which the “second tranche” depends 
without affecting the full disbursement o f the present project98. The consequence o f this 
conditionality “violation” is indeed very different from the scenario o f that in the 
adjustment lending. However, similarity between them can be identified if  consideration 
is taken from a broader perspective to look at the Operational Programme99 in which 
these projects are to operate. The purpose o f setting down conditions on which 
subsequent GEF funding depends is to ensure the continuity o f the projects in order to 
achieve the objectives o f the Operational Programmes. In the case o f adjustment lending 
in the BWIs, one of the purposes of conditionality is to ensure the objectives o f an 
adjustment loan will be achieved. Therefore, the phasing o f proposed GEF grants shares 
the same rationale with the compliance o f conditionality in the adjustment lending.
The GEF projects in the focal area o f climate change needs to fall within any o f 
the three Operational Programmes, which seeks to create an environment in which
97 These key performance indicators will include institutional performance indicators as well as quantified 
energy savings and associated C02 emission reduction resulting from the project (GEF, 31 March 1997b).
98 The consequences o f not complying with the conditions might have more legal, or practical, 
implications in the Russian case since it involves other legal obligations undertaken by the Russia under 
the Montreal Protocol, see Werksman, 1996b.
99 There is no operational programme for the focal area concerning ozone layer depletion and GEF is not 
linked formally to the Montreal Protocol. However, GEF Operational Strategy in ozone depletion is “an 
operational response to the Montreal Protocol, its amendment, and adjustment” (GEF, February 1996). In 
addition, the series of the ozone grants to Russia are for the specific purpose o f providing financial 
assistance for Russian compliance with the Montreal Protocol. Therefore, although not directly 
comparable with China’s energy conservation projects, which fall under one Operational Programme, the 
conditionality applied in the ozone grants to Russia also serves the purpose o f consistency and continuity 
to ensure the compliance o f Montreal Protocol by its parties. The comparison might be easier to identify if  
“compliance with the Montreal Protocol” were regarded as another Operational Programme designed by 
the GEF Council.
159
projects can be successfully implemented. In other words, in order to ensure the 
successful implementation o f a GEF project, the recipient government will have to 
provide such an environment, which usually entails a change o f policy framework in 
most of the developing countries. By conditioning the subsequent projects on the 
implementation o f the first project, it seems that GEF implicitly seeks to encourage the 
recipient government to change its policy framework in order to provide an environment 
conducive enough for successful implementation o f the first and subsequent projects. 
From this perspective, conditionality, defined as “the exchange o f financial assistance for 
policy reform” seems to have begun to develop in GEF operations.
Conditionalities are imposed on the recipient countries, which are the developing 
country Parties to the FCCC in the case o f GEF serving as the entity entrusted by the 
COP to operate the financial mechanism. In the context o f the FCCC, it is worth noting 
that another form of condition is imposed on the developed country Parties, which 
represent donors in GEF. Article 4.7 of the FCCC stipulates that: “The extent to which 
developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the 
Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of 
their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of 
technology . . .” (emphasis added.) Namely, the Convention places a condition on the 
developed country parties to implement their obligations relating to financial resources 
and transfer of technology as a prerequisite for developing country Parties to implement 
their treaty obligations. This form of conditionality —  an “inverse” conditionality100 —
100 The choice o f the word “conditionality” might not be appropriate considering what conditionality 
stands for in the practice o f the BWIs. Article 4.7 o f the FCCC does not seek a complete policy change in 
the developed countries. It merely sets down a “condition” for its developed country Parties to implement 
if  co-operation from the developing country Parties are anticipated. However, this is still phenomenal as 
developed countries are required under an international treaty to take responsibilities to solve problems to 
which they have contributed most in the past.
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injects a new dimension into the traditional relationship between donors and recipients in 
the BWIs regarding conditionality. This “inverse conditionality” has, arguably, more 
legal implications than conventional conditionality since failure to comply could 
constitute a legitimate defence for developing country Parties’ non-compliance. How this 
phenomenon is reflected in the operations of GEF has not yet been ascertained, as 
corresponding provisions are nowhere to be found in the guidance from the COP to GEF. 
Nevertheless, this development merits closer and continuing observation for its potential 
implications on the relationship between the donors and recipients in the BWIs.
To conclude, the issue o f conditionality, the “conventional” conditionality, seems 
to exist in GEF operations, albeit the term “conditionality” is not used. Considering the 
limited resources GEF has and, as a result, the limited projects GEF resources are able to 
finance101, it is conceivable that conditions in country and project eligibility are applied so 
rigorously. The similar consideration can be identified in, for example, the rationale 
behind the IMF conditionality in that its resources are available to its member states only 
temporarily102 and conditions need to be applied in order to ensure that its limited 
resources are used efficiently and that the same resources can be used by other member 
states. On the other hand, taken into account the rationale behind the design o f the 
Operational Programmes, and the requirement that projects must comply with the 
purposes of one of the Operational Programmes, it is also understandable that post­
approval conditionalities are applied in the manner as the two above-mentioned examples 
demonstrated. This consideration somewhat reminds us o f the rationale behind the
101 In particular, GEF funding has been taken the form o f “grant” so far. The financial resources are not 
“recycled” by repayments from the recipients, as are in the case o f loans from the BWIs.
102 Article I(v) o f the Articles of Agreement of the IMF states that: “The purpose o f the IMF is ... to give 
confidence to members by making the general resources o f the Fund temporarily available to them under 
adequate safeguards.” (emphasis added.)
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structural adjustment lending o f the World Bank103. These forms o f conditionalities 
employed by GEF might be different from the narrower concept o f “conditionality” in 
the context o f loan disbursement in the BWIs. Nevertheless, conditionality does exist and 
remains an important issue in GEF operations, as is in the case with the operations o f the 
BWIs.
Before rounding off this section in which comparisons are drawn between GEF 
and the adjustment lending of the BWIs, it is to be noted that the “unit” o f comparison is 
not always directly comparable between the two. For example, an Operational 
Programme designed by GEF, rather than a single GEF project (or grant) is the unit of 
comparison with an adjustment loan of the BWIs when the similar programmatic nature 
between the two are identified. Another example concerns the comparison between the 
post-approval conditionalities o f GEF and conditionality employed in the disbursement 
process of the BWIs. The GEF form of conditionality involves a series o f projects 
(grants) while the BWIs type o f conditionality in a more confined sense applies to 
different tranches in one single loan. Furthermore, it needs to be noted that the relative 
size of the resources involved is different. Compared with the overall resources available 
in the World Bank and some o f the larger adjustment loans, the resource GEF is able to 
provide is bound to be smaller than what the adjustment loan can provide104. This, 
however, will not invalidate the purpose o f conducting this comparison, which intends to 
demonstrate how a new mechanism like GEF, with a touch o f similarity and a brand new 
institutional device, might be more effective for the World Bank to play an effective new
103 See the Chapter 4.3.1.2 on the discussion o f the comparison between GEF and programme-type 
adjustment lending.
104 For example, a Coal Sector Adjustment Loan made by the IBRD to Russia in FY 1998 provided 
US$ 800m and a SAL made to South Korea in the same year provided US$ 3bn. In the case o f GEF, the 
total resources available form 1998 to 2001 after the second round o f replenishment negotiation is only
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role in assisting the implementation of the FCCC in the developing countries. The 
following section will continue carrying on discussion in the context o f relationship 
between the World Bank and developing countries.
4.4 Relationship between the Bank and developing countries in light of the
innovative mechanisms
The governance structure o f GEF, including its novel decision-making rules and 
closer link with the FCCC, has to a certain extent address the issue o f asymmetry 
perceived by the developing countries in the traditional financial institutions like the 
BWIs. Within the GEF Council, developing countries have secured a voting procedure 
where the developed countries no longer control the majority voting power. In addition, 
through the relationship established by the GEF Instrument, the FCCC, and the MOU, 
the authority o f the COP to the FCCC has been acknowledged over the major parts o f 
GEF operations. This might be a positive development for the developing countries since 
the decision-making arrangement in the COP represents a more collective process where 
the needs and priorities o f the developing countries have the opportunities to be 
incorporated. It seems plausible to conclude that, in the context o f the novel governance 
structure o f GEF, the overall relationship between GEF and the recipient countries has 
begun to improve compared with the traditional relationship between similar types o f 
financial institutions, notably the BWIs, with their recipients. This improvement has 
ramifications as well on the relationship between the developing countries and the Bank 
as the Trustee o f the GEF Trust Fund and as one o f the IAs.
US$ 2.57bn. The amount of resource provided by GEF grant stands no comparison with that provided by 
the IBRD.
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In addition to the novel governance structure, another aspect of GEF operation 
has equally important implications for the World Bank and that is the possible move 
toward the adoption o f conditionality and programme and policy-based lending. These 
legal and quasi-legal instruments have been employed by the BWIs to influence the 
developing countries in dealing with structural adjustment problems. As Chapter 3 come 
close to demonstrate, these legal and quasi-legal instruments associated with the SAPs of 
the BWIs have been rather effective in producing changes o f domestic laws and policies, 
albeit their effectiveness in achieving the desirable result might have been undermined by 
the governance structure of the BWIs perceived as asymmetric by developing countries. 
The development in GEF operations towards the adoption o f similar instruments might 
arguably give the World Bank more leverage in influencing their developing countries’ 
policies to implement the FCCC. Furthermore, GEF, compared with the SAPs, might 
have a better chance at producing the desirable result, ie the impact, because its novel 
governance structure that might be able to mitigate the problem o f asymmetry perceived 
by the developing countries.
As Chapter 3 pointed out, an important element in contributing to the 
implementation of the SAPs by the borrowing government is “ownership,” and it was 
argued in that chapter that the tense relationship between the BWIs and the developing 
countries, resulting from the governance structure, reduced the intensity of borrower 
ownership. In the case o f GEF, the novel governance structure has brought a closer 
relationship with the FCCC. The guidance from the COP to the FCCC shall be followed 
or respected in the operations o f GEF, and the COP has the authority to decide on 
policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the FCCC. The 
developing countries can, via the forum of the COP, put into their environmental and
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developmental priorities and participate in the process o f drawing up the guidance to 
GEF. Under this arrangement, the ownership problem identified in the SAPs could be 
addressed since developing countries are able to participate in the decisions relating to 
GEF grants and funding. Thus, GEF projects and programmes might overcome the 
hurdle o f “borrower ownership” and get implemented by the recipient governments. As a 
result, the legal and quasi-legal instruments employed in GEF might be effective in 
producing both an outcome and an impact because o f the novel governance structure of 
GEF that helps to improve relationship between the Bank and the recipient developing 
countries.
From the discussion in the preceding chapters, the evolution o f the relationship 
between the BWIs and the developing countries can be analysed as follows. Before the 
1990s, the BWIs tried to influence the developing country members to embark on the 
model of “development”, ie unlimited economic growth, that they perceived as ideal. 
With the introduction of structural adjustment lending in the 1980s, the BWIs have had a 
certain degree of success in producing an outcome, ie policy changes in the borrowing 
developing country. The main tools associated with the SAPs and employed by the BWIs 
in influencing the developing countries are programme and policy-based lending and the 
application of conditionality. However, as has been identified in Chapter 2, developing 
countries have been quite discontent with the governance structure and the consequent 
asymmetrical treatment they received in the operations o f the BWIs. Furthermore, the 
asymmetry perceived by the developing countries, the more so in the context of 
conditionality and policy-based lending, might have itself weakened the sense o f 
“borrower ownership” o f the SAPs and, as a result, diminished the effectiveness in
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producing an impact, ie delivering the desirable economic situation intended by the 
BWIs’ own programmes in the borrowing developing countries.
Meanwhile, as the environmental impact o f the traditional model of 
“development” became apparent to and recognised by the international community, the 
relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries has gone through a 
transformation as well. After the 1990s, World Bank began to introduce new 
mechanisms in which funding is provided to assist domestic compliance with MEAs in 
the developing countries members. In this new relationship, mostly demonstrated from 
the operations o f GEF, the relationship between the World Bank and the developing 
countries has been gradually improving. The asymmetric treatment within the BWIs as 
perceived by the developing countries has somehow been mitigated by the novel 
governance structure in GEF, including the closer link between the COP to the FCCC 
and the World Bank in its capacity as both the Trustee o f the GEF Trust Fund and one of 
the GEF’s IAs.
When “development” was perceived as unlimited economic growth and was 
promoted by the BWIs, the relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries 
has been anything but harmonious. The main reasons are the governance structure o f the 
BWIs and the mechanisms created thereof, the SAPs, to be employed by the BWIs to 
influence the development path of the borrowing developing countries. The legal and 
quasi-legal instruments employed by the SAPs, including policy-based lending and the 
application of conditionality, have provoked controversies as they are perceived by 
developing countries as part of the asymmetry in the BWIs. When sustainable 
development emerged and the World Bank began experimenting with innovative 
mechanisms as a response, the relationship between the Bank and the developing
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countries had been undergoing certain transformation because o f the nature and design of 
these new mechanisms105. In the operations o f GEF, policy-based lending and 
conditionality might begin to develop gradually, as identified in this chapter. Will this 
development effect the improved relationship between the World Bank and the 
developing countries for which the developing countries have fought very hard to 
achieve?
As one commentator puts it: “the usual critique o f conditionality has focused on 
the nature of the conditions rather than on the principle o f conditionality” (Collier et al, 
1997, p. 1399). The uneasy feeling the developing countries has toward conditionality 
and policy-based lending is largely associated with the ways in which the conditions and 
policy advice are designed and imposed by the management and donors o f the BWIs. It 
is the asymmetric treatment perceived by the developing countries within the BWIs, 
rather than the rationale behind conditionality and policy-based lending, that is the source 
o f discontent106. “Environmental conditionality” has been fiercely opposed to by the 
developing countries during the negotiation of the UNCED (Ricupero, 1993). It is, 
however, the environmental “conditionality”, conditionality associated with the BWIs107, 
that is at the centre o f controversy. The principle o f “environmental” conditionality in the 
context of achieving a sustainable development is not disputed for the concept of 
sustainable development has been accepted and endorsed by the developing countries
105 That is, the novel decision-making rules and the closer link with the MEAs. See Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 for 
a further discussion.
106 In addition to the asymmetry resulted from the weighted voting system, another asymmetry is relating 
to the adjustment measures an indebted countries are required to adopt while richer creditor countries, 
especially those with a balance o f payments surplus, are required to do nothing. This is another basic 
problem o f the SAPs (Singer, 1995), which will not be dealt with in the present study due to the limited 
scope o f thesis.
107 As discussed in Chapter 4.1.2.1 the distrust the developing countries have toward GEF P was mainly 
the reflection of that toward the World Bank. As a result, what the developing countries did not want was 
the kind of environmental conditionality that is designed and imposed by the World Bank, as the 
traditional type o f conditionality associated with the SAPs.
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themselves at the UNCED108. In addition, in the case o f GEF, the decision-making 
process in which conditions and policies are decided is different from that in the 
operations o f the SAPs and the BWIs. The World Bank, as the Trustee o f the GEF Trust 
Fund and as one o f the IAs, will need to follow the guidelines adopted in the COP to the 
FCCC, over which the developing countries can have more control. Therefore, the 
developing countries can take advantage o f the more equitable decision-making structure 
of the GEF Council and o f the FCCC COP, and contribute to the design o f a set of 
conditions and policies that are beneficial to their own development as well as the global 
environment.
Moreover, as has been discussed in the preceding section, a kind o f “inverse 
conditionality” has been incorporated in Article 4.7 o f the FCCC. Conditions are 
imposed on the developed countries for what might be the first time if  the developing 
countries are expected to implement their obligations under the FCCC. That resulted 
from the increasing bargaining power the developing countries are able to employ in 
negotiating international environmental affairs. With this newly gained bargaining 
power, developing countries no longer need to feel uneasy about the practice of 
programme lending and conditionality being developed in the operations o f GEF. On the 
contrary, the developing countries can take advantages o f their positions in the FCCC 
and put into the conditions and policies that are o f more importance to them.
From the perspectives of the management, as well as the donors o f the World 
Bank, the “new” conditionality associated with GEF strengthens its influence over the 
developing countries as well. With the practice o f policy-based lending being developed 
in the operations o f GEF, albeit in the context o f operational programmes, the Bank will
108 However, there is no consensus as to what “environmental” conditionality entails, for the concept and
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be able to gain access to the policy-making process in the borrowing governments in 
areas other than economic policies109. In addition, the effectiveness in producing both an 
outcome and an impact in the borrowing government is enhanced as well for the 
following reasons. GEF funding is to assist the developing country members in 
implementing the FCCC, an international treaty that imposes legal obligations upon its 
Parties. The borrowing countries are under legal obligations to change their domestic 
laws and policies to implement these laws and policies and to comply with the FCCC. 
Therefore, policy advice given and conditionality imposed through the operations of 
GEF will be able to encourage the borrowing governments a swifter change o f laws and 
policies in order to implement the FCCC —  producing an outcome. Under this 
circumstance, if  conditionality and policy-based lending are beginning to develop in 
GEF, they will be more effective in producing an impact, ie an improved environmental 
state in which GHGs emissions are stabilised110 since the recipients will be willing to 
implement these policy changes because o f two reasons. First, the recipients are Parties 
to the FCCC and are, thus, under treaty obligations to implement these laws and policies 
in any case. Secondly, and most importantly, because of a stronger sense o f “ownership” 
the recipients might have toward the GEF projects. The reason for this improvement lies 
in the unique characteristics o f GEF: its novel governance structure o f decision-making 
rules and closer link with the FCCC. These unique characteristics o f GEF serve to reduce
definition o f “sustainable development” itself is undergoing debate and clarification.
109 It is particularly the case now that the GEF Secretariat, as discussed in the previous section, will begin 
to request the IAs to put into explicit reference in the project briefs “specific policies or sectoral economic 
activities that could negatively affect project success”. For further discussion, see Chapter 4.3.2.1.
110 Confusion should not be made between two sets o f parallel and theoretically comparable objectives o f  
the SAPs and o f GEF, which have implications in analysing the effectiveness in terms o f producing an 
impact. The objective o f the SAPs is mainly to improve the economic situation o f the borrowing 
developing countries, while the aim o f GEF is to assist the implementation o f the FCCC in developing 
countries. Thus, the impact o f an effective SAP will be an economic situation in which the countries’ 
balance of payments positions are improved, while the impact o f an effective GEF grant will be an
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the controversies surrounding “conditionalities”, in particular in the context o f the 
governance structure o f the BWIs and the resulting asymmetric treatment perceived by 
developing countries. These characteristics might also play a role in enhancing the sense 
o f “ownership” developing countries have over GEF projects and grants and, as a result, 
produce the desirable impact as intended by GEF.
It is still too early to conclude whether the overall relationship between the World 
Bank and their developing country members have been improved greatly and the legal 
and quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs will be very effectively for the Bank 
to play its new role. Nonetheless, the new dimension o f this relationship injected by GEF 
is a positive development after all. The following chapter will begin to discuss how the 
BWIs can use their influences to assist the implementation o f the FCCC in their 
developing country members.
environmental situation in which the emissions o f GHGs are stabilised to a satisfactory level in controlling 
climate change.
CHAPTERS: FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
AND BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
In the previous chapters, we established that the BWIs and the legal and quasi- 
legal instruments employed to influence the developing countries achieved a certain 
degree o f effectiveness. The subject o f this chapter is whether they can exert such 
influence to assist the implementation o f the FCCC in developing countries.
A brief account of the FCCC will be introduced from the outset. The relationship 
between the BWIs and the FCCC will be examined, including issues such as how treaty 
obligations under the FCCC can affect the regular operations o f the BWIs, and 
implications of the Kyoto Protocol to the World Bank. The remaining two sections will 
examine the operations o f the SAPs of the BWIs and the innovative mechanisms o f the 
World Bank that might be relevant to the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The third 
section first identifies the relationship between the SAPs and the environment, with 
particular reference to climate change, and proposes possible reforms of the SAPs in the 
light o f the obligations under the FCCC. The last section will then conduct a brief 
evaluation of the innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank, which are designed 
primarily to facilitate the implementation of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
5.1 The UNFCCC
Before examining the relationship between the BWIs and the FCCC, this section 
will firstly look at the Convention itself. A very brief account o f the negotiation history 
leading to the Convention will be discussed. The Convention, the important decisions 
reached at the Conference o f the Parties (COP) and the unique treaty obligations based
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on the principle o f common but differentiated responsibilities for its Parties, are also 
examined. The relevance o f the FCCC with, in particular, the operations o f the BWIs will 
be the emphasis at all times.
5.1.1 Negotiation history
The issue o f climate change first reached the UN General Assembly in September 
1988, with Malta proposing that climate should be recognised as “common heritage of 
mankind”. By December 1988, the General Assembly passed Resolution 43/53 
recognising that climate change is “a common concern o f mankind” and endorsing the 
establishment o f an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) set up jointly by 
the UNEP and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). The IPCC was entrusted 
to “provide internationally coordinated scientific assessments o f the magnitude, timing 
and potential environmental and socio-economic impact o f climate change and realistic 
response strategies”. The FCCC was negotiated by an Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee on Climate Change (INC) established under the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 45/212 in December 19901, from 1990-92. Resolution 45/212 also establishes 
a special voluntary fund for developing countries to ensure their full and effective 
participation in the negotiating process (Zaelke and Cameron, 1990).
In addition to the IPCC and the INC, various international conferences, either at 
the initiative of individual states or sponsored by the UN and/or its specialised agencies,
1 UN General Assembly Resolution 45/212 (21 December 1990) on the “Protection o f global climate for 
present and future generations o f mankind” decided “to establish a single intergovernmental negotiating 
process under the auspices o f the General Assembly ... for the preparation by an INC o f an effective 
framework convention on climate change, containing appropriate commitments, and any related 
instruments as might be agreed upon . . .”
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were held in the late 1980s and early 1990s2. The 1990 Second World Climate 
Conference (SWCC) organised by the WMO in conjunction with other UN bodies and 
the International Council o f Scientific Unions, marked an important development in the 
negotiation history of climate change. For the first time, developing countries 
participated as equal partners in the discussions and made clear, to a much greater extent 
than previously, that north-south issue would play a prominent role in any future 
convention negotiations (Bodansky, 1993 and 1994). One o f the significant effects of 
that development was that, it became obvious that the climate change negotiation would 
not be simply about the environment, but about the inseparable issues o f environment 
and development3.
In addition to the constant debate about environment and development, another 
contentious issue throughout the negotiation process has been the financial resources 
needed by developing countries to implement the Convention, ie the financial 
mechanism under the Convention. Prior to the first INC meeting, negotiation for the pilot 
phase GEF (GEF P) was concluded in November 1990. After the first INC meeting in 
February 1991, the first Participants’ meeting o f GEF P was held in April 1991. 
Throughout the INC negotiation process, GEF was favoured by the developed countries 
to act as the Convention’s financial mechanism; while the developing countries remained
2 For example, the 1988 Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, held by the Canadian 
government, adopted the first timetable for the reduction o f emission. Other conferences included the 1989 
Conference on Global Warming and Climate Change at New Delhi in India, and the 1989 Ministerial 
Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change at Noordwijk in the Netherlands and so on. 
For further discussion, see, for example, Bodansky, 1993 and 1994; Paterson, 1996, chapter 2.
3 Developing countries tended to see climate change in developmental as well as environmental terms, 
given its implications for industry, transportation and agriculture (Bodansky, 1993).
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unconvinced and doubtful o f a financial mechanism that is closely associated with the 
World Bank, an institution distrusted by the developing countries4.
Both the issues o f the relationship between environment and development, and of 
financial mechanism, are highly relevant to the operations o f the BWIs. In relation to the 
former issue, the BWIs and the developing countries, despite their differences, seem to 
have put “development” before “environment”. Developing countries are concerned that 
the prospect o f their development, the traditional “economic” type o f development, might 
be threatened if the burden of limiting GHGs emissions falls on their shoulder or diverts 
their resources for “economic” development. The BWIs, with their structural adjustment 
lending and programmes, have been promoting the same model o f “development” 
without sufficiently taking into account the need to protect the environment5. From this 
perspective, both the BWIs and the developing countries appear to aim for the same thing 
— “economic” development6.
In relation to the issue regarding the financial mechanism o f the Convention, 
however, developing countries were reluctant to accept a World Bank-associated GEF, 
notwithstanding the same view o f development model they share with the BWIs. 
Developing countries rejected GEF from the onset o f the negotiation because they 
regarded GEF P, to which the World Bank served as one o f the Implementing Agencies, 
as too much donor-dominated. Developing countries would prefer a number o f smaller 
funds to be set up outside the scope o f “pre-existing, and generally donor-dominated,
4 As one commentator puts it: “Criticisms o f GEF by developing countries had much to do with an 
underlying mistrust o f the World Bank.” (Paterson, 1996, p. 77.)
5 For further discussion on structural adjustment and the environment, see Chapter 5.3.1.
6 Note that this convergence o f view does not invalidate the previous propositions relating to the 
relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries. The goal o f achieving economic growth has 
never been disputed between the BWIs and their borrowing developing countries. It is the ways in which 
programmes to achieve this goal are designed and imposed by the BWIs that raise controversies.
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multilateral development institutions” (Jordan and Werksman, 1994a, p. 69)7. Developed 
countries and the World Bank have, on the other hand, favoured GEF to be designated as 
the financial mechanism of the FCCC.
This peculiar position of developing countries, ie sharing the same goal of 
“economic” development with the BWIs on the one hand but distrusting the Bank to run 
the financial mechanism of the FCCC, could be explained by several reasons. One reason 
might be that the linkage between climate change and “sustainable” development has not 
been fully appreciated by the developing countries from the start o f the climate change 
debate8. With sufficient and proper financial and technological assistance, developing 
countries are offered a chance to achieve sustainable development and to deal with the 
potential impact o f climate change9. Another reason might be that, the developing 
countries have had enough of the asymmetric treatment they receive in the BWIs10 that 
they do not want a BWIs-style mechanism in the FCCC in case it exacerbates the 
asymmetry problem associated with climate change as has been identified at the New 
Delhi Conference on Global Warming and Climate Change (the New Delhi 
Conference)11. From this perspective, the developing countries’ deep-rooted discontent 
with the BWIs might have overshadowed the common goal o f promoting “economic” 
development.
7 This, again, echoes the propositions presented in the preceding chapters arguing the discontent 
developing countries generally felt toward the BWIs. Had the developing countries satisfied with the 
operations o f the BWIs, they would have trusted GEF, whose pilot phase was closely associated with the 
World Bank, to run the financial mechanism o f the Convention.
8 For example, the developing countries wanted the “right to development”, development as in “economic” 
development, to be inserted into the Article on “principles” in the Convention.
9 For example, in the energy sector, if  the developing countries are provided with technology on energy 
conservation or renewable energy, they can increase their energy consumption to satisfy their development 
demand without aggravating the problem o f climate change at the same time.
10 See Chapter 2.2.1 for further discussion.
11 For a discussion on the asymmetry problem associated with climate change, and on the interaction 
between asymmetry associated with the BWIs and asymmetry in the climate change regime, see 
Chapter 5.2.2.
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In the end, compromises were reached with regard to both the issues of 
relationship between environment and development and o f financial mechanism. The 
developing countries dropped their insistence to recognise expressly “right to 
development” in the Convention12. A restructured GEF that is transparent, open to 
universal participation, and with a more equitable decision-making process was 
designated as the interim financial mechanism of the Convention. This compromise 
emerged from the climate change negotiation has implications on both the developing 
countries and the BWIs. For developing countries agreeing to the FCCC no longer means 
foregoing the opportunities to develop in a more sustainable manner. For the BWIs, in 
particular the World Bank, the developing countries’ acceptance o f a restructured GEF 
has brought a closer link with the FCCC, which, as discussed in Chapter 4, could help to 
improve the relationship between the Bank and its developing country members13.
Before turning to examine the Convention and the three COPs, another point 
worthy o f further discussion concerns the outcome of GEF negotiation. The FCCC 
Parties agreed to accept GEF as the interim operator o f the Convention’s financial 
mechanism only after GEF agreed to restructure its governance structure; ie to become 
more transparent, open to universal participation, and have an equitable and balanced 
representation of all Parties (FCCC, Articles 11.2 and 21.3). The design o f a financial 
mechanism in the Convention help to mitigate one aspect o f the asymmetry problem
12 A right to promote “sustainable development” is stipulated in Article 3 o f the Convention.
13 Another potential implication o f developing countries’ acceptance to a restructured GEF for the BWIs 
relates to their governance structure, in particular the voting arrangements. As has been mentioned in the 
preceding chapters, reforms o f the decision-making process o f the BWIs have been called for, in particular 
during the NIEO period (eg Ferguson, 1988, pp. 88-95). Various proposals have also been forwarded, (eg 
Gerster, 1994, pp. 95-97) but have all been failed so far. The fact that developing countries, as well as 
donor countries, have both been willing to accept the new decision-making arrangement o f the restructured 
GEF, whose operation is closely associated with the World Bank, could shed some lights on the BWIs in 
terms o f possible governance structure reform. Since the present study does not deal with the governance 
structure reform o f the BWIs per se, this potential implication will not be discussed in more detail here.
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associated with the climate change regime: the burden o f controlling climate change14. 
The acceptance by the recipient countries of a restructured GEF with novel governance 
structure could have implication for the asymmetry problem associated with the BWIs as 
well. The function o f the financial mechanism is to be guided by and accountable to the 
COP, at which every Party, developed or developing country has an equal vote in 
reaching decisions. The international entities entrusted to operate the financial 
mechanism are to be guided by the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria 
decided by the COP (FCCC, Article 11.1). The restructured GEF has a unique 
governance structure15 where developed countries can no longer dominate the decision­
making process where policies and conditions regarding the GEF project are made. In 
this regard, this new feature breaks away from the set o f decision-making rules under the 
BWIs where economic power has been the sole consideration in allocating votes. As a 
result, the FCCC and its interim financial mechanism, GEF might shed some light on the 
BWIs with regard to how to deal with the asymmetry problems inherent in their 
systems16.
5.1.2 The Convention and the decisions o f  the Conference o f  the parties (COP)
The objective of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the COP 
may adopt is to achieve stabilisation o f GHGs concentrations in an atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
14 For detail discussion on the asymmetry problem associated with the climate change regime, see 
Chapter 5.2.2.
15 See Chapter 4.2 for further discussion on the decision-making procedures o f the restructured GEF.
16 As will be discussed in the succeeding section, the thesis does not attempt to come to a conclusion as to 
which system is “fairer” than the other does. It merely tries to point out that, since developing countries are 
guaranteed the opportunities to participate more fully in the decision-making process o f GEF, 
conditionality and similar tools associated with GEF and the FCCC might become less contentious and 
more successful in achieving the desirable result.
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During the process of achieving stabilisation, the Convention should ensure that the 
timeframe is sufficient to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner (FCCC, Article 2). In the course o f implementation, the Parties to the 
Convention shall be guided by the principles set down in Article 3. As for treaty 
obligations, they are essentially laid down commensurate with the capacities o f Parties. 
Parties to the Convention are divided into four groups: Annex I Parties, Annex II Parties, 
non-Annex I Parties, and the less developed country Parties17. Article 4 provides different 
sets of obligations to Parties in different categories18.
Article 4.7 conditions the effective implementation by developing country|Parties 
of their commitments on the effective implementation by developed country [parties of 
their commitments related to financial resources and transfer o f technology. Recalling the 
kind of conditionalities operated in the mechanisms, SAP as well as GEF19 o f the BWIs, 
where developing countries are required to implement conditions before receiving or in 
utilising money from mainly the developed countries, the FCCC seems to set an“inverse 
conditionality”20 on developed countries for a change. The BWIs, o f course, are not 
bound by this provision. Nevertheless, this provision might influence the Executive 
Directors (EDs) from the developed countries sitting on the Board. The EDs are 
international civil servants, who, theoretically, cannot accept directions from their 
country o f nationality. In practice, however, they are usually influenced by their domestic
17 The criteria for this categorisation are nowhere to be found in the Convention. The Convention lists 
countries which are Annex I and Annex II Parties and it is assumed that countries not on these two lists are 
non-Annex I Parties. However, the Convention does not explain why those countries are on these two lists 
in the first place, either.
18 What those obligations entail are provided in Article 4 and will not be described here. For further 
discussion, see, for example, Bodansky, 1993; Panjabi, 1993.
19 See Chapters 3.4 and 4.3.2 for more detailed discussions.
20 See Chapter 4.3.2 for more detailed discussions.
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policy consideration21. Therefore, when reaching any decisions that might affect the 
treaty obligations undertaken by developed country parties, EDs from the developed 
countries will need to bear in mind the requirement sets down in Article 4.7 of the 
FCCC. For example, if the Board of EDs has in front o f it a SAP with climate change- 
related policies, EDs from developed countries might want to re-examine the amount of 
money and the type of technical assistance provided by this SAP. This is because such a 
SAP indirectly promotes the implementation by developing government o f its obligations 
under the FCCC, and, under Article 4.7 of the FCCC, developed countries are required to 
provide financial and technological assistance before developing countries undertake to 
implement their treaty obligations. As a result, this FCCC provision, and other treaty 
obligations for the developed countries, might bear implications for the operations o f the 
BWIs, which will be examined in more detail in the following section.
Due to the short timeframe of the INC negotiating process and the amount o f 
contentious issues to be negotiated, the negotiations “were not truly completed” 
(Dasgupta, 1994, p. 131) and the COP is to carry out the negotiations o f certain issues 
which have remained unresolved at the INC process. The “battles” between and within 
the developed and developing countries during the INC negotiation process were, 
consequently, extended to the COP that follows. In addition, the FCCC is only a 
framework convention. More detail and substantive obligations need to be fleshed out by 
the COP, the supreme body o f the Convention22 (FCCC, Article 7). The COP, after its
21 The relationship o f the Executive Directors with the member governments that appoint or elect them is 
not mentioned in the Articles o f Agreements . The Executive Directors are, on the one hand, expected to 
express the views o f the countries they represent; and, on the other hand, officials o f the BWIs and receive 
their salaries from them. Larger countries, such as the five members who can each appoint one Executive 
Director, “tend to use the leeway inherent in this dual character of the Executive Directors’ role for the 
benefit o f their own country” (Gerster, 1993b, p. 92).
22 For example, the COP is to provide guidance to the financial mechanism and to decide on its policies, 
programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the Convention (FCCC, Article 11.1).
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first session in March 1995, one year after the date o f entry into force o f the Convention, 
is to be held every year unless it otherwise decides (FCCC, Article 4.4). Four sessions of 
the COP have been held as of March 199923.
One of the innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank stemmed from the decision 
of the COP 1, which established a pilot phase for joint implement among Annex I Parties 
and, on a voluntary basis, with non-Annex I Parties (Decision 5/CP.l, 1995). That 
decision o f activities implemented jointly provides the basis o f the Bank AIJ 
programme24. Guidelines are provided in the decision on how AIJ will be carried out. 
The COP 3 adopts a uniform reporting format for Parties undertaking AIJ projects to 
submit their reports to the Secretariat (Decision 10/CP.3, 1997). The World Bank AIJ 
programme will assist its members participating in its AIJ projects to prepare and to 
submit such report to the Secretariat. The COP 4, after reviewing the second synthesis 
report on the AIJ projects, decided to continue the pilot phase and to begin preparations 
for a review process o f the pilot phase (Decision 6/C P.4,1998).
The process o f negotiating a protocol began its initial work at the COP 1 
(Decision 1/CP.l, 1995). At the COP 2, the Geneva Declaration adopted instructs the 
Parties to accelerate negotiations on the text o f a legally binding protocol or another legal 
instrument to be completed in time for the adoption at the COP 3. At the COP 3, the first 
protocol to the FCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted after an intense and highly 
publicised negotiation. The Kyoto Protocol will only enter into force after “55 Parties to 
the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at 
least 55 per cent o f the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 o f the Parties included in
23 Detail discussion and the significance o f the COPs will not be described here. For more information, see 
Rowlands, 1995 for COP 1; Bums, 1996 for COP 2; and, Yamin, 1998 for the Kyoto Protocol concluded 
at COP 3.
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Annex I” (Kyoto Protocol, Article 25), have ratified the Protocol. As o f COP 4 in 1998, 
60 Parties, including the US, to the FCCC have signed the Kyoto Protocol. It is difficult 
to predict when, or whether, the Protocol will enter into force since the US congress has 
indicated that it will not ratify any Protocol that has no substantive commitments for 
developing countries. However, the Kyoto Protocol itself marks an important milestone 
in the climate change regime. It has significant implications for the World Bank’s 
innovative mechanisms, as will be discussed in the succeeding section.
5.2 The FCCC and the BWIs
The 1992 UNFCCC is a remarkable piece o f legal instrument that seeks to 
incorporate the spirit o f sustainable development, which in essence require an integrated 
approach to economic, social and environmental development25. The cause of climate 
change is relevant to the economic activities associated with the type o f development that 
seeks to maximise economic growth, a model that has been advocated in the past by the 
BWIs. The solution to climate change will also affect every aspect o f modem economic 
lives, which happens to fall within the competence o f the BWIs —  the regulators of 
international economic affairs. The relationship between climate change and “economic” 
development will be demonstrated firstly. Furthermore, as the overlap between 
membership and areas of competence increase, the interaction between the FCCC and the 
BWIs needs to be examined in more detail, which will be looked at in the second sub­
section.
24 For further discussion on the AIJ programme in the World Bank, see Chapter 4.1.2.2.
25 Literature abounds regarding the implications o f the FCCC on the concept o f sustainable development. 
See, for example, Sands, 1994; and, Lang, 1995.
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5.2.1 Climate change and “economic” development
The FCCC is intended to tackle the threat o f global wanning and climatic change 
resulting from the problems of the increasing greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect is 
a naturally occurring phenomenon. The so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the 
atmosphere absorb infrared radiation and reradiate it towards the earth, causing the 
earth’s surface temperature to raise26. The largest man-made GHG is carbon dioxide, 
(CO2) resulting mostly from the burning of fossil fuel. During the past century, the 
“greenhouse effect” became the “greenhouse problem” as human activities enhanced the 
natural greenhouse effect through the release to the atmosphere o f billions o f tones of 
CO2 and other GHGs (Mintzer and Leonard, 1994a).
Historically, anthropogenic sources o f GHGs have been closely related to 
industrialisation, population growth and economic development. When the industrial 
revolution began at the turn of the century, the nature o f the new technologies brought in 
is characterised by the massive consumption o f fossil fuels, particularly o f coal and oil 
(Uzawa, 1991). As the subsequent human economic activities expanded, the emission of 
several GHGs, in particular CO2 has increased substantially, leading to high atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs. The Second Assessment Report o f the IPCC, endorsed by the 
Parties to the FCCC at the COP 2, has concluded that there is “a discernible human 
influence upon the climate system”.
The sources o f GHGs are embedded in the global economic structure; that is, 
industrialisation and economic development. On the other hand, controlling emissions o f 
GHGs, particularly CO2 goes to the heart o f the daily economic activities and has
26 For a general scientific background of the greenhouse effect, see the Second Assessment Report o f the 
IPCC: Houghton et al, 1995.
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enormous implications for current industrial, agricultural, energy and transport policies 
and practices (Churchill, 1991).
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the traditional development model 
promoted by the BWIs and pursued firstly by developed countries and now by 
developing countries, has been equated with “economic” development and has largely 
been measured by the level of industrialisation. The developed countries have achieved 
this type of “development” by emitting a large amount o f GHGs into the atmosphere 
during their development processes, which is evident from their estimated three-quarters 
o f CO2 emissions globally. In the developing countries, economic and industrial growth 
accounted for more than two-thirds o f the increase in CO2 emissions (Han and 
Chatteijee, 1997) Considering the low level o f economic development and the 
consequent huge potential for growth, the future GHGs emissions are expected to come 
from the developing countries.
The primary objective o f the policymakers in the developing world is to raise the 
standard of living o f their people, and economic growth is imperative to alleviate 
poverty27. It is, hence, unrealistic and unfair to argue for the reduction o f energy 
consumption and o f GHGs, especially CO2, emissions in the developing countries28. If 
this need for development o f the developing countries is aided and financed by the BWIs 
through their traditional SAPs, developing countries will aggravate GHGs problems,
27 The G-77, representing more than 120 developing countries during the INC-4, jointly put forward the 
“Principles of G-77 and China on the climate convention” proposing several formulations as the basis for 
negotiation. One o f the formulations is “right to development,” which states that: “The right to 
development is an inalienable human right. All peoples have an equal right in matters relating to living 
standards. Economic development is the prerequisite for adopting measures to address climate change.” 
(Hyder, 1992, Table 1.)
28 Note that some developed countries, in particular the US, have been arguing that developing countries, 
especially those with potential to become major emitter themselves, should undertake substantial 
commitment to reduce GHGs emissions. However, this need o f the developing countries, need for growth, 
has been recognised in the FCCC. The Preamble affirms that responses to climate change should take into
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since they will embark on a development path that, as identified in the preceding 
paragraph, is a major cause of climate change. This, however, can be mitigated in two 
circumstances. Firstly, a reformed SAP of the BWIs that incorporates environmental 
considerations might be able to guide the developing countries to adopt a sustainable 
development path that does not emphasise exclusively on industrialisation and economic 
growth. Evidence is growing that macroeconomic policy changes, a strength that can be 
introduced by a SAP, will strongly affect future GHGs emissions and that it is in a 
country’s best interests to pursue actions that also capture climate change benefits (World 
Bank, 1997a). Secondly, the new mechanisms of the World Bank, with a more balanced 
governance structure for developing country members to participate, are designed 
primarily to assist the developing countries to implement the FCCC. In addition, the new 
mechanisms, with the innovative elements similar to, for example, emission trading, will 
be able to control the overall global GHGs emission. Both o f these circumstances will be 
elaborated further in the succeeding discussion.
To conclude briefly, the causes o f as well as solutions to climate change involve 
the whole range o f the human economic activities and are influenced by the development 
path a country decides to adopt. Consequently, the FCCC has an exceptionally broad 
scope, encompassing not simply environmental protection as traditionally conceived, but 
economic and development policies more generally (Bodansky, 1995). According to the 
Head o f the Indian Delegation in the FCCC negotiation process, a climate convention 
“could constitute a major multilateral economic agreement” (Dasgupta, 1994, p. 131). 
With the macroeconomic-centered SAPs and the FCCC-inspired innovative mechanisms
full account “the legitimate priority needs o f developing countries for the achievement o f sustained 
economic growth and the eradication o f poverty”.
184
such as GEF, AIJ, and GCI, the BWIs, in particular the World Bank, are well-placed to 
assist their developing country members to achieve the objectives o f the FCCC.
5.2.2 Interaction between the FCCC and the BWIs
As the preceding discussion points out, a substantial overlap in the areas o f 
competence has emerged between the BWIs and the FCCC. This overlap has brought a 
closer relationship between the BWIs and the FCCC in the context o f treaty obligations 
each prescribed for its member states. Before turning to the discussion on how treaty 
obligations under the FCCC might affect the regular operations o f the BWIs, we need to 
take note of another aspect o f the interaction between the two, and that is the asymmetry 
problem associated with both regimes. The “important asymmetry” associated with 
climate change, first articulated by the New Delhi Conference on Global Warming and 
Climate Change29 and summarised by Slinn, (Slinn, 1991) has the following 
characteristics. The historical and current emissions o f GHGs have come from the 
developed countries; while many o f the most serious effects o f global climate change 
will occur in the developing countries30.
Another crucial element in this asymmetry, identified by Slinn, is the burden of 
controlling climate change (Slinn, 1991, p. 77). The preservation o f rain forests and 
curbing of dangerous emissions have been identified as some o f the mitigation measures 
to control climate change. A truly global effort is required to limit GHGs emissions.
29 This Conference was held in February 1989 to address specific problems that the developing countries 
are likely to face. This was the first conference in which perspectives on global warming from developing 
countries were voiced. For a detail account on the proceedings o f the Conference, see: Gupta and Pachauri, 
1989.
30 The FCCC specifically recognises the difficult situation o f developing countries (for example Article 
3.2). Developing countries, particularly those on the ragged edge o f subsistence with few resources to 
divert to dealing with climate change, are probably more vulnerable to global warming than are developed 
countries (Nordhaus, 1991).
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However, while all the countries, developed and developing alike, need to share the cost 
of controlling emissions, only developing countries where the rain forests are located are 
most affected by the former type of measures, ie preservation o f forests. Without external 
assistance, those developing countries are required to shoulder the cost o f both emission 
reduction and forests preservation to combat climate change, a problem to which they 
historically did not contribute. This asymmetry between developed and developing 
countries in association with climate change reminds us o f the asymmetric treatment in 
the international economic regime, as discussed in Chapter 2. Under the international 
economic regime regulated by the BWIs, developing countries have perceived 
themselves as being treated asymmetrically31. The governance structure o f the BWIs is 
perceived by developing countries as one major cause of this asymmetry. The weighted- 
voting system gives the developed countries a greater influence in the decision-making 
process; while the majority of these decisions have tremendous impact on the developing 
countries32.
The two sets of asymmetry bear interesting comparisons from developing 
countries’ perspective. For example, the international economic regime, shaped and 
operated by the BWIs, was mainly the outcome o f the negotiation among the developed 
countries, and is still more dominated by the developed countries through the governance 
structure of the BWIs. In the climate change regime, problems associated with climate
31 For example, one type o f asymmetry concerns the degree o f influence o f the BWIs over the policy­
making process in developing and developed countries. As one commentator points out that developing 
countries are “required to endure a degree o f BWI involvement in policy formation that would not be 
tolerated for a moment by OECD governments, who routinely discount the ‘surveillance’ advice o f the 
IMF” (Killick, 1995b, p. 33).
32 The discontent o f the governance structure o f the IMF has first been expressed by the G-24 at its very 
first meeting in April 1972. In the Communique o f its first Ministerial Meeting, the Group “expressed its 
dissatisfaction that important decisions affecting the International Monetary System have been taken by a 
small number of developed countries to the exclusion and neglect o f the interest o f the rest o f the 
international community, and that these decisions have adversely affected the economies o f developing 
countries.” (Sauvant, 1981, p. 298.)
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change are the outcome of the development path historically undertaken by the 
developed countries that emphasises economic growth and industrialisation, and the 
financial and technological means needed to tackle the problems are mainly at the hands 
of the developed countries. The developing countries have to live with the impact of 
BWIs’ operations and o f climate change, to which they historically could not or did not 
contribute. In the case o f the projects and programmes from the BWIs, the borrowing 
developing countries have no other alternatives but to comply with, and to live with the 
consequences and impact of, conditionalities that are largely defined by the BWIs where 
developed countries hold the majority o f votes33. In the case o f the climate change 
regime, the developing countries will, as has been identified at the New Delhi 
Conference, experience some of the worst effects o f global climate change, and bear 
incommensurate burden to control climate change problems.
The two sets of asymmetry can interact with each other as well. The BWIs might 
help to balance the asymmetry in the climate change regime by, for example, providing 
adequate resources to the developing countries to control climate change. The BWIs 
might, on the other hand, aggravate the asymmetry problem associated with climate 
change with its own asymmetry problem. For example, the BWIs’ projects and 
programmes might be designed by the developed countries who may try to avoid their 
historical responsibilities by imposing conditionalities that burden the borrowing 
developing countries disproportionately in controlling climate change34. In this case, 
developing countries might find themselves being trapped in a “double asymmetry” since
33 Developing countries as a group do not have the voting power to take decisions relating to the design of  
conditionality, while developed countries as a whole can prevent approval o f any o f these decisions. 
Developed countries thus “have the dominant say in defining conditionality and approving requests for use 
of Fund resources” (Ferguson, 1988, p. 203).
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they have little influence over how the BWIs’ projects and programmes are decided and 
they are required to shoulder the burden of controlling a problem for which they have 
little historical responsibility.
The asymmetry problem associated with climate change has, after intense 
negotiations between and among developed and developing countries, been mitigated by 
the international treaty that addresses the problem o f climate change: the UNFCCC. The 
FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, from the developing countries’ viewpoint, represent a 
multilateral framework35 that seek to deal with the asymmetry problem associated with 
the climate change regime. Developed countries, categorised as Annex I Parties in the 
FCCC, undertake more substantive treaty obligations as an implicit recognition of their 
historical responsibilities (FCCC, Article 4.2; Kyoto Protocol, Article 3). In addition, 
they are required to provide financial and technological resources to assist developing 
countries to deal with the impact o f climate change (FCCC, Article 4.3 and 4.7). A 
financial mechanism, which shall have an equitable and balanced representation of all 
Parties within a transparent system of governance, is defined in the FCCC (Article 11). 
Whether these provisions have actually mended the asymmetry problem identified by 
developing countries will depend on the effectiveness o f implementation o f these 
provisions, which remains to be the subjects under review by the COP. However, these 
provisions have at least provided a mechanism, an opportunity to deal with the 
asymmetry problems associated with the climate change regime. The BWIs, on the other 
hand, are actually one part o f the asymmetry problem associated with the international
34 For example, developed countries can, via the Board o f Executive Directors, prescribe conditionality 
such as the reduction o f GHGs emissions by certain percentage in the borrowing developing countries in 
exchange for financial assistance.
35 For example, in order to assure the participation o f developing countries, a trust fund to defray the costs 
incurred to certain developing countries in their attendance at the negotiating sessions was established by
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economic regime from the developing countries’ perspective. For example, while the 
impact of the decisions of the BWIs relating to lending operations fall mostly on 
developing countries, these decisions are reached in an environment where developing 
countries considered themselves underrepresented in terms o f numbers o f votes allocated 
to them36.
For the developed countries, however, things might look a bit different. 
Developed countries might not regard the BWIs and conditionalities imposed on the 
borrowers as representing any asymmetry since they contribute most o f the resources to 
the institutions and are entitled to determine how their money will be spent37. Meanwhile, 
they might perceive the FCCC and the Protocol as imposing asymmetrical treatment on 
them since they are asked to take on more obligations than the developing countries38. As 
a result, neither o f the two, the BWIs and the FCCC, can satisfy both developed and 
developing countries as an “ideal” system in which a “symmetrical world” can be 
achieved.
One must reckon that, despite the many similarities they share, the two systems 
represent different regimes39 designed to deal with different sets o f problems. First o f all,
the same UN General Assembly Resolution (45/212) that set up the INC in December 1990. For further 
discussion, see Hyder, 1994, pp. 203-204).
36 Various proposals have been put forward to reform the methods through which votes are allocated. It 
has been argued that votes should be allocated based not only on economic power but also on population, 
capacity for development and supply o f raw materials. See, for example, the Communique, G-24, seventh 
Ministerial Meeting, 9-10 June 1974, reprinted in Sauvant, 1981, pp. 307-308.
37 This can be demonstrated by, for example, why the developed countries played down the role o f the UN  
ECOSOC and patronised the BWIs with the beginning o f the cold war. One o f the reasons for this Western 
preference for the BWIs over the UN ECOSOC was the decision-making procedure o f the BWIs 
(Dasgupta, 1998, pp. 72-73).
38 This can be illustrated, for example, by the U S’s position on the negotiation o f the Kyoto Protocol. The 
US Senate has already indicated that it will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol or any convention under which 
developing countries do not bear substantive commitments with regards to GHGs emission reduction.
39 The word “regime” has its specific meaning under international relations school, see, for example, Levy 
et al, 1995. However, the term, international economic “regime” and climate change “regime”, is used 
more loosely here in referring to an environment under which rules, institutions, human behaviour and 
' other factors interact with one another. On the other hand, the BWIs and the FCCC “systems”, as shall be
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the governance structure o f the BWIs is one o f the causes o f the asymmetry perceived by 
developing countries under international economic regime, and the BWIs have not dealt 
with this asymmetry to the extent that satisfies their developing country members40. On 
the other hand, the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are evolved partly to deal with the 
asymmetry problem associated with the climate change regime. Secondly, despite the 
ultimate goal o f these two systems is the pursuit o f sustainable development, their 
objectives and short-term aims are different from each other. The BWIs seek to address 
economic difficulties in their member states and to create a well-functioning international 
economic environment; while the FCCC seek to stabilise GHGs concentrations in the 
atmosphere. Thirdly, the modus operandi is also different between these two systems. 
The FCCC is an international treaty that sets down rules by which Parties are required to 
abide. The BWIs are established by their respective Articles o f Agreements, which are 
international treaties as well. Nevertheless, the BWIs have developed sophisticated 
institutions, such as Executive Boards and a large body o f professional staffs, whose 
operations are similar to co-operatives in that members contribute to a pool o f funds from 
which they can borrow in the hour o f need. It is, thus, understandable that the governance 
structures o f the two systems are different. In sum, it is difficult to determine which 
system is better than the other and the fundamental differences between the two needs to 
be recognised. Nevertheless, the interactions between the two systems are likely to 
increase, as has been discussed previously, because o f their substantial overlap in 
operation and in membership. We will now turn to the discussion on the interaction 
between the BWIs and the FCCC.
discussed later on, refer to sets o f formal rules and institutions operating under international treaties —  
Articles o f Agreements of the BWIs and the Convention itself.
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Table 5-1 presents the comparison between the BWIs and the FCCC, including 
their differences and similarities.
TABLE 5-1: Comparison between the BWIs and the FCCC
COMPARISON BWIS, ARTICLES OF 
AGREEMENTS
FCCC, KYOTO 
PROTOCOL
Differences Governance Weighted voting based on 
financial contribution
One country, one vote.
Obligations41 More obligations for 
developing countries 
because of more frequent 
use of resources.
More substantive obligations 
for developed countries, in 
particular under the Kyoto 
Protocol.
Leverage Developed countries, as 
they hold the majority 
votes in the decision­
making process of the 
BWIs.
Developing countries, as 
their cooperation is crucial to 
the success of the FCCC42.
Similarities Historical force 
leading to 
establishment
Both were mainly the result of inadequate policies 
pursued by developed countries43.
Negative 
impact: should 
the system fail?
Both have or will have negative impact on every country 
in the world44.
Source of 
finance
Both are financed largely by developed countries45.
Legal character Both the Articles of Agreements of the BWIs and the 
FCCC are binding international legal treaties.
Membership Large overlap in membership46
40 For example, although calls for reforming the voting rules came as early as in 1972, the proportion of  
basic votes, which are allocated equally among all members, in the IMF have been decreasing with each 
review of quotas conducted every five years (Gerster, 1993a).
41 This refers to both treaty obligations and obligations arising from loans in the case o f the BWIs.
42 For further discussion on how developing countries have gained greater leverage under international 
environmental negotiation, see: Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992.
43 The protectionist policies practiced by most o f the developed countries in the 1940s contributed to the 
chaotic world order that led to the outbreak o f WW II. The ruthless pursuit o f industrialisation and 
unlimited economic growth by the developed countries since the age o f industrialisation are one o f the 
main causes o f climate change.
44 A failed BWIs will have implications on the international economic order, which will affect not only 
developing but developed countries as well. In case where the FCCC fails to get fully implemented, the 
resulting increase of the GHGs concentration and climate change will have devastating effect on every 
single country on earth.
45 In the case of the FCCC, providing financial assistance is actually a treaty obligation for the developed 
country parties (FCCC, Article 4.2).
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From Table 5-1, we can find striking similarities between the BWIs and the 
FCCC. However, they have fundamental differences as well. What are, then, the 
interaction between the obligations under the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and those of 
the BWIs? And how does the existence of the FCCC affect the operations o f the BWIs?
As previously pointed out, the causes o f and solutions to climate change require 
re-examination o f every aspect o f our economic activities, which implicate the overlap of 
competence between the BWIs and the FCCC. Nevertheless, under the treaty regime of 
the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol, substantive treaty obligations have not yet comprehensive 
enough to cover such a wide range o f economic aspects that come into the competence of 
the BWIs47. Why, then, does the existence o f the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol affect the 
regular operations o f the BWIs? The answer lies in the impact the operations o f the BWIs 
could have on the climate change regime.
First o f all, while the World Bank has the largest renewable energy portfolio of 
any institution in the world, renewable energy only represents about 10% of the total 
energy portfolio value in the last six years (World Bank, February 1998a). The Bank still 
has large lending operations to fund fossil fuel-related projects in the developing 
countries48, resulting in large amount o f GHGs emissions. Secondly, the existing design 
and operations o f the SAPs o f the BWIs have, as will be demonstrated in the succeeding 
section, implications for the climate change regime as well. The design o f the existing
46 All the Parties to the FCCC are member states o f the BWIs. There are 176 parties to the FCCC as of 
October 1998, 183 member states o f the IMF and 181 member states o f the IBRD.
47 Although Article 4.1(f) requires all|Parties to take climate change considerations into account in their 
relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, it does not impose concrete obligations 
such as limiting the type o f economic or developmental policies Parties are allowed to adopt. This is more 
vividly illustrated in the case o f developing countries that are not subject to the only set o f substantive 
obligations of reducing GHGs emissions under the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol. For example, developing 
countries can, in principle, pursue an unlimited economic growth and a higher level o f industrialisation to 
the extent that their potential GHGs emissions level will reach that o f the developed countries.
48 In FY 1997, World Bank (IBRD and IDA) lending for oil, gas and coal represents nearly 19% of the 
total commitments in the energy section, the figure rises to 43% in FY 1998.
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SAPs has the development model, ie economic growth and industrialisation pursued by 
the developed countries in mind. The correlation between this development model, ie 
“economic” development and global climate change has already been demonstrated in 
the preceding section. Therefore, it is this potentially negative impact the operations of 
the BWIs could have on the climate change regime that we examine to what extent does 
the existence of the FCCC affect the operations o f the BWIs.
The interaction between the FCCC and the BWIs will be analysed from three 
perspectives: the BWIs themselves, the developed countries which hold the majority 
votes in the Boards o f Executive Directors, and the developing countries. In order to 
determine how does the existence o f the FCCC affect the regular operations o f the 
FCCC, we need to examine what are the legal obligations, if  any, under the FCCC for 
each of these three groups, and what kind o f conflict might arise as a result between these 
obligations o f the FCCC and the existing operations o f the BWIs.
From the perspectives of the World Bank as an international organisation, it 
needs to be pointed out from the beginning that the Bank itself is not a Party to the FCCC 
and is ineligible to become one under the FCCC49. In addition, the Articles o f Agreement 
of the Bank and the provisions of the FCCC can hardly be categorised as “regulating the 
same subject matter”. As a result, principles under the law o f treaties are inapplicable in 
this context. In principle, thus, the World Bank as an international organisation does not 
carry any legal obligations toward the FCCC, and should not be affected by the existence 
of the FCCC. However, the following developments seem to suggest otherwise. First o f 
all, the Bank adopted an internal policy (OMS 2.36 on Environmental Aspects o f Bank 
Work, May 1984) as early as in 1984 stating that the Bank “will not finance projects that
contravene any international environmental agreement to which the member country 
concerned is a party”50. This internal procedural requirement prevents the Bank from 
funding projects that might contravene with the obligations o f the FCCC. In addition, 
any affected citizen in the country where a Bank project is situated could bring complaint 
to the Inspection Panel in cases where the Bank violates this internal policy51,52. 
Furthermore, such a formal commitment o f not financing projects that contravene any 
international environmental agreement “rises to the level o f a limited legal obligation not 
to disregard the objectives and purposes o f the MEA concerned” (Handl, 1998, p. 658). 
Secondly, the Bank, in writing the covenants in any loan agreement for investment 
projects, should avoid “covenants that would be inconsistent with, or that could not be 
performed without modification of, the domestic law o f the member concerned” (OP
7.01 on Contractual Agreements, July 1994). In cases where the member concerned is a 
Party to the FCCC and has incorporated its treaty obligations into its domestic law, the 
Bank will have to respect the relevant provisions under the FCCC that have been 
transformed into domestic law.
Thirdly, the acceptance of the role as the Trustee o f the GEF Trust Fund and as an 
Implementing Agency o f the restructured GEF has implications for the Bank in its 
relations with the FCCC. The Bank, in its capacity as the Trustee o f the GEF Trust Fund
49 Article 22 o f the FCCC states that only “States and regional economic integration organizations” are 
eligible to become Parties to the FCCC.
50 However, after this OMS was published, the Bank still involved in several controversial loans which 
caused, for example, deforestation in the borrowing country (eg the Brazilian Polonoroeste project) that 
could have contravened the Convention on Biodiversity.
51 Following the 1987 reorganisation, OMSs were gradually reflected in new documents called 
“Operational Directives”, and not all OMSs have been converted to Operational Directives. Therefore, the 
Panel still needs to decide whether certain details in a specific OMS are provided as technical advice to the 
staff or are meant to be strictly complied with (Shihata, 1994b). It is not yet clear whether this provision in 
OMS 2.36 is subject to the competence o f the Panel.
52 This scenario can arise in cases where the Bank finance a fossil fuel-related project in an Eastern 
European country, which has obligations under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce GHGs emission, that will
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and the Implementing Agency of GEF, is accountable to the GEF Council, which, in 
turn, has to follow guidance from the COP to the FCCC with regard to climate change- 
related projects53. By approving the restructured the GEF Instrument, the Bank, Sand has 
argued, is restricted in providing funding for “projects that would run counter to the 
objectives o f the two new conventions which it is formally committed to implement” 
(Sand, 1996, pp. 495-96). Fourthly, the Bank is itself a subject o f international law and 
“cannot stay aloof form, or be unaffected by, changing international public policy and 
normative developments” (Handl, 1998, p. 647). The FCCC admittedly does not contain 
provisions that refer specifically to international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank or the IMF. Nevertheless, Handl has argued: “ ... as members o f the international 
community, multilateral development banks are subject not only to evolving 
international public policy and general international law, but also to the normative reach 
of those MEAs that have been adopted precisely to lay down principles and standards o f 
global applicability” (Handl, G, 1998, p. 661)54. As the FCCC no doubt qualifies as one 
of those widely adhered to MEAs that lay down principles and standards of global 
applicability, the Bank arguably should respect obligations prescribed under the FCCC 
when conducting its regular operations.
To sum up, the obligations o f the FCCC do not legally bind the World Bank in 
conducting its existing operations. However, from the recent practice o f the Bank such as 
its internal policies and approval of the restructured GEF, as well as development under
increase the GHGs emission o f the country. This project clearly contravenes an international 
environmental agreement: the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol in this case.
53 For further discussion on the implications for the World Bank acting as the Trustee o f GEF Tmst Fund, 
see Chapter 4.2.3.
54 Handl concludes that there is even no need to amend the articles o f agreements o f multilateral 
development banks: “MDBs in general not only are free to take sustainable development concerns into 
account, but also have an international legal obligations to do so —  not despite their constituent 
instruments but, rather ... because o f them!” (Handl, 1998, p. 665.) (original emphasis.)
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international law identified by legal scholars such as Sand and Handl, the existence o f the 
FCCC bears profound implications for the World Bank in the sense that the Bank should, 
arguably, take into account obligations prescribed by the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
when carrying out its existing operations55.
The aforementioned analysis does not apply as readily to the IMF in its entirety. 
There are no decisions in the Fund similar to the Bank’s OMS 2.36. Nor does the Fund 
assume any role under MEAs regime as the Bank does under GEF and the FCCC. 
Nevertheless, according to Sir Joseph Gold, part o f the considerations when the 
Executive Board decided stand-by arrangement were not international agreements or 
treaties (Guidelines on Conditionality, para. 3) has been “the desirability o f avoiding 
conflicts with other international organizations” (Gold, 1980a). It is conceivable, thus, 
that the Fund does not want to engage in activities that might result in conflicts with 
other international organisations, MEAs arguably included. Furthermore, the IMF is also 
itself a subject under international law. Thus, the argument by Handl in relation to the 
quasi-binding effect o f the evolving international public policy and general international 
law should also apply mutatis mutandis in the case o f the Fund. As a result, in so far as 
the Fund’s role overlap to some extent with the Bank in the structural adjustment 
operations, which potentially have implications for climate change, the Fund arguably 
should also take into account development under the FCCC in conducting its structural 
adjustment-related operations.
55 Similar discussion took place in the field o f human rights protection as well. It has also been urged that 
“international organizations should not promote policies or provide funding in a manner that would 
undermine the member states’ ability to fulfill their own freely assumed international legal commitments” 
because international organisations are “both subjects of international law and bound by its norms.” 
(Bradlow and Grossman, 1995, p. 428.)
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For developed countries they, as Annex I and/or II56 Parties to the FCCC, bear 
more substantive obligations under the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol. They have a dual role 
under the BWIs: on the one hand, they have treaty obligations under the respective 
Articles of Agreements, such as to co-operate in the Fund’s surveillance operation or to 
pay in subscription to shares; on the other hand, as the holder o f majority votes as a 
group in the Boards o f Executive Directors, they assert much influence over the decisions 
and operations o f the BWIs57. Under the circumstances, what kind o f conflict can arise 
for the developed countries undertaking obligations under the BWIs and the FCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol? Their treaty obligations under the Articles o f Agreements o f the BWIs, 
such as subscription to shares a d quotas, do not seem to interact much with the existence 
of the FCCC. In addition, since developed countries, in particular OECD members, no 
longer receive financial assistance from the BWIs, they are not subject to the 
programmes and policies prescribed by the BWIs. For example, they are not required to 
implement SAPs, whose policy content might have implications for the implementation 
of the FCCC. Therefore, it seems conceivable that developed countries do not have two 
sets of treaty obligations that might conflict with each other58. However, their other role 
under the BWIs, ie their dominating position in the decision-making process o f the 
BWIs, deserves more attention.
56 Annex II Parties are all OECD members; while Annex I Parties are Annex II Parties plus economies in 
transition (Annex I and Annex II to the FCCC).
57 For example, after examining the structure, purpose and voting system o f the IMF and the IBRD, White 
concludes that “... it can be seen that it is dominated by the Western industrial powers” (White, 1996, p. 
77).
58 This conclusion mainly applies to developed countries that are OECD members. For economies in 
transitions (EIT) there is possibility where conflict could arise when they, for example, apply for funding 
from the World Bank for coal power plant whose GHGs emission level could result in a breach o f treaty 
obligation under the Kyoto Protocol, under which EIT have substantive obligations to reduce GHGs 
emissions. The special case o f EIT under this circumstance deserves more analysis. Nevertheless, since the 
main focus o f discussion here is on developing countries, the case o f EIT will not be elaborated in the 
present study.
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One aspect from developed countries’ perspective o f the interaction between their 
treaty obligations under the FCCC and decision-making role under the BWIs relates to 
the amount o f resource needed in approving a loan whose operations will have 
implication to the FCCC59. In addition, there are other potential interactions, even 
conflicts, between the objective o f the FCCC and impact o f the BWIs operation* from 
developed countries’ perspective. For example, the Boards o f Executive Directors might 
need to decide whether to approval a loan, such as a fossil fuel-related investment project 
or a structural adjustment lending whose policy suggestions might fail to take climate 
change implications into account, that could have potential negative impact ion climate 
change, such as a global increase of GHGs emissions. Under this circumstance, if  the 
Boards, where the developed countries hold the majority votes60, approve such a loan, the 
objective o f the FCCC will be undermined. As taking climate change consideration into 
account does not breach the criteria set down in the Articles o f Agreements o f the BWIs 
with regard to making loan decisions61, developed countries in their capacity as 
Executive Directors seem able to satisfy their obligations under both the FCCC and the 
BWIs by rejecting loans that could result in negative impact on climate change. This is 
how the existence o f the FCCC can affect the regular operations o f the BWIs from the 
developed countries’ perspective.
For developing countries, they have not yet had substantive obligations relating to 
emissions reduction under the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol at the time being. However,
59 This is relating to Article 4.7 o f the FCCC, for further discussion, see Chapter 5.1.2.
60 Although the Boards usually reach its decision through consensus and rarely take a vote, the “voting 
strength o f members remains a cmcial consideration with regard to the evaluation o f consensus on any 
matter” (Ferguson, 1988, p. 65). Thus, developed countries can still dominate the outcome o f the meeting 
of the Boards.
61 For further discussion on the compatibility between the “economic consideration” prescribed under the 
respective Articles of Agreement o f the BWIs and “sustainable development”, see Chapter 1, and Handl, 
1998.
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according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (Article 26, Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties), a Party to the FCCC should perform treaty obligations of the FCCC in 
good faith, including not to engage in activities that run counter to the objectives o f the 
FCCC. When a developing country is required to implement a SAP whose conditionality 
and policy suggestions might render this country incapable o f complying with the FCCC 
in the future, potential conflict arises for this developing country between loan 
obligations from the BWIs and treaty obligations under the FCCC62. In this circumstance, 
it is up to individual developing country to decide how to respond to two different and 
sometimes incompatible sets o f international obligations. Legally speaking, developing 
countries will not be in breach of FCCC obligations if  they undertake projects or 
programmes that result in substantive GHGs emissions for they do not have such 
substantive obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, the need for energy 
consumption in developing countries is bound to increase if  their standard o f living is to 
reach a basic level63.
Does this imply that developing countries can undertake any project and 
programme of the BWIs, even though such project and programme could undermine 
their future ability to implement the FCCC? In other words, does this mean that the 
existence o f the FCCC has no impact whatsoever on the operations o f the FCCC from the 
developing countries’ perspective?
Not necessarily. The FCCC provides financial and technological assistance to its 
developing country Parties under certain conditions through GEF, its interim financial
62 This is a widely perceived problem when international treaties proliferated after the 1970s. For example, 
there has been a constant debate regarding the compatibility between MEAs with trade provisions and the 
GATT and WTO. A country faces contradictory treaty obligations from two different international regimes 
and finds it difficult to conciliate..
63 This is one o f the considerations why developing countries do not need to make substantive commitment 
at the time being. See the previous section for further discussion.
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mechanism. In order to receive the financial and technological assistance, developing 
countries will need to refrain from undertaking BWIs obligations and instructions that 
might render itself unable to implement the FCCC in the future, and, consequently, 
become disqualified in receiving financial and technological assistance from the 
Convention. Does this mean that developing countries will chose to observe the overall 
objective of the FCCC in order to receive assistance from the FCCC, and forgo loans 
from the BWIs? This might depend on the amount o f money a developing country will 
be able to receive from each o f the two regimes. If  the amount o f money a developing 
country can receive under the BWIs loan exceed that under the FCCC, it can afford to 
forgo the assistance from the FCCC and opt for the BWIs loan instead. At the moment, it 
seems that, compared to GEF, the BWIs can provide a much larger financial assistance to 
their developing country members64. However, more money usually means more 
conditionality, as has been discussed previously. Although it has been identified in 
Chapter 4 that GEF might begin to develop its own conditionality requirement, the 
BWIs-style conditionality seems to attract more criticism because o f the governance 
structure o f the BWIs that results in asymmetric treatment from developing countries’ 
perspectives. Under the governance structure o f GEF, however, developing countries will 
be able to participate in designing the conditionality developed under GEF. From the 
viewpoint of conditionality requirement, thus, it is not necessarily more advantageous for 
developing countries to opt for the BWIs since, under the FCCC regime, developing 
countries have more opportunity to take part in reaching decisions regarding how GEF 
money can be used in their own territories.
64 To make a rough comparison: Russia received a Coal Sector Adjustment Loan in FY 1998 of 
US$ 800m; while China received a Energy Conservation grant form GEF in FY 1997 o f only US$ 22m.
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Therefore, from the perspectives o f the developing countries, the existence o f the 
FCCC does have implications for the regular operations o f the BWIs. In order to qualify 
under the FCCC to receive financial and technical assistance from GEF, developing 
countries can either refrain from applying for project and/or programme loans that may 
have negative impact on climate change from the BWIs, or they can seek to change the 
decisions and policies of the BWIs through their own Executive Directors, both of which 
can affect the operations o f the BWIs.
To sum up, as the preceding discussion demonstrated, the existence o f the FCCC 
can affect the operations o f the BWIs from the perspectives o f all major groups involved: 
the institutions themselves, the developed countries and the developing countries. It is 
not to suggest that the BWIs should then subject themselves to the authority o f the 
FCCC. Nevertheless, from the perspectives of all three, the BWIs seem no long able to 
operate in total disregard o f treaty obligations undertaken by their member states under 
the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Before examining how then the existing mechanism 
of the BWIs, the SAPs, can be reformed in the light o f the FCCC, and how the 
innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank can be further developed, the next sub-section 
will look more specifically at the implications o f the Kyoto Protocol on the World Bank.
5.2.3 Implications o f  the Kyoto Protocol to the World Bank65
The Kyoto Protocol does not impose substantive commitments on developing 
countries. Under Article 10 o f the Protocol, commitments in Article 4.1 o f the 
Convention for all Parties are reaffirmed. It is specifically stated in Article 10 that new 
commitments for non-Annex I Parties, ie developing countries will not be introduced.
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However, after the Annex I Parties have committed themselves to these substantive 
commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, the next logical step is to start negotiating modest 
commitments for developing country Parties if  efforts made by Annex I Parties are not to 
be offset by the potentially enormous amount o f emissions from the developing world. 
This negotiation might be even more difficult than that o f the Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol, which can already be detected from the thorny debate on voluntary 
commitments by non-Annex I Parties at the COP 4 in Buenos Aires in 1998.66 
Nevertheless, it will be necessary if the ultimate objective o f the Convention is to be 
achieved: the stabilisation o f GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
As a result, developing countries will need to start preparing themselves for the 
time when substantive obligations from future protocol arrive. This possible development 
under the FCCC on the part of developing countries will have further implications for the 
regular operations o f the BWIs. As has been illustrated in the preceding discussion, the 
existence of the FCCC has already affected the regular operations o f the BWIs to the 
extent that the BWIs can no longer carrying out their operations in isolation from any 
development under the climate change regime. If, in the future, developing countries 
have more substantive obligations under the climate change regime, they will need to 
refrain from undertaking projects or programmes that might increase their GHGs 
emissions and, as a result, lead to a breach o f their treaty obligations under the climate 
change regime. Under this scenario, the BWIs will put their developing country members
65 A detail analysis o f the provisions o f the Kyoto Protocol will not be conducted here, for further 
discussion, see: Yamin, 1998.
66 At the COP 4, some developed countries, US for example, sought to secure voluntary commitments 
from developing countries with regard to targets and timetable for GHGs emissions reduction. Two 
developing countries, Argentina and Kazakhstan, announced that they would undertake voluntary
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in a very difficult position if  they continue to propose projects or programmes to these 
members that might hamper their developing country members’ abilities to implement 
the FCCC or any future protocol.
In addition to the future development under the climate change regime with 
regard to substantive commitment and its implications on the operations o f the BWIs, 
certain provisions in the Kyoto Protocol have already had implications for the World 
Bank’s innovative mechanisms. The first one is the official sanction of joint 
implementation (JI) between the Annex I Parties. Although JI is only limited among 
Annex I Parties, namely the developed countries, at presnet, it opens the possibility that 
JI might be permitted between developed and developing countries67. The Bank has 
indicated that its AIJ project selection criteria and evaluation guidelines are consistent 
with the objective of the FCCC. Nevertheless, the relationship between the JI under the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Bank AIJ programme remains unclear. For example, since JI 
under the Kyoto Protocol is limited among developed countries, it remains unclear 
whether the Bank AIJ programme will follow the JI operational guidelines developed by 
the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol in the future. 
It is, thus, too early to see whether the Kyoto Protocol has any immediate or significant 
implications on the Bank AIJ programme. Nevertheless, as long as the possibility 
remains that JI could be undertaken between developed and developing countries, the 
Bank AIJ programme might attract more attention from donor as well as host countries. 
For example, there might be more agreements, similar to the one between Norway and
commitments. This, however, was heavily criticised by G-77 and China. For more discussion, visit the 
website on: http://www.iisd.ca/climate/ba/.
67 After the Kyoto Protocol, the official JI refers to the bilateral relationship between two Annex I Parties. 
The CDM seeks to “multilateralise” the essentially bilateral-natured JI by providing a mechanism to 
supervise emission-reduction projects. In fact, the CDM has provided another form o f JI between
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the Bank, between other donors and the Bank in which the Bank plays a facilitative role 
in arranging AIJ projects. The Bank AIJ programme, thus, could have the potential to 
have wider scope o f operations than its present arrangement. This is one o f the 
implications the Kyoto Protocol might have for the World Bank.
From developing countries’ perspective, this potential implication for the Bank 
AIJ programme might be beneficial. The developing countries might prefer having a 
mechanism like the Bank AIJ programme, preferably one that has closer link with the 
Kyoto Protocol68, than leaving all the bilateral JI negotiation to themselves. From 
developing countries’ perspectives, the unequal bargaining positions in bilateral JI 
negotiations might allow developed countries to impose new conditionalities or to 
promote projects that are not in the national interest (Werksman, 1998). Therefore, if  all 
the JI projects can be arranged and overseen by the Bank AIJ programme having a close 
link with the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries might be able to gain more control 
over the operations of all the JI projects through the Kyoto Protocol and the FCCC.
Another provision of the Kyoto Protocol that potentially has significant 
implication for the World Bank is Article 12. The CDM defined in Article 12 o f the 
Protocol has striking similarities with another innovative mechanism the Bank is in the 
process o f setting up, that is the GCI/PCF69. The COP serving as the MOP to the Protocol 
will elaborate modalities and procedures o f the CDM at its first session. Operational 
entities will need to be designated by the COP serving as the MOP to the Protocol as
developed and developing country Parties. For further discussion on the concept o f JI and its various forms 
under the Kyoto Protocol, see: Missfeldt, 1998.
68 For example, formal agreement could be arranged between the Bank AIJ programme and the MOP to 
the Kyoto Protocol which gives the MOP the mandate to design project criteria and to oversea the 
operations of the AIJ programme.
69 For information on the development and operations GCI/PCF, see Chapter 4.1.2.2.
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well70. As for the World Bank’s GCI/PCF, it is not operational yet and further operational 
guidelines and procedures are still developing within the Bank. Considering the 
relatively small amount o f money the PCF is able to obtain pledges so far (US$ 100m) 
the Bank does not seem to envisage the PCF having any formal link with the CDM under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, the PCF will be different from other financial 
mechanism, like GEF, in that private sector will play a large part in it. What are the 
implications o f the CDM for the World Bank?
Although the Bank does not envisage any formal link between its PCF and the 
CDM under the Kyoto Protocol, the following considerations could push the Bank into 
another direction. Firstly, the Bank has extensive experiences in project identification 
and implementation, and has conducted advanced research in methodological issues 
through taking part in GEF and the AIJ programme. This “comparative advantage” puts 
the Bank in a position where the investors, in particular developed countries obligated 
with substantive commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, would prefer the Bank and its 
PCF playing a large part in the CDM. Secondly, if  a formal relationship is established 
between the PCF and the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the “carbon offset” obtained in 
the project funded by the PCF can then be credited under the Protocol. This is certainly 
desirable from the investors’ perspective. Lastly, the potential financial benefit o f the 
developing countries, as hosts in the projects arranged under the CDM, is at stake. The 
developing countries might prefer a formal relationship to be established between the 
PCF and the FCCC because they perceive the FCCC as a better forum over which they
have more control. Taken all these factors into consideration, it is likely that some kind
/
of agreement could be reached between the PCF o f the Bank and the CDM under the
70 For further discussion on the negotiation history and detail analysis o f Article 12 o f the Kyoto Protocol,
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Kyoto Protocol. In that case, the development of the CDM under the climate change 
regime will have implications for the World Bank in its GCI/PCF.
In short, the Kyoto Protocol potentially has significant implications for the World 
Bank’s Jl-related innovative mechanisms. The official sanction' o f JI under the Kyoto 
Protocol could widen the scope o f the present Bank AIJ programme. The establishment 
of CDM by the Kyoto Protocol might have implications for future development o f the 
Bank’s GCI/PCF. The earlier discussion demonstrates how the existence o f the FCCC 
affect the existing operations o f the BWIs and concludes that the BWIs will need to take 
into account obligations under the FCCC when carrying out their regulation operations. 
This section points out the potential implications o f the Kyoto Protocol for the innovative 
mechanisms of the World Bank and suggests formal arrangements to be established 
between the Bank’s innovative mechanisms and the Kyoto Protocol for the benefits o f 
both developed and developing countries. The next section will look more specifically at 
how the existence o f the FCCC can affect the existing operations o f the BWIs by 
examining the relationship between the SAPs and the FCCC. Suggestions will be put 
forward as to how the design o f the existing SAPs can be reformed in order to assist the 
developing countries to implement the FCCC.
5.3 SAPs with a “climate safety net”?
The SAP, its policy content and conditionalities attached are based on the 
economic model perceived by the BWIs as ideal for a country’s economic growth —  
“development” in the traditional sense. Considering the lack o f concerns over 
environmental factors in this previous development model, it is not surprising to find the
see Werksman, 1998.
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lack of reference to the environment in the design o f the SAPs. Before presenting 
suggestions to the reform of the SAPs in the light of the obligations under the FCCC, the 
next section will briefly examine the environmental impact o f the current SAPs, with 
particular reference to the impact on climate change. It demonstrates that the SAPs have 
implications for the developing countries in implementing the FCCC.
5.3.1 SAPs and the environment, with particular reference to climate change
SAPs mainly contain suggestions o f a set o f macroeconomic policies in order to 
deal with the structural problems o f a country. The process o f structural adjustment 
usually involves evaluating and reformulating the macroeconomic economic policies o f a 
country. The linkage between macroeconomic policies71 and the environment did not 
draw immense attention before the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, since the 
environmental impact o f SAPs supported by the BWIs has become an issue subjected to 
controversial debate (eg Kothari and Kothari, 1993; Reed, 1992 and 1996; Rich, 1994), 
the interrelationship between macroeconomic policies and the environment has, as a 
consequence, begun to draw greater attention72. The discussion o f the linkage between 
the two is an on-going debate. Starting with earlier debate on arguing whether or not 
macroeconomic policies have any impact at all on the environment73, the focus has now 
moved towards ascertaining whether the impact is positive or negative, and attempting to
71 Macroeconomic policies are usually defined as: “fiscal and monetary policies that aim at achieving 
economic goals, such as control o f economic stability, growth, full employment, and balance-of-payments 
equilibrium.” (Shim and Siegel, 1995.)
72 For example, the IMF only began to consider the impact o f macroeconomic polices on the environment 
and vice versa in early 1991. Its staff produced a limited number o f working papers after 1990 to discuss 
general issues relevant to the environment (eg Levin, 1993; Muzondo et al, 1990; and, McMorran and 
Nellor, 1994). It also held two seminars, one in May 1993 and the other in May 1995, to discuss the 
relevant issues o f macroeconomic policies and the environment with academics and NGOs and it 
published the proceedings .of the latter in 1996 (Gandhi, 1996.)
73 That is whether environmental policies will affect the macroeconomic situation o f a country.
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setting up a framework within which an integrated approach between macroeconomic 
and environmental policies can be undertaken (Gandhi, 1996).
The impact of various macroeconomic policies on the environment can both be 
direct and indirect, as well as negative and positive74. Fiscal policy, which directs 
government spending and taxation for gearing the economy toward a growth rate that is 
neither too rapid nor too slow, is a good example to look at. Environmental tax has direct 
and, potentially, positive impact on the environment through the application of the 
“polluter pays principle”. Expenditure policy, in particular the requirement to cut down 
government expenditure, can have negative impact on the environment through a budge 
cut on the relevant environmental agencies; however, it can have positive impact on the 
environment through the elimination of subsidy which often results in the wasteful use of 
resources. Other adjustment measures, such as trade liberalisation or exchange rate 
policies, can alter the relative prices o f different commodities, including energy sources 
such as petroleum, change the output structures or input combination, and, as a result, 
influence the patter of resource utilisation (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995).In a word, no 
simple generalisations are possible as to the likely environmental effects o f broad policy 
measures (Munasinghe, 1993).
In addition to the impact on the environment in general, some of the 
macroeconomic policy reforms involved in the structural adjustment process have either 
direct or indirect impact on the climate change regime. For example, price reform has 
been a major element in the process of structural adjustment. The change o f the relative 
prices o f input through, for instance, the elimination o f subsidies will affect the types and 
quantities of resources used (Institute o f Development Studies, 1991). This, as a
74 For a number of good illustrations on this two-prong effect, see: Gandhi and McMorran, 1996.
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consequence, can alter the pattern o f fossil fuel used as energy input and affect the GHGs 
emission level o f a country. The liberalisation o f international trade, with the aim to 
increase government revenue, has been at the centre o f most structural adjustment 
programmes (Zarsky, 1994). This advocacy o f free trade policy can have an impact on 
the international trade o f certain substances (or goods containing such substances), which 
might be subjected to restrictions under future protocols o f the FCCC75.
It is therefore fair to conclude that macroeconomic policies can have either 
positive or negative impact on the environment and on climate change, depending on the 
design and implementation o f the relevant structural adjustment policy instruments. The 
design of programmes and policies o f the SAPs in the past did not seem to consider their 
environmental impact76. It has been argued, for example, that economy-wide policy 
reforms suggested by the IMF and the World Bank “have been encouraged with little 
regard to their environmental consequences due to the presumption that these effects 
could be ignored or could be dealt with separately” (Opschoor and Jongma, 1996)77. 
Considering the models o f “development”, ie unlimited economic growth, these SAPs 
seek to achieve fails to address the environmental constraints, it is understandable that 
SAPs themselves do not prescribe economic policies that take into account the 
environment.
75 The FCCC is a framework convention without setting out any regulatory timetable o f certain substances 
yet. The Kyoto Protocol, being agreed at the COP 3 to the FCCC in December 1997, sets down substantive 
obligations o f emissions reduction for the Annex I Parties, and prescribes six types o f GHGs that are 
subject to the reduction target. The Protocol, however, has not come into force yet and does not authorise 
the use of trade restriction.
76 For example, the in-house historian o f the IMF recognised the lack o f environmental concern in the 
SAPs: “[The Fund] is also increasingly concerned with ... the impact adjustment programs and economic 
policies will have on the environment.” (De Vries, 1995, p. 45.)
77 Even the research on the experience under the SAF and ESAF conducted by the IMF staff concluded 
that: “Environmental considerations began to come into play in ESAF-supported programs but demand 
greater attention.” (Schadler et al, 1993.)
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Several case studies o f the impact SAPs on the environment in countries 
undertaking a SAP have been conducted (eg Cruz and Repetto, 1992; Panayotou and 
Sussangkam, 1991; Reed, 1992 and 1996). The results o f these studies vary and general 
conclusions are difficult to draw. The environmental impact o f SAPs concluded in these 
various case studies differs depending on several factors. For example, the yardsticks by 
which evaluation of the environmental impact is measured differ among bodies 
conducting the research; the methodologies applied in ascertaining the impact differ as 
well78. In addition, no case study has been conducted so far to examine specifically the 
impact of the SAPs on climate change, such as the impact on the GHGs emission level of 
countries under the SAPs. However, it is conceded that environmental considerations, 
including those that have profound implications for climate change, have received 
insufficient attention in the design of a SAP and that an integrated approach should be 
adopted in the future design of a SAP79.
5.3.2 Reform o f  the design o f  the SAPs
Call for environmental reform of the SAPs has been mounting from 
environmental and social groups since the 1980s. However, the response from the BWIs 
has been limited. Despite, for example, pressure from several US legislative efforts after 
1989 calling for environmental reform within the IMF (Horta, 1996), the message from 
its Managing Director has been that: “In addressing the specific issues o f the 
environment, we rely basically on the expertise o f our sister institution the World
78 The difficulties and problems associated with evaluating the effect o f the SAPs on the economy, as has 
been identified in Chapter 3, are applicable in evaluating the environmental impact o f the SAPs as well. 
For more comprehensive discussion on these difficulties associated with the evaluation o f the 
environmental impact o f the SAPs, see: Panayotou and Hupe, 1996.
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Bank.”80 This statement seems somehow contradictory with the recent recognition within 
the IMF staff o f the important linkage between the macroeconomic policies and the 
environment81. As far as the World Bank is concerned, on the other hand, it has begun to 
pay some limited attention to the environmental aspect o f its SAPs. For example, o f the 
34 adjustment operations approved in fiscal year 1989, 7 contained conditions directly 
related to environmental management (Webb and Shariff, 1992). Nevertheless, structural 
adjustment lending is exempted from the environmental impact assessments82. 
Considering the increasing importance o f structural adjustment lending in the 1980s and 
1990s, as mentioned earlier, this exemption can result in a negative impact o f the overall 
operations of the World Bank Group on the environment, notwithstanding its 
involvement in co-managing GEF with the UNEP and UNDP.
As has been pointed out in the preceding section, the existing operations o f the 
BWIs are affected by the treay obligations under the climate change regime. This 
development will no doubt strengthen the previous call for the reform of the SAPs. From 
the perspectives o f all the major groups —  the institutions, developed countries and 
developing countries —  the BWIs conceivably need to bring their operations in line with 
the treaty obligations o f the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol, or at least to avoid activities that 
might run counter to the objectives o f the FCCC. To put this policy consideration into 
action, reforming the design o f the SAPs would undoubtedly be a good start. The
79 For example, it has been suggested that: “structural adjustment programs, even though they are intended 
to create an appropriate policy framework for long-term growth, also omit crucial environmental 
safeguards.” (Cruz and Repetto, 1992.)
80 The message is addressed by Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director o f the IMF, to the UN 
Conference on the Environment and Development in June 1992.
81 For example, the First Deputy Managing Director o f the IMF Stanley Fischer noted at an IMF-sponsored 
seminar on the environment in May 1995 that, “excessive exploitation o f natural resources can give rise to 
structural balance o f payments problems and reduce economic growth prospects.” (IMF, August 1996, 
p. 263.)
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primary objective o f a SAP is to correct the structural problems in the economy of the 
borrowing country. The main purpose o f the BWIs is not, after all, to assist the 
implementation o f the FCCC. Thus, economic theories and models that are employed to 
improve the economic situation in the borrowing country will still dominate the basic 
ideology behind the design o f the SAP83. As a result, it seems more plausible to design a 
“filter” in the SAPs for climate change purpose to leave out negative impact on climate 
change. Such an action has already had precedent in the current operations o f the SAPs: 
the practice o f “social safety net”.
At present, “social safety net” has been incorporated in some o f the programmes 
under either the Bank or the Fund84. Some o f the measures have been identified as rather 
common in the design o f social safety net, such as targeted subsides, improved 
distribution o f essentials such as medicines, temporary price controls for essential 
commodities, and adaptation o f permanent social security arrangements to protect the 
poorest (IMF, 1995). This demonstrates the flexibility and possibility o f the staff of the 
BWIs to design a “climate safety net” by incorporating factors that might mitigate the 
negative impact on climate change. The following discussion will then look at ways in 
which a “climate safety net” could be adopted in the SAPs. Note that the following
82 Operational Directive 4.01on Environmental Assessment o f 3 October 1991 states, in part: “For the 
purpose of this directive, environmental assessment covers project-specific and other environmental 
impacts in the area o f influence o f a p ro je c t . . .” (emphasis added.)
83 It is, o f course, possible to advocate for a complete shift o f the economic theories and models behind the 
design of the SAPs by, for example, proposing formal amendment to the Articles o f Agreements in order 
to take on “sustainable development” as one of the purposes o f the BWIs. In which case, the design o f the 
SAP will be based completely on the sustainable development model. Nevertheless, reform on such a 
grand scale seems rather impractical considering, for example, the cumbersome amendment procedures set 
down in the Articles o f Agreement. Therefore, the present study will try to make modest, but workable 
suggestions as is discussed in this section. More discussion follows in the main text.
84 Note that it is not yet ascertain that “social safety net” has become a standard practice in the SAPs. It is 
even yet to be established that the “social safety net” has already changed the perception o f the 
management of the IMF. For example, in a recent report on the experiences o f the Fund’s social safety net, 
it is stated that: “The IMF’s involvement in social issues has to be seen in the context o f its mandate ...
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recommendations are by no means comprehensive or effective in terms o f the impact on 
climate change. It merely presents some alternative options the BWIs can take up in 
reforming their SAPs.
The most relevant elements in the SAP affecting the implementation o f the FCCC 
are likely to be, inter alia, pricing mechanism and subsidy reform, public expenditure 
policies, and trade liberalisation. Pricing reform is probably the most fundamental 
proposal for environmental sustainability in almost all sectors o f the economy (Williams, 
1995).
Among the pricing reform, the energy sector must receive the first and foremost 
attention for both economic and environmental purposes. On the economic front, energy 
prices often do not cover their true economic costs, including the externality costs to the 
environment in most developing countries. This often means that consumers are not 
paying the prices that encourage them to use energy efficiently and select the right form 
of energy and energy-saving equipments for their needs (Churchill and Saunders, 1991). 
On the environmental front, the energy sector needs to be re-examined as well if  the 
domestic policies o f any Parties are to be brought in line with the objectives o f the 
FCCC85.
In the present operations, pricing reform has become a standard element in the 
SAPs. In the evaluation conducted by the World Bank on the implementation of 
conditionality in the SAL/SECAL, the policy areas where implementation has been most 
successful are those involving changes in prices, including energy prices (World Bank, 
1988a). In the process of pricing reform, the elimination o f energy subsidies serves both
given [its] essentially macroeconomic mandate, the IMF’s contribution to social development is mainly 
indirect, and its role in social policy advice is necessarily limited.” (Chu and Gupta, 1998, p. 3.)
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economic and environmental purposes. Removing energy subsidies relieves the 
government o f an unnecessary public expenditure. It enables the energy price to reflect 
its true market value as well, which stops the consumers to over-consume the under- 
priced energy sources, in particular non-renewable energy sources such as fossil fuel. 
Although pricing reform is identified as one of the more successful policy area where the 
implementation of conditionality is the strongest, “energy subsidies”, according to 
another World Bank report on the experiences o f adjustment lending, “received scant 
attention in conditions on adjustment lending”86 (Huther, Roberts, and Shah, 1997, p. 
33). The same report also recognises that, “the limited data on subsidy reductions 
indicate that though expenditures on subsidies were often reduced in response to 
conditions, the reductions are often not sustained”87 (Huther, Roberts, and Shah, 1997, p. 
33).
Energy subsidies can be granted to various energy sources, including renewable 
ones. A traditional SAP would have all forms o f energy subsides removed. By adopting a 
“climate safety net”, however, subsidies granted to renewable energy sources could be 
maintained. For example, if  the borrowing government is receiving a GEF grant and 
subsidy is granted to renewable energy, such form of energy subsidy would not be
85 For example, “energy” is listed first in the Sectors/source categories in the Annex A to the Kyoto 
Protocol which sets down the types o f GHGs that are subject to the reduction timetable.
86 Another World Bank report in 1995 looks at the experience o f SAL/SECAL during 1980-92 (Jayarajah 
and Branson, 1995). This report has a specific chapter examining the energy sector. 65% of the adjustment 
operations feature substantial energy conditionality (21 out o f 32 adjustment operations are under review). 
According to the Bank’s evaluation, satisfactory results in terms o f programmes success and sustainability 
are identified. Limitations of the adjustment operations in the energy sector, however, do have been 
pointed out and recognised as well in this evaluation.
87 When looking at these two World Bank reports on the experiences o f adjustment lending, one has to pay 
attention to the year when the reports were conducted. The 1988 report on the evaluation of the SAL/ 
SECAL examines the adjustment loans made before fiscal year 1988; while the 1997 report looks at the 
adjustment loans made more recently. The problem o f insufficient attention to the energy subsidies is 
identified in the later report. This demonstrates that the problem is still prevailing in the SAL/SECAL 
operations of the World Bank as recently as in 1997.
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removed under a SAP with a climate safety net88. Similar operations have already been in 
place in the IMF programme with a social safety net. For example, under the IMF 
programme with a social safety net, food subsidies in general will be removed, except for 
those specifically targeted at the poorest group (IMF, 1995). As a result, it will not be 
unprecedented if  a climate safety net is adopted to differentiate different types of 
subsidies. It is, thus, suggested that the World Bank, in designing a SAP, should adopt a 
more consistent approach toward pricing reform in the energy sector and the elimination 
o f energy subsidies, in particular subsidies to fossil fuel. Although the IMF usually deals 
less with sectoral issues in its ESAF conditions, its mandate does not preclude it from 
bringing such issues to the attention o f the borrowing governments in discussing any 
necessary policy reform89. Furthermore, the IMF and the Bank could also ensure that 
such issues would be properly addressed in the Policy Framework Papers they assist the 
borrowing government to prepare90.
The climate safety net in this context has its potential problems, however. For 
example, how can the BWIs and the borrowing government distinguish “climate friendly 
subsidy” from “climate unfriendly subsidy”? Another potential problem is that, subsidy 
that passes through the “climate filter” and remains in place consequently might later be 
challenged under the WTO regime where certain types o f subsidies are prohibited. 
Nevertheless, all these potential problems should not overshadow the potential gain a 
climate safety net can achieve.
88 The subsidy the BWIs seek to remove might arguably be different from subsidy granted under an 
international body such as GEF. However, both involve giving money to a specific industry or commodity 
in order to lower the true cost. As the discussion o f the differences between the two is beyond the scope of  
the study, both forms o f subsidy will be regarded the same in this chapter.
89 Pricing reform and the elimination o f subsidies form no small part o f the public expenditure reform o f a 
government. The conditionality laid down in an ESAF usually requires such reform.
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Another common element in a SAP is the requirement to cut down government 
expenditure. Under the FCCC, all Parties, including the developing country Parties, are 
committed to prepare a National Communication containing various types o f information 
and describing policies taken to implement the Convention (FCCC, Article 12). This 
commitment demands adequate resources for the domestic environmental agency to 
implement. As domestic environmental agencies in developing countries are usually 
rather weak, their budget is highly likely to be affected when government expenditure 
reform is required. The climate safety net recommended should be able to help the 
borrowing government to identify what kind o f fundamental environmental services, 
including its treaty obligations under the FCCC, are to be maintained. Under the FCCC, 
developing countries are entitled to seek financial resources to meet the “agreed full 
costs” from developed countries in complying with obligations to submit National 
Communications. In addition, the developing countries are eligible to apply to GEF for 
funding in the process o f preparing the National Communication91. This, however, does 
not give the government an excuse to relieve itself from the responsibility of devoting 
adequate resources in undertaking commitments under the FCCC. Furthermore, National 
Communication is not the only national programmes1 Parties to the FCCC are to 
formulate. The climate safety net can help to identify resources required in formulating 
and implementing programmes that are unable to receive funding from GEF.
As for the element o f trade liberalisation in the SAP, comprehensive suggestions 
will be more difficult to offer. One of the purposes o f the SAP, and indeed o f the BWIs,
90 A recently published PFP, one prepared by the Former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia as a 
prerequisite to its application of an ESAF, does incorporate energy sector in its medium-term programme 
for 1998-2000.
91 This falls under the category o f “enabling activities”, one o f the three categories as described in GEF 
Operational Strategies. It is also under a speedier disbursement process, as has been requested by the COP 
to the FCCC (FCCC/CP/1996/L.9).
216
is to encourage the liberalisation o f international trade. By doing so, the borrowing 
government is expected to earn foreign exchange and to achieve long-term growth. 
Liberalisation of international trade usually requires the government to lower import 
tariff and to promote export. At the moment, the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol do not set 
down trade restrictions similar to those in the 1987 Montreal Protocol. Theoretically, 
thus, the design o f a SAP with respect to trade liberalisation does not affect the Parties to 
the FCCC. Nevertheless, various aspects relating to trade liberalisation do have impact 
on the ability o f the government to implement the FCCC. For example, for an energy- 
importing country, lowering the import tariff o f various energy sources can have 
different implications to its FCCC commitments. If  the import tariff o f petroleum is 
reduced to such a level that does not reflect its true costs92, it might lead to over­
consumption. On the other hand, if  the government chooses to lower the import tariff o f 
natural gas, it can help to reduce the emission o f C02. Other examples can be observed 
in countries that are rich in fossil fuel resources. If  the government has an incentive to 
increase its export of, for instance, petroleum, by lowering the price to a level that does 
not reflect its true value, it might end up encouraging other countries to over-consume 
and result in an overall increase o f GHGs emissions on a global scale.
As has been illustrated, element of trade liberalisation in the SAP does affect a 
country’s ability to implement the FCCC. It needs to be pointed out that the BWIs do not 
and should not engage in constructing the government’s international trade regime, such 
as what types o f commodity should have a lower import tariff than the others have. 
However, the BWIs can assist the government in the process o f trade liberalisation by 
providing advice on the the sequence and priorities o f trade liberalisation.
92 The true cost o f fossil fuel should take into account its local and global environmental externalities,
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The aforementioned suggestions are by no means comprehensive. They are some 
of the possible ideas the BWIs can consider when designing a climate safety net o f the 
SAP93. Note that none o f the suggestions is easy to implement and each o f them requires 
thorough research to ascertain the impact on the borrowing government. In addition, with 
the application of the “old-style” conditionality associated with SAPs, imposing these 
ideas on the borrowing developing countries might provoke resentment. However, these 
suggestions can take the form of policy advice, which do not necessarily take the form of 
“loan conditions” in the sense that failure to comply will result in suspension o f loans. It 
might be argued that the effectiveness would be diminished if  these suggestions carry no 
legal implications since governments could afford to ignore them. On the other hand, 
however, being flexible can soften the harsh image conditionality generate. In any case, 
the government bears the ultimate responsibility of designing and implementing 
domestic policies that are compatible with the FCCC. It is sufficient that the BWIs 
provide the correct incentives and policy advice when assisting their developing country 
members undergoing the process of structural adjustment. Furthermore, since the 
borrowing countries themselves are Parties to the FCCC, they have the responsibilities to 
comply with the FCCC. Therefore, the policy advice in the SAP with a climate safety 
net, designed with climate change concerns in mind, have a better chance to get 
implemented by these borrowing governments.
It is not yet certain whether the practice o f “social safety net” has achieved its 
objectives. By the same token, a climate safety net can not guarantee to solve all the 
problems associated with the operations o f the SAPs and enable the BWIs to assist their
rather than referring merely to its market price.
93 One criticism relating to the climate safety net might be that it would lead to a proliferation of  
conditionalities. Nevertheless, as can be seen from the previous discussion, a SAP with a climate safety
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developing country members to implement the FCCC. It nevertheless provides a better 
and more feasible option for the BWIs to begin reforming their operations in the light of 
treaty obligations under the climate change regime. In addition, an encouraging sign can 
be seen from the more recent Policy Framework Papers published by the borrowing 
governments in which environmental factors have been taken into account. In the Letter 
o f Intent submitted by the Indonesian government in July 1998, environmental 
conditions have also been incorporated94. These developments demonstrate that the BWIs 
have already begun to pay more attention to the environmental impact o f their 
programmes, which might enable the design o f climate safety net being adopted more 
easily.
5.4 Evaluation of the innovative mechanisms
The previous section examined how the existing mechanism of the BWIs can be 
reformed in the light of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The SAPs are not the only 
operation of the BWIs that are affected by the development under the climate change 
regime. The development of the World Bank’s innovative mechanisms, as has been 
pointed out, can also be affected by the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Hence, this 
section will conduct a brief evaluation o f the innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank 
that are designed for a specific purpose: to facilitate the implementation of the FCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol.
net, rather than add on more conditionality, requires a re-design o f the existing conditionality. Therefore, it 
does not necessarily incorporate more conditions than the existing SAPs do.
94 For example, PFPs published in 1998 by the governments o f Mali, Central African Republic, Cameroon, 
Republic of Mozambique, Uganda, and Malawi all contain sections referring to environmental policies. 
All these documents can be found at the official website of the IMF at: http://www.imf.org.
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Among the three innovative mechanisms introduced in the present study 
(Chapter 4), GEF95 and the Bank AIJ programme have become operational while the 
GCI/PCF is still under preparation as o f March 1999. The evaluation conducted in the 
following will look at the governance structure o f these mechanisms and its implications 
to the relationship between the World Bank and its developing country members. In 
addition, the relationship with the FCCC will also be investigated. In relation to GEF, 
this issue will be examined in the context o f “mainstreaming”96 which, in combination 
with its governance structure, bears implications to the relationship between the Bank 
and its developing country members. In relation to the AIJ and GCI/PCF, the relationship 
with the FCCC is more difficult to evaluate since no formal relationship has been 
established as has been done in the case of GEF. Thus, this issue will be examined in the 
context of “possible” relationship with the FCCC and whether it is in the interests of 
developing countries that such relationship should be instituted.
GEF has commissioned two independent external evaluation teams to evaluate 
the performances o f its pilot phase (1991-94, GEF P) and the first three-year (1994-97, 
GEF I) operations after its restructure in 1994 (UNDP, UNEP and World Bank, 1994; 
GEF, March 1998). The following evaluation will be based largely on these two 
independent evaluation reports97. The World Bank AIJ programme has had rather limited 
experiences in terms o f projects undertaken and the number o f participants. Therefore, its 
evaluation will be difficult to carry out98. The following discussion can only examine the 
governance structure o f the present World Bank AIJ programme that is laid down in the
95 Unless otherwise specified, the term “GEF” used throughout this section includes GEF P and GEF L
96 “Mainstreaming” refers to how the operations o f GEF have influenced the regular operations o f its 
Implementing Agencies.
97 Due to the limited resources and time frame of the thesis, it is impossible for the present study to carry 
out its own large-scale evaluation of GEF.
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official documents related to the AIJ programme produced by the Bank". As for the 
GCI/PCF that is not yet operational, the basis o f the following discussion will be similar 
to that applied in the AIJ programme. That is, the official documents from the Bank in 
relation to the establishment o f the GCI/PCF and its future operations100.
5.4.1 Governance structure and relationship with the developing countries
5.4.1.1 GEF
The assessment o f the decision-making structure was not in the terms o f reference 
in either o f the two independent evaluation report. As for the relationship between the 
World Bank and the developing countries, only GEF P evaluation report has touched 
upon similar issue very briefly101. Institutional issues have been addressed. However, the 
dynamics of power structure in the GEF Council, with its novel design o f decision­
making process after the restructure, and the recipient countries’ perceptions o f this 
governance structure are addressed in neither o f the reports102. GEF P evaluation report 
comments that: “The influence of recipient countries on the type and substance of 
individual projects implemented in their countries is far lower than it may appear from 
publicly available documents.” (UNDP, UNEP and World Bank, 1994, p. 12.) This is 
understandable in the operations of GEF P since most o f the policies and procedures 
adopted during the pilot phase were mainly based on those o f the Implementing
98 Even the Bank itself has not carried out a full evaluation as to the performances o f its AIJ projects and 
programmes.
99 These documents include, for example, World Bank, May 1997a, November 1997a. All these documents 
can be found on the website: http://www-esd.worldbank.org/cc.
100 These documents include, for example, World Bank, May 1997b, August 1997, and November 1997b. 
All these documents can be found on the website: http://www-esd.worldbank.org/cc.
101 This issue is not included in the terms of reference in GEF P evaluation report. It is analysed in the 
context of a general introduction, in which the expectations o f GEF P is discussed from the donors’ and 
the developing countries’ perspectives. See: UNDP, UNEP, and World Bank, 1994, pp. xii-xiii.
102 Unsuccessful attempts were made to interview those GEF Council Members who at the same time serve 
on the World Bank Executive Board during the author’s field trip to Washington DC.
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Agencies, one of them the World Bank. It seems fair to conclude that, the relationship 
between the Bank and the developing countries remained somehow adversarial in GEF P, 
as the input from the developing countries was minimal. In terms o f agenda setting, GEF 
I is required to seek and follow the guidance o f the two Conventions to which GEF 
serves as the interim financial mechanism. At their respective COPs, in which the 
developing countries are better positioned to voice their environmental and 
developmental priorities, the two MEAs adopted their respective guidance to GEF. GEF 
I concluded that: “The study team found that GEF has sought and strictly implemented 
the guidance o f the conventions with due regard for GEF’s own mandate and funding 
limitations.” (GEF, March 1998, para. 343.)
As far as agenda setting is concerned, hence, the recipients, ie the developing 
countries, managed to claim a greater degree o f influence over the restructured GEF. 
This, however, does not corroborate that the relationship between the World Bank and 
the developing has been improved. Nevertheless, the restructured GEF does carry with it 
a set of decision-making procedures in which the recipients can participate more actively. 
In addition, the GEF I evaluation report has identified traces o f improvement and noted 
that: “GEF working relationships within the World Bank are somewhat analogous to 
those between the World Bank and the recipient countries, with a tendency for GEF 
activities to become ‘donor driven’ . . .” (UNDP, UNEP and World Bank, 1994, p. 134.) 
In GEF I, the evaluation report concludes that GEF I activities become less “donor 
driven”, resulting from clearer mandates emanated from Operational Strategies and 
Operational Programmes. Thus, GEF’s working relationship within the Bank has 
improved after the restructure. Considering the similarity between GEF working 
relationships within the Bank and those between the Bank and the recipient countries,
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this improvement can shed some light on the World Bank in re-examining the 
approaches used in dealing with its developing country members.
5.4.1.2 Joint implementation-related mechanisms: AIJ and GCI/PCF
There is no formal governance structure in the current Bank AIJ programme. This 
is understandable considering the nature o f the current Bank AIJ programme, which is 
essentially a bilateral one between the host governments and Norway103. After JI104 
among Annex I Parties was formally sanctioned by the Kyoto Protocol, and after the AIJ 
polite phase under the FCCC began to cumulate more experiences, the Bank AIJ 
programme has now the potential to attract more participants. That might leads to a 
formal link being established with the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, as has been 
discussed in the Chapter 5.2.3. If  that is the case, the governance structure o f the Bank 
AIJ programme will play a more significant role as its operations will affect developing 
countries’ access to this pool o f resources in carrying out projects related to climate 
change105. If the Bank AIJ programme develops into a more formal mechanism similar to 
GEF, the governance structure o f GEF might provide a good precedent.
As for the relationship between the Bank and its developing countries members, 
the limited operations o f the Bank AIJ programme make it difficult to ascertain the 
impact the AIJ programme have had on the operations o f the Bank at large and on the 
relationship between the Bank and its developing country members. The pilot projects 
under the Bank AIJ programme are expected to be implemented in conjunction with
103 For further discussion on the origin, development and operations o f the Bank AIJ programme, see 
Chapter 4.1.2.2.
104 As has been discussed previously, JI under the Kyoto Protocol refers to collaboration between Annex I 
Parties only.
105 More discussion on this potential relationship with the FCCC will be conducted in the succeeding sub­
section.
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other World Bank Group investment projects. From this perspective, it seems arguable 
that the Bank AIJ programme will be influenced by the regular operations o f the Bank, 
rather than vice versa. The Bank has drawn up a set o f project selection criteria and 
evaluation guidelines for its AIJ programme. These criteria and guidelines are consistent 
with the objective o f the FCCC. However, it remains unclear whether these criteria and 
guidelines are drawn up in consultation with the developing countries. The AIJ under the 
FCCC is bilateral in nature while the Bank AIJ programme inevitably has certain input 
from the Bank. Since these criteria and guidelines are already in place, any future 
collaboration between other donors and the Bank in setting up similar AIJ programmes 
will most likely follow these criteria and guidelines in the first instance. The current 
design of the Bank AIJ programme, the one in collaboration with Norway, has only 
limited, if any, input from the developing countries106. It can be improved in the 
following aspects. Further project selection criteria and evaluation guidelines will need to 
follow the guidance from the COP to the FCCC107, as in the case o f GEF operations. In 
addition, the Bank is encouraged to consult with developing countries that show interests 
to be potential hosts to any AIJ programme in the process o f setting out these criteria and 
guidelines, including methodological issues in implementing these projects. Both of 
suggestions can complement any future governance structure the Bank AIJ programme 
might develop in tending to the need o f the developing countries in implementing the 
FCCC.
106 In the relevant documents relating to the Bank AIJ programme, it is stated that: “The Bank AIJ program 
is coordinated by a small team within the Global Environment Division [of the Bank] which also relies 
heavily on input from staff members throughout the Bank.” (World Bank, May 1997a.) The relevant 
documents do not indicate the involvement o f the developing countries in the process o f formulating 
project selection criteria and evaluation guidelines.
107 Or MOP to the Kyoto Protocol, which will be the supreme body laying down the operational 
procedures and criteria for the JI operations o f the Kyoto Protocol.
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As for the GCI/PCF, evaluation relating to its governance structure can not be 
conducted at the moment since it is not operational yet. As has been discussed in Chapter 
4, the PCF is likely to become another trust fund administered by the Bank. The role o f 
the Bank as its trustee will depend on any possible link the PCF might have with the 
CDM under the Kyoto Protocol in the future108. The Bank plans to make its investments 
in projects funded by the PCF on the basis o f “Project Selection Guidelines”, which will, 
according to the Bank, be developed in consultation with the participants and hosts 
(World Bank, 1998b). This is an encouraging step which the Bank intends to take in 
terms of providing a more collective decision-making process. The Bank’s Executive 
Directors from developing countries are said to be very supportive and interested in the 
development o f the GCI/PCF, especially the decision-making structure o f the GCI109. 
However, the work on setting up the GCI/PCF so far is basically prepared by the Bank’s 
GCI team. In addition, as the private sector is envisaged to play a large role in the PCF, 
the Bank does not favour GEF Assembly type o f structure as the model for the 
GCI/PCF110. As a result, whether the Guidelines will have equal inputs from the investors 
as well as the developing countries as hosts remain uncertain.
5.4.2 Relationship with the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
5.4.2.1 GEF: the issue o f “mainstreaming”
The importance o f “mainstreaming” the regular operations o f the World Bank for 
global environmental benefits has been reiterated in the New Delhi Statement adopted at
108 More discussion on the potential relationship between the GCI and CDM will be conducted in the 
succeeding sub-section. For further discussion on the development of the GCI/PCF, see Chapter 4.1.2.2.
109 Personal communication with a staff member of the World Bank.
110 Personal communication with a staff member o f the World Bank.
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the first GEF assembly in April 1998111. The task of “mainstreaming o f the global 
environment by Implementing Agencies” has nevertheless been identified as 
unsatisfactory by both GEF independent evaluation reports112. In GEF P, the influence 
was rather from the Bank to GEF than vice versa. From the beginning o f selecting the 
four focal areas, GEF P is founded on the existing policies and procedures of the 
Implementing Agencies. As the GEF P evaluation report points out: “GEF working 
relationship within the World Bank are somewhat analogous to those between the World 
bank and the recipient countries, with a tendency for GEF activities to become ‘donor 
driven’ ... GEF has suffered from being treated as either an add-on or a minor sideline to 
the World Bank’s regular lending . . .” (UNDP, UNEP and World Bank, 1994, p. 134.) 
This hardly proves that the objective of mainstreaming the global environment into the 
operations of the World Bank through its involvement in GEF P has been achieved. On 
the contrary, it seems to suggest the opposite that, the Bank was using GEF P as a 
“window dressing” to its normal operations and the involvement in GEF P brought no 
impact on the regular Bank operations at all.
In GEF I, clearer Operational Strategies and Operational Programmes have been 
adopted by the GEF Council following the guidance from the COPs to the FCCC and the 
CBD. With a clearer mandate, GEF I should be able to rid the “shadow” o f the Bank and 
act as a “Trojan horse” in mainstreaming the global environment into the operations of 
the World Bank. Nevertheless, the GEF I evaluation report still concludes that: “Overall, 
the team found that, although the World Bank’s co-financing o f GEF projects is a
111 It is stated that: “GEF Implementing Agencies should promote measures to achieve global 
environmental benefits within the context o f their regular programs and consistent with the global 
environmental conventions while respect the authority o f die governing bodies o f the Implementing 
Agencies.” (New Delhi Statement o f the First GEF Assembly, para. 9.)
112 The same observation has been pointed out by other commentators. See, for example, Fairman and 
Ross, 1996.
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significant accomplishment in mainstreaming the global environment, it has fallen well 
short of its potential for mainstreaming.” (GEF, March 1998, para. 266.)113 The 
conclusions reached in two evaluation reports coincide with the conclusion o f the present 
study that environmental issues, including global environmental issues, have not been 
incorporated into the design o f the Bank’s SAPs114, an important part o f its operations.
In a report prepared by the World Bank to the Executive Board and the GEF 
Council Meeting in October 1998 regarding “mainstreaming the global environment in 
the World Bank Group operations”, it is identified that: “The compatibility o f the Bank 
Group’s broader project portfolio with the Bank-GEF objectives for global 
environmental management has been raised by some as an issue. Specifically, it has been 
questioned whether continued Bank lending for GHG intensive fossil fuel-based energy 
projects is consistent with the Bank-GEF objective to promote climate-friendly energy 
technologies.” (GEF, October 1998, p. 15.) In responding to this concern, the Bank states 
that “it is important to note that the Bank’s primary mission is to reduce poverty and 
promote economic development” (GEF, October 1998, p. 15) and does not seem 
prepared to phase-out operations of this kind that are incompatible with the FCCC. 
Recalling the interaction between the BWIs and the FCCC, as discussed in Chapter 5.2.2, 
the current operations o f the Bank apparently has not taken into account the objective of 
and obligations under the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Whether this practice of the Bank 
is incompatible with its OMS 2.36, which requires the Bank not to finance projects that 
might contravene any international environmental agreement to which the member
113 The evaluation team has identified the following aspects o f the Bank’s operations in which efforts of 
mainstreaming are needed. These include, inter alia, lack o f attention to the energy lending strategy, 
inadequate budget for the global overlays programme, lack o f incentives to the staff to encourage or 
manage projects with global environmental benefits, and lack o f global environmental issues in the 
Country Assistance Strategies documents (GEF, March 1998, paras. 219-270).
114 See Chapter 5.3.1 for further discussion.
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country concerned is a party, deserve further observation. For example, cases might arise 
where affected citizen in a country where the Bank is funding a coal-powered plant 
decide to make a complaint to the Inspection Panel alleging the Bank’s breach o f this 
particular provision under the OMS 2.36. What will then be the decisions o f the 
Inspection Panel remains uncertain. In any case, it seems, under its current operation, the 
World Bank still has some way to go in truly mainstreaming the global environment 
into its overall operations.
5.4.2.2 J-related mechanism: AIJ and GCI/PCF
At the moment, both the Jl-related mechanisms within the Bank do not have 
formal link with the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. However, as JI is officially 
sanctioned (Article 6) and other Jl-related implementation tools are provided for in the 
Kyoto Protocol115, the Bank AIJ programme might attract more attention from donor as 
well as host countries. As interest from other countries in establishing a similar 
collaboration with the Bank increases, and as the AIJ pilot phase is better developed 
within the FCCC, the Bank AIJ programme has the potential to step up its scale and to 
transform into another potentially influential mechanism o f the Bank to assist domestic 
compliance of the FCCC in its developing country members.
As for the other Jl-related mechanism, the GCI/PCF, no assessment and 
evaluation are available for it is not yet operational. The PCF under development now 
has not yet had any formal link with the FCCC. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
relationship between the GCI/PCF and the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol remains to be 
seen. The legal framework for the PCF would be similar to that o f a World Bank trust
fund. Since the potential investors in the PCF include public and private participants, and 
there is no formal link between the PCF and the FCCC at the moment, the Bank’s role as 
a trustee in the PCF trust fund is expected to be different from that in the GEF Trust 
Fund. If a formal agreement between the PCF and, for example, the CDM is established, 
it will then be expected that the Bank as a trustee needs to be accountable to the COP 
serving as the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol.
This scenario will be a positive development o f the GCI/PCF as the needs o f the 
developing countries can be better reflected via the COP/MOP to the Kyoto Protocol. In 
fact, as argued in Chapter 5.2.3, it seems advantageous to both developed and developing 
countries that a formal link with the FCCC is to be established. In that case, arrangement 
similar to that o f GEF might be expected between the GCI/PCF and the FCCC and/or 
Kyoto Protocol. This, as in the case o f GEF, will have positive influences on the 
operations of the Bank. In the meantime, before such arrangement is reached, developing 
countries are encouraged to take a more active role in participating in the design of the 
GCI/PCF. The Bank, in drawing up guidelines for projects funded under the PCF, will be 
expected to follow its own policy that requires consultation with both the participants and 
the hosts. The. GCI/PCF that comes into operations will be beneficial to both the 
investors and the hosts, while bring positive lessons to the operations o f the Bank at 
large.
In summary, it is difficult to have a conclusive evaluation on these innovative 
mechanisms of the World Bank. In the case o f GEF, the overall operations, in particular 
those of GEF I have proved to be encouraging and improving. With regard to the new 
governance structure of GEF I, developing countries have the opportunities to participate
. 115 For example, the CDM provided in Article 12 and emission trading provided in Article 17 of the Kyoto
in the design o f conditionalities GEF might employ. This might gradually help to 
improve the relationship between the Bank and its developing country members, which, 
in turn, might increase the effectiveness o f the GEF in achieving its objectives. In the 
meantime, the IMF can leam valuable lessons as to how - international financial 
institutions can achieve a better working relationship with the recipient countries. As the 
International Expert Advisory Panel for the the GEF I evaluation report correctly points 
out: “The Implementing Agencies, in carrying out the GEF mandate, may also need to re­
examine the potential for influencing their other partners, such as the International 
Monetary Fund' (emphasis added) (GEF, March 1998, Annex II: Report o f the 
International Expert Advisory Panel for the Study o f GEF’s Overall Performance, 
January 1998).
With regard to “mainstreaming” the regular operations o f the Bank, more 
improvements will need to be made if  the Bank is to comply with its own policy 
statement that it will not finance activities that contravene its borrowers’ international 
obligations. As for the Jl-related mechanisms, evaluations as to their governance 
structure can not be conducted yet due to a limited experience. However, as both o f these 
mechanisms are created to assist the implementation o f the FCCC, some form of 
cooperation, or formal link with the Convention and the Protocol could be expected. The 
COP to the FCCC, or the COP/MOP to the Kyoto Protocol, represent a collective 
decision-making body where developing countries can voice their priorities and needs. 
To have the Jl-related mechanisms follow the guidance from the COP, rather than to 
leave it to the discretion o f the Bank, the interests o f developing countries as hosts to 
projects funded under these mechanisms might be better served.
Protocol. For more information on these mechanisms, see: Missfeldt, 1998.
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CHAPTER 6: SOUTH-EAST ASIA: A CASE STUDY
The thesis has so far suggested that governance structure is one o f the crucial 
elements for the effectiveness o f the legal and quasi-legal tools employed by the BWIs to 
influence developing countries. The implications o f the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol on 
the operations o f the BWIs have also been investigated. This chapter will conduct a brief 
case study on a special group of developing countries to test the arguments presented in 
the present study. South-east Asian countries, albeit a very heterogeneous group, share 
similar experiences in terms of “economic” development, the traditional model o f 
“development” advocated and supported by the BWIs.
The first section o f this chapter will look at the process o f “development” in 
South-east Asia after WW II and up until the financial crisis in 1997-98, and the role o f 
the BWIs in this process. From this section, the imprint o f the BWIs on the domestic 
policies of these countries will try to be identified. As argued in Chapter 5, the traditional 
model o f “development” advocated by the BWIs has led to the adoption o f policies that 
contribute to the emissions o f GHGs. This will be echoed by examining the 
environmental impact of South-east Asia’s “development” on climate change, which will 
be conducted in the second section of this chapter. Since the model o f “development” 
promoted by the BWIs might have impeded the South-east Asian governments’ abilities 
to implement the FCCC, the last section o f this chapter will investigate the potential of 
the innovative mechanisms of the Bank in advancing the objectives o f the FCCC in 
South-east Asia.
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6.1 Economic development after W W II and the BWIs’ role
6.1.1 From import-substitution to export-oriented industrialisation
South-east Asia has some o f the fastest growing economies among developing 
countries in the 1980s and in the 1990s. This section will briefly delineate the 
development strategies o f these countries after the WW II and their economic 
achievement at this stage. A loosely structured regional organisation in this geographical 
area is the Association o f South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) o f 19671. Among the 
present nine members, only four, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, will 
be the subjects o f the present discussion2.
The four South-east Asian countries at the centre o f this discussion differ from 
each other in terms of, for example, economic and political structure, natural resources, 
and the extent to which they receive external assistance, financially and technically, from 
the international institutions, in particular the IMF and the IBRD3. However, they share 
various similarities in terms o f their post-war development strategies. Hence, rather than 
focusing the discussion on individual countries, this section will concentrate on the 
different development strategies at different stages o f their economic development since 
these strategies are similar in many ways. References to individual countries will be 
made either as an example or as an exception.
1 The founding members o f ASEAN are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Brunei. Vietnam was admitted in 1995 and Myanmar (Burma) and Laos were admitted in 1997. The 
membership for Cambodia was delayed due to a coup in 1997 that brought political turmoil to the country.
2 The economic development o f Singapore is the most advanced among ASEAN and has traditionally be 
categorised as one o f the “Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs)”, ie Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. It has different development stages from those o f other ASEAN members. Brunei is a 
relatively small economy that depends largely on its oil export, and, hence, is different from other ASEAN 
members in this respect. Vietnam is essentially a socialist economy, which is different from other capitalist 
economies in ASEAN. As for Myanmar and Laos, both o f them still suffer from political instability, have 
relatively close economies compared to other ASEAN members, and, therefore, are different from the four 
countries in the present discussion. For these reasons, “South-east Asia” will be referring only to Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, when the term is used throughout the discussion.
3 For example, in one research carried out by the Overseas Development Institute, the adjustment 
experiences of the Philippine and the interaction between the Marcos government and the BWIs have been
232
6.1.1.1 Post-war period until the 1970s
Each of these four countries, except Thailand, was subjected to colonial rule after 
the 19th century4. As a result, when South-east Asia was opened up to international trade 
and foreign investment in the late 19th century, the expansion in the exports o f primary 
products was the principal means for economic development (Myint, H, 1972). Even 
after their independence5, a larger proportion o f the exports were still primary 
commodities, with timber, mineral fuels and mineral ores subjected to the greatest 
demand on the international market. For example, in Indonesia, exports o f mineral 
products, especially petroleum, expanded considerably in the 1950s (Mangkusuwondo, 
1975); in Malaysia, the combined exports of rubber, tin and iron ore amounted to 86.6% 
of its total export in 1950, remained at 84.6% in 1960, and was still as high as 66.1% in 
1970 (Arudsothy, 1975); in Thailand, teak exports increased greatly in late 1940s and 
early 1950 (Chomchai, 1975); and, in the Philippines, exports o f logs and lumber were 
more than 20% of total export and mineral ores constituted another 20% in 1969 (Castro 
et al, 1975). In addition to primary goods, the exports o f agricultural products were also 
larger than manufactured goods; and agricultural sector were still accounted for larger 
share of GDP in all four countries —  agriculture accounted for more than 30% o f the 
GDP6 in all countries.
Industrialisation was low when the WW II ended, and the manufacture sector
regarded as rather different from those of the other three countries (Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) in 
the region (Marr, 1996).
4 Malaysia was a British colony; Indonesia was a Dutch colony; and, the Philippine was a Spanish colony 
first, and an American colony following the Spanish defeat to the USA in 1899. For a pre-colonial period, 
colonial period, and independence movement in the South-east Asia, see, for example, SarDesai, 1989 
(2nd ed).
5 All o f them gained independence after the WW II: Indonesia in 1945, the Philippines in 1946 and 
Malaysia in 1957.
6 This figure is from Ichimura, 1975, and some countries used Net Domestic Product not Gross Domestic 
Product, in their calculation.
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grew slowly in the 1950s and 1960s. Import-substitution policies7 have been widely 
adopted in this region in the two post-war decades. For example, Thailand’s strategy of 
its initial industrial development emphasised import substitution with high protection 
barriers (Chomchai, 1975). By the early 1960s, import-substitution strategies for 
industrialisation and manufacturing were at the centre o f economy planning in South-east 
Asia (Robinson et al, 1987). Indonesia was the “closest” o f all because o f its ideological 
goals of economic nationalism and socialism during 1950-65. The Indonesian 
government, for example, increased its quantitative controls over foreign trade and direct 
state intervention (Myint, 1972). However, Indonesia was not an exception where the 
role of state was crucial. State involvement in investment and production, along with 
economic planning, were the prevailing characteristic in the whole region in the 1950s 
and 1960s. (Robinson et al, 1987)
The economic policies of South-east Asia in the 1950s and 1960s can be summed 
up as follows: reconstruction after the WW II, the dominant position o f primary exports 
and agricultural sector, limited industrialisation and a small manufacturing sector, and, 
most important, import-substitution policies.
6.1.1.2 From the 1970s
By the early 1970s, South-east Asia was able to maintain a reasonably high rate 
of growth and to begin a limited industrialisation. The two oil crises characterised the 
international economic scene in the 1970s turned out to be the “blessing” for Indonesia 
and Malaysia because of the massive oil and natural gas export earnings. The availability
7 Import-substitution strategies usually take the forms of high import tariff, bans, and quotas, as well as 
import licensing. They are used by developing countries to protect their industrialisation and resources for 
the purposes o f building its own ability to produce the product and subsequently to foster export trade.
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of the so-called “petro-dollars8” enabled the others, in particular the Philippines, to 
borrow heavily from private commercial banks in order to finance the high cost o f major 
investment industries, which were highly protected under the import-substitution 
policies. This ready availability o f international finance capital has provided the means 
for the South-east Asian countries, except Malaysia which moved into the export- 
oriented phase in the late 1960s for its growing trade deficits and constricting domestic 
market, to maintain their import-substitution policies throughout the 1970s (Robinson et 
al, 1987).
By the early 1980s, the positive external economic environment was under 
constraint due both to the collapse o f world commodity prices and to the contracting 
international capital market where private funds were no longer easily available. As a 
result, most o f the South-east Asian countries were facing economic contraction 
throughout the 1980s, partly resulting from the debt accumulation from the 1970s. 
Indonesia, with more than 80% of its foreign earnings coming from oil and liquefied 
natural gas by 1981-82, was in the most difficult situation when oil prices collapsed in 
1981-82 (Robinson, 1987). The Philippines also experienced hardship, in particular in 
the first half of the 1980s, as its debt service, measured as a ratio o f export earnings, 
nearly doubled in 1980-82, and the international terms o f trade had been deteriorating 
since 1972 (Fayasuriya, 1987). In Thailand, the continuous inflow o f capital throughout 
the 1970s and early 1980s helped to cushion the worst effects o f the world recession. The 
capital inflow, however, also induced the corresponding increase o f foreign debt. As a 
result, Thailand faced its first major economic crisis by 1985 since the 1950s (Hewison, 
1987) Malaysia, with a broader export base and its policies and measures to encourage
8 The sharp increase in the price o f petroleum in the 1970s brought huge export earnings for oil-exporting 
countries, and most of these countries deposited large sum o f their export earnings in private commercial 
banks in the US and in Europe. The sudden influx o f cash compelled the private commercial banks to
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foreign direct investment since late 1960s, was more resilient. Between 1979 and 1981, 
however, the Malaysia government, in the face o f adverse international economic 
environment, relied heavily upon deficit budgets to sustain high growth. Consequently, it 
accumulated its external debt in a very short period o f time in the early 1980s 
(Sundaram, 1987).
By the end o f 1980s, South-east Asian countries, at varying degrees and at 
different times, all experienced serious recession and ran into debt problems. The 
resulting difficult situation has rendered these countries vulnerable to foreign economic 
policy influence, in particular the IMF and the World Bank (Robinson et al, 1987), which 
will be examined later. In addition to the increasing influence o f the BWIs over South­
east Asia, the 1980s also witnessed two other important developments in the region: the 
export-oriented strategies had been thoroughly adopted throughout the region9 and the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) had been increasing at a phenomenal speed.
As mentioned, the import-substitution policies were at the thrust o f economic 
planning in South-east Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. As the easy phase10 of import- 
substitution policies reached its limit by mid to late 1960s, calls were being made for a 
shift of policy toward a more export-oriented strategy. It is not to suggest that this change 
of policy separated the history o f industrialisation in this region neatly into import- 
substitution period and export-oriented period. Certain sectors have long before been 
promoted for export-oriented production, while specific sectors, for example, the heavy 
industries in Indonesia, were still under extensive protection at the same time. In 
addition, the pace for this change o f policy was not uniform throughout the region. For 
example, as early as 1968, Malaysia has signalled the strategic switch from import-
recycle these “petrodollars” and made borrowing from these private sources relatively easy and attractive 
for developing countries in the 1970s.
9 Probably with the exception o f Indonesia, see: Robinson, 1987.
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substitution policy to export-oriented policy in its Investment Incentives Act (Sundaram, 
1987). Indonesia, on the other hand, still granted strong protection to a variety of 
industries in mid 1980s as political, bureaucratic and capitalist interests became 
intertwined with the continuation of its import-substitution policy (Robinson, 1987). 
Despite some difficulties facing the South-east Asian countries in shifting toward a more 
export-oriented strategy11, it is, nevertheless, fair to conclude that, at the end of 1980s, 
export-oriented strategies have been firmly adopted, and will continue to be adopted, 
throughout South-east Asia12.
Another significant phenomenon in South-east Asia in the 1980s was the 
increasing inflow of FDI. Four of the top ten largest host developing countries o f FDI 
were Asian in 1996. The inflow of FDI into the four ASEAN countries increased by 43% 
in 1996, to an estimated US$ 17bn (UNCTAD, 1997). That was the result o f several 
policy considerations o f private investors and South-east Asian governments. For private 
investors, in particular multinational enterprises (MNEs), cheap labour costs for their 
production and new market for their products were constantly in demand. When the 
rising labour costs in the Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs) were no longer 
competitive, South-east Asia emerged to provide an alternative for overseas investment 
o f the MNEs. For the South-east Asian governments, FDI seemed to be the ideal form of 
external financing because not only does it bring in capital as well as technology, FDI, 
unlike foreign loans, is not subjected to the obligation o f repayment in the future. Thus, 
the South-east Asian countries have adopted various incentives to attract FDI.
10 That is, the domestic market has reached its saturation point, particularly in consumer goods, and the 
financial resources available for protecting the infant industries have reached the limit.
11 For example, the very conditions in the 1960s and 1970s that had enabled the export-oriented models, 
the Asian NICs, to expand their exports were rapidly collapsing in the 1980s due to the prevailing world 
recession. In addition, fiscal pressures on governments, rising debt levels and balance of payments 
problems have put constraints on die South-east Asian countries to provide sufficient means to finance 
projects central to achieving the objectives, ie the export-oriented strategies (Robinson et al, 1987).
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Furthermore, in order to tap the increasing FDI from the neighbouring countries, ie the 
Asian NICs and Japan (Guillouet, 1990) and, in particular after the 1990s, to cope with 
the rise of a competitive China, (Nomura Research Institute et al, 1995) the governments 
in South-east Asia became even keener to adopt a number o f policies for promoting FDI 
via favourable treatment. For example, the restrictive attitude toward FDI adopted by the 
Malaysian government in the 1970s and early 1980s has transformed into an active 
promotion o f FDI since 1987; the acute infrastructure inadequacies that discourage 
foreign investors to invest in the Philippines have since been gradually addressed at the 
onset o f the 1990s by the Filipino government in an effort to attract more FDI inflow 
(Nomura Research Institute et al, 1995).
Thus, at the beginning o f the 1990s, the South-east Asian countries grew out of 
the troubled decade o f the 1980s characterised by debt crisis and the collapse of 
commodity market. The thrust o f their economic planning shifted from import- 
substitution to export-oriented strategies, which was evident from their strong export 
growth figures and the steady expansion o f manufactured exports (Villegas, 1990). The 
most significant development after the 1980s was conceivably the trend of increasing 
FDI, which has continued to be one of the “engines o f growth” in this region during most 
of the 1990s13.
12 For example, the growth of exports in South-east Asia, except in Indonesia, has substantially outpaced 
that of GDP in the mid 1980s (Arya, 1990).
13 The onset o f the infamous East Asia financial crisis in late 1997 has seriously retarded the strong 
economic performances o f South-east Asia, in particular Thailand and Indonesia. The inflow of FDI has 
sharply declined as a result. The present study, however, will not look into the causes and impact o f this 
latest financial crisis in detail for the following reasons. First o f all, the exact causes o f this crisis have 
been keenly debated and no definite conclusion has been agreed. Secondly, the impact o f this crisis will 
continue to be felt several years from now, which make a thorough assessment impossible at this stage. 
Thirdly, and most crucially, the role of the BWIs in assisting the governments to deal with the crisis o f this 
nature is different from the one the present study focused, namely, the role o f promoting development. As
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6.1.2 The role o f  the BWIs
This section will draw from the existing literature and research to ascertain 
whether the BWIs programmes have been effective in producing an outcome and an 
impact in Southeast Asia. The BWIs’ involvement before the 1980s in the process of 
South-east Asia’s economic development included technical assistance regarding 
economic policy reforms and project lending from the World Bank14. For example, in 
post-colonial Malaysia, the government based its import-substitution industrialisation 
policy on the recommendations of a World Bank mission in 1954 (Sundaram, 1987). 
Thailand had received more than US$ 180m in loans from the World Bank by the mid 
1960s, which accounted for half of the funding from overseas loans for the first 
development plan (Hewison, 1987). The Private Development Corporation of the 
Philippines, whose purpose was to promote and lend to the private sector, was set up in 
1963 with the encouragement and assistance from the World Bank (Castro et al, 1975), 
and an emergency mission from the IMF was called upon to arrive in January 1970, 
when the Philippines was unable to meet its payment obligations as its balance of 
payments had been deteriorating, and as foreign creditors insisted that the debt 
restructure was conditional upon government acceptance o f an IMF stabilisation package 
(Fayasuriya, 1987).
It was not until the South-east Asian countries undertook the process o f structural 
adjustment in the early 1980s that the BWIs appeared to have more influence over this 
region in terms o f providing policy advice with their lending activities. The prevailing 
difficult balance o f payments situation and crisis in state revenues resulting largely from 
falling world commodity prices, coupled with the accumulation o f large foreign debt,
a result, discussion o f this latest financial crisis will only be conducted to the extent that is relevant to the 
present study.
14 Note that Indonesia briefly withdrew from the IBRD in 1965 and rejoined again in 1967.
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tilted the political influence and power toward the international financial institutions, in 
particular, the BWIs (Robinson, 1987). Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and, to a 
lesser extent, Indonesia, have all been subjected to acute intervention by the IMF and the 
World Bank. The Philippines had one SAL from the World Bank, which was co­
ordinated with an IMF EFF, extended in 1979 (Fayasuriya, 1987) and has had a series of 
stand-by arrangements covering almost the entire 1980s. It also implemented the IMF- 
supported adjustment programmes in the 1980s (Hemming et al, 1990). Thailand, whose 
development policies have been closely associated with the BWIs since the early 1950s, 
has received three stand-by arrangements from the IMF and two SALs from the World 
Bank in the 1980s (Hewison, 1987). Malaysia has availed itself o f credits under the 
buffer stock financing and Compensatory Financing Facilities o f the IMF during the 
1980s when experiencing the unstable world commodity market (Mohammed, 1990). In 
addition, the BWIs, by ways o f affecting Malaysia’s international credit and investment 
rating, was able to assert their influence in Malaysia in this regard, which can been 
attested from the various deflationary and deregulatory policies adopted by the 
government in the 1980s (Sundaram, 1987). Even in Indonesia where the BWIs were less 
able to assert their power in terms of lending activities, the policy suggestions contained 
in a 1981 World Bank report, which is produced in response to the Indonesian situation, 
have begun to be adopted in the 1980s despite the initial irritation o f the Indonesian 
government toward this World Bank report (Robinson, 1987).
During this period, the BWIs have lent several loans for structural adjustment 
purposes: four SALs and several SECALs from the World Bank and one EFF from the 
IMF15. Both types o f the loan16 contain high conditionality17. With the application of
15 The SAF and ESAF o f the IMF were only set up in 1986-87 and were not yet available for the South­
east Asian countries during this period. However, the EFF o f the IMF was the main facility provided for 
longer-term adjustment purpose before the SAF and ESAF came into place.
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conditionality and policy-based lending, the BWIs acquired much leverage over the 
borrowing governments in South-east Asia. Conditions and policy recommendations 
provided by the BWIs were incorporated to a large extent. For example, in the case of 
Thailand, in order to implement conditions under the two SALs from the World Bank, 
certain legislative action were undertaken. Legislation was submitted to Parliament for 
overhauling motor vehicle taxation as part o f the tax policy reform, and bill that 
reformed operations of, and transferred selected business taxes to the Excise Department 
for administration was enacted (Sahasakul, 1992). For countries that did not apply for 
loans from the BWIs (eg Indonesia) or apply for loans with low conditionality 
requirement (eg Malaysia), the influence o f the BWIs in inducing domestic policy 
change might be more difficult to ascertain than in countries where SAPs existed (eg 
Thailand). Nevertheless, through their technical advice and consultation in the process o f 
negotiating loans, the BWIs definitely had the access to influence policymakers in these 
governments, and played a role in the process o f South-east Asian’s economic 
development18.
On the other hand, it is more uncertain as to whether the programmes o f the 
BWIs have been effective in achieving the desirable result, ie an impact in these 
countries. Each country has its own perception of the BWIs and is in a different position
16 The term “loan” here refers to loans from the World Bank and arrangements and/or facilities from the 
IMF.
17 The SALs, compared to other project loans, have with it higher degree o f conditionality, which is 
applied in the way die SALs are disbursed. The conditionality applied in the EFF is less intensive than that 
applied in the SAF/ESAF, but is more intensive than that applied in other facilities such as the 
Compensatory Financing Facility.
18 Admittedly, there is no consensus as to the role the BWIs played in the process o f economic 
development in South-east Asia or how effective have these SAPs been at contributing to the growth in 
this region. For example, one study by the Overseas Development Institute in London on the effectiveness 
of the BWIs adjustment programmes on South-east Asia concludes that: “.. conditionality played only a 
limited role in the adoption o f [adjustment] policies” in SEA. (Marr, 1996, p. 7) Nevertheless, although 
conditionality did not play a main role in inducing policies, the role o f the BWIs in influencing the shape 
and direction o f economic policies through other techniques such as policy dialogue and the building of 
intellectual capabilities have been acknowledged in this study.
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to deal with the BWIs. In the case of Thailand, most o f the conditionalities19 attached to 
the two SALs signed at 1982 and 1983 had already been taken up on the government’s 
own initiatives (Sahasakul, 1992). Nevertheless, the IMF and World Bank conditionality 
and austerity programmes seemed unable to tackle the crisis Thailand faced in the 1980s 
and, hence, the effectiveness o f these programmes were subjected to serious doubt 
among business leaders as well as political and military leaders. Furthermore, it was 
believed that cheaper loans with less stringent conditions could be raised elsewhere. As a 
result, a third SAL from the World Bank was dropped from the government’s plan of 
external borrowing in 1986 (Hewison, 1987). In fact, one study concluded that: “Those 
elements o f the SAL which were conditional were generally the least successfully 
implemented .. .” (Sahasakul et al, 1991, cited in: Marr, 1996, p. 38). The Philippines, 
possibly the most hard-hit by the debt crisis among the four, had only the BWIs to turn to 
for financial assistance and realised that its debt restructuring was most often contingent 
upon its acceptance o f either the IMF’s stabilisation programmes or the Bank’s structural 
adjustment programmes20. The contention between the Philippine government and the 
BWIs over a variety o f policies, such as trade liberalisation measures, existed throughout 
the 1980s (Fayasuriya, 1987). What is more controversial is that, after a series o f IMF- 
supported programmes and stand-by arrangements covering the 1980s, the evidence o f 
balanced and sustained growth was not as clear in the Philippines as in the case of, for 
example, Thailand (Hemming et al, 1990)21. In the case o f Indonesia, the group of 
technocrats who were responsible for designing Indonesia’s first phase o f adjustment
19 Conditionality in the context o f the World Bank is most relevant in the case o f SALs and SECALs. For 
more discussion on conditionality, see Chapter 3.4.
20 The circumstance where a debt rescheduling is conditioned upon the debtor country reaching a loan 
agreement with either o f the BWIs might amount to “cross-conditionality” —  an “informal indirect 
fmancial cross-conditionality” as one author named it (Kremmydas, 1989). For more discussion on the 
different types o f conditionality, see Chapter 3.4.
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programmes between 1983-85 were supported, technically and financially, by the World 
Bank and the IMF (Guillouet, 1990). However, the earliest adjustment programme in 
1983 was not initially financed by the World Bank and a substantial part o f Indonesia’s 
subsequent adjustment effort was not financed in the form of SALs/SECALs from the 
World Bank, albeit elements included in its adjustment programmes were similar to 
those in many SALs/SECALs (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995). As for Malaysia, the role 
of the BWIs was somehow limited in terms o f their lending facilities. However, in terms 
of their policy influence, the BWIs still maintain a certain degree o f leverage over 
Malaysia, as mentioned earlier, for the BWIs can strongly affect the international credit 
and investment rating (Sundaram, 1987)22.
All these four South-east Asian countries certainly have achieved various degree 
o f economic growth23 throughout the 1980s and the first half o f the 1990s. However, 
from the preceding discussion, it is difficult to ascertain whether the BWIs and their 
programmes has been the main driving force behind this success. Admittedly, this brief 
case study has not presented direct empirical data from the existing research 
demonstrating the arguments suggested in Chapter 3 relating to the effectiveness of the 
SAPs24, in particular in the context of the correlation between governance structure and 
effectiveness. Nonetheless, the preceding paragraphs managed, drawing from the 
existing literature, to provide some indirect evidence on the effectiveness o f the SAPs in 
South-east Asia in producing the outcome (eg in the case o f Thailand) but not the impact
21 In the research carried by the Overseas Development Institute, the failure of the BWIs programmes in 
the Philippines was attributed more to the domestic factors, in particular political ones. (Marr, 1996, 
pp. 39-42).
2 See Chapter 3.2 for more discussion on how the BWIs assert their influence over developing countries 
through the application of various instruments used mainly, but not exclusively, in their adjustment 
lending.
23 The traditional yardsticks such as GDP and GNP measure the term “growth” here.
24 There are even studies suggesting that the SAPs o f the BWIs did not have impact at all in terms of 
influencing the South-east Asian governments’ economic and developmental policies in their process of 
economic development (eg Marr, 1996).
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(eg in the case o f the Philippines). Another implication brought out by the case study on 
South-east Asia was the need for the BWIs to re-examine their traditional role as 
providing funding for “economic” development purposes in the 1990s, as the following 
discussion will show.
One o f the most important policy recommendations from the SAPs of the BWIs 
has been the promotion o f FDI in this region through various favourable measures. 
Before the 1997-98 fmancial turmoil hit the region, all these four South-east Asian 
countries have been able to attract FDI from developed countries as well as the Asian 
NICs. As a result, they have been less and less inclined to resort to the BWIs for 
fmancial assistance, to which a string o f conditions are always attached, in particular in 
programme and policy-based lending25. It seems tempting to conclude that the BWIs 
could be pushed into a more marginal role in this region in the 21st century. However, 
when the fmancial crisis broke out in the region in late 1997, the BWIs have assumed a 
centre role again in providing the fmancial sources urgently needed. Nevertheless, the 
nature of this role played by the BWIs in 1997-98 was different from that in the 1980s. 
The presence of the BWIs in this region throughout the 1980s has largely been to provide 
finance and policy advice for development purposes; while their recent role in some of 
the South-east Asian countries is to quickly provide financial resources to respond to an 
emergency situation. In addition, the characteristics o f conditionality and policy advice 
prescribed in the recent “rescue” package from the IMF are different those applied by the 
BWIs in the 1980s26.
25 The experience o f Thailand, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, in which a third SAL from the 
IBRD was dropped by the Thai government is a good example.
26 The causes o f the recent Asian crisis were a combination o f weak financial system, huge capital flows, 
and unwise private-sector borrowing. It had little to do with macroeconomic policy failure (Financial 
Times, 7 January 1998). As a result, the policy advice prescribed by the emergency loans from the BWIs, 
in particular from the IMF, focuses more on the reform o f domestic financial sector. This is different from 
the macroeconomic policy advice usually prescribed by structural adjustment lending, which was applied 
in the 1980s in South-east Asia.
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The BWIs have made their presence in South-east Asia since the 1950s and 
played an important role in the process o f economic development in this region. Their 
influence reached its peak in the 1980s when they had the greatest leverage over the 
governments through gaining access to their economic policy-making process27. Before 
the fmancial crisis broke out, the services provided by the BWIs in terms o f promoting 
development have been in less demand in these South-east Asian countries. This, in turn, 
has rendered the influence o f the BWIs over these countries less and less significant. The 
recent Asian crisis might have helped the BWIs to regain their influence in terms of 
gaining access to the policy-makers through their lending activities. However, the role as 
a “fire fighter” is only a small part of the functions o f the BWIs envisaged by their 
founders back in the 1940s28. In addition, the role has brought about new tensions 
between the BWIs and the borrowing governments since the terms and conditions under 
such emergency assistance are often being criticised as harsh29. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness o f these loans in tackling the crisis remains to be seen. How, then, can the 
BWIs find a new role in the region which is less controversial? The new role the Bank 
assumes after the 1990s in assisting the implementation o f the MEAs might provide 
some clues.
When South-east Asian countries began to face serious domestic environmental 
problems and to contribute to regional and global environmental degradation, sustainable 
development suddenly ceased to be mere a slogan and became a practical policy 
alternative for South-east Asian countries. The acute environmental problems require
27 In the process o f negotiating and designing a SAP, the BWI is able to generate profound changes in 
development policy and economic structure o f the borrowing country (Reed, 1992).
28 It can be argued that this role o f the BWIs, in particular o f the IMF, has only had it origin after the 
similar crisis broke out in Mexico in 1992-93. In fact, an Emergency Financing Mechanism was only 
adopted in September 1995 by the IMF Board o f Executive Directors, which established an accelerated 
procedures to enable the Fund to respond swiftly in support o f a member facing an external financial crisis 
and seeking financial assistance form the IMF (IMF, 20 August 1997).
29 See, for example, Financial Times, 15 December 1997.
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technical and financial resources to tackle. These resources might now become scarce 
when the financial crisis hit the region. Under this circumstance, the innovative 
mechanisms of the World Bank might be able to offer assistance. This might also 
provide an opportunity for the BWIs to re-examine their role in the region. The next 
section will first review the environmental impact, in particular on climate change, of 
South-east Asia’s economic development during the 1980s when major structural 
adjustment took place.
6.2 South-east Asia and climate change
6.2,1 The environmental impact o f  “economic” development on climate change
As has been identified in Chapter Five, the traditional, neo-classical development 
path undertook by industrialised countries and advocated by the BWIs significantly 
contributed to the greenhouse problems. Since the development strategies favoured by 
the BWIs and adopted by the South-east Asian governments mirrored those o f the 
industrialised countries, the problem of climate change poses potential threats to the 
region, as well as to the world. In the following discussion, the environmental impact o f 
South-east Asia’s economic development will be laid out with specific reference to the 
problems contributing to climate change, such as pattern o f energy use and deforestation.
Due to its colonial history, South-east Asia’s economy took off on the basis o f its 
abundance natural resources in the late nineteenth century. The development strategies 
through the early years of independence rested ultimately on resource-based production 
for export and for domestically consumed food-stuffs and raw materials. (Brookfield, 
1993) Though the shares of agriculture and mining in GDP show a steady decline after 
the 1980s, production based on natural resources has not diminished as significantly as in 
the Asian NICs. Despite the rapid growth in the share o f manufacturing in GDP and in
246
export, employment in the manufacturing sector has not risen proportionately. As a 
result, measures based on under-priced resource exports and on resource-based 
manufactures for poverty eradication purposes have continued after the 1980s. 
(Brookfield, 1993) In addition, a large part o f industrialisation and the provision of 
infrastructure are still financed through the massive exploitation o f natural resources in 
the early 1990s. (Brookfield, 1993) For countries like Indonesia and Malaysia where 
natural resources abound, export-eamings from petroleum and timber constitute a large 
share of their foreign exchange earnings. (Seda, 1993) As a whole, natural resources, in 
particular petroleum and timber, will continue to play an important role in the economic 
development process in the region of South-east Asia. This can already be observed after 
the financial crisis since countries suffering economic difficulties have to earn foreign 
exchange in a short period o f time and export o f natural resources seem to be a quick-fix. 
For example, a draft budget proposal proposed by the Indonesia government in January 
1998 depended heavily on oil and gas revenues to correct the country’s balance of 
payments deficits. (Financial Times, 24 January 1998)
The resource-based economies in South-east Asia inevitably resulted in some 
environmental problems. For example, deforestation, resulting from various reasons30, is 
not only itself a fundamental problem of environmental degradation in the region, (Seda, 
1993) but also reduces the sink functions in absorbing the GHGs. Take Malaysia and 
Thailand for examples. It has been estimated that deforestation has resulted in a decline 
o f Malaysia’s forested area from three-quarters o f the nation in 1958 to well under half 
o f the nation in 1985; and in a decline in Thailand’s forested area from 53% of the nation 
in 1961 to 29% in 1985 (Hirsch, 1987). Another environmental problem associated with 
deforestation is the GHGs emitted through the burning o f the forests. It has been
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estimated that land use changes, especially deforestation account for more than 70% of 
the emissions in South-east Asia31 (Sharma, 1994). In addition, rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation, both o f which can lead to significant GHGs emission, represent yet another 
sources o f environmental degradation32 (Jones, 1993).
The South-east Asian governments undertook a series o f structural adjustment 
reforms in the 1980s to control the external imbalance and associated foreign debt 
problems. Some reforms were carried out through the governments’ own initiatives33; 
others were subject to the SAPs of the BWIs following their structural-type loans34. The 
various structural adjustment policies adopted by the South-east Asian governments all 
aimed at the improvement o f their macroeconomic conditions. Since the linkage between 
macroeconomic policies and the environment did not draw immense attention until later 
1980s and early 1990s, it is fair to point out that environmental constraints were not 
reasonably taken into consideration in the design and implementation o f these structural 
adjustment policies. For example, externalities o f environmental costs35, one o f the 
causes for environmental degradation, were recognised by neither the governments nor 
the BWIs and, hence, were not incorporated and rectified in the process o f structural 
adjustment. Meanwhile, excessive and urgent demand for foreign exchange for balance 
of payments purposes exacerbated environmental degradation because export earnings
30 For example, inadequate forest management, slash and bum practices, forest clearance in order to plant 
cash crop and so on. For more detail account, see, for example, Potter, 1993; Wirawan, 1993.
31 The clearing o f forests for agriculture has been a major cause o f the recent forest fire in Indonesia in 
1997. The fire has caused disastrous regional environmental problems including smog and heavy air 
pollution throughout the region.
2 Environmental degradation associated with industrialisation and urbanisation include, for example, air 
and water pollution in the process o f industrial production, and health problems resulting from inadequate 
sanitation and other basic health services and air pollution in the rapidly expanding urban area, in 
particular in those mega-cities such as Bangkok. In addition to these domestic environmental problems, 
transboundary air pollution, such as the resulting acid rain, is another example.
33 For example, Malaysia’s third phase o f development, 1986-90, was one on adjustment and liberalisation, 
which was incorporated in its National Development Policy (Salleh et al, 1993).
34 For example, there were two SALs from die World Bank to Thailand in 1982 and 1983 (Sahasakul, 
1992).
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from primary products and natural resources seemed to be an easy and attractive option. 
For example, timber extraction is still largely regarded as an integral component of 
economic growth plans in both Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 1990s (Seda, 1993). 
As for the environmental impact of the BWIs-supported SAPs, several studies have been 
conducted in the cases o f Thailand and the Philippines (eg Cruz and Repetto, 1992; 
Panayotou and Sussangkam, 1991). Although none o f the studies focus specifically on 
the environmental impact o f climate change, most o f them criticised the inadequacy of 
the designs of these programmes for their lack o f environmental considerations.
Along with deforestation, the increasing energy demand and the associated 
problems of climate change will be another issue o f concern in the ever-growing 
complicated relationship between economic growth and environmental protection in 
South-east Asia. The absolute energy demand will increase significantly in South-east 
Asia, given that this region is expecting the highest economic growth in the 21st 
century36 (Clark, 1993). A major environmental impact o f this expanding energy demand 
will be the emissions o f GHGs with effects in terms o f global warming and acid rain, 
because Asia37 is 90% dependent on fossil fuels for primary energy (Baker, 1994). 
Furthermore, according to one estimate, South-east Asia has been a major source of 
methane, another GHGs emissions since the late 1980s (Brookfield, 1993). As a result o f 
this energy demand, as well as the state o f deforestation, GHGs emission from South­
east Asia is likely to become globally significant in the very near future. The actual 
impact of climate change on the region o f South-east Asia has not been ascertained due
35 Externality, also referred to as “market failure”, refers to the imperfection in a price system that prevents 
the cost o f environmental goods and services to be fully incorporated.
36 The reference made here refers to the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, including South-east Asia. This 
reference should only be used in an illustrative manner since the ratio o f the increase o f energy demand 
between the Asian NICs and South-east Asia countries are unclear and the figure derived is the average of 
these two groups. In addition, the figure might need further adjustment considering the impact o f the recent 
financial crisis would have had on the economic performance o f the East and South-east Asian countries.
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partly to the unclear geographical definition o f “South-east Asia” in various reports38 
(Henderson-Sellers, 1993). However, the variations associated with climate change, such 
as sea level rise, rain fall variability, and the warming o f temperature, will have 
significant impact on South-east Asia. For example, rain fall variability and the rise o f 
temperature will have immense impact on agriculture; and sea level rise will becpme a 
big threat to the archipelago states, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, in the region. 
Thus, the governments o f  at least some South-east Asian countries are conscious of 
global climatic change and its likely implications on human activities, and are making 
efforts to improve understanding of the nature and mechanisms o f regional climate and 
policy options (Sani, 1993).
To conclude briefly, for the previous four decades, South-east Asian countries 
have paid insufficient attention to the impact economic development can have on the 
environment. Natural resources, as the major source o f export earnings, were subjected 
to unsustainable management, particularly at the early stage of their economic 
development. During the adjustment decade o f the 1980s, understanding on the linkage 
of macroeconomic policies and the environment was too insufficient to design 
environmentally benign adjustment policies. Moreover, the development strategies and 
economic policies pursued by the governments in South-east Asia and supported by the 
BWIs have contributed to the problem of climate change and rendered the 
implementation o f FCCC difficult. Consequently, national and regional, as well as 
global, environmental problems associated with climate change emerged and required 
more and more resources to remedy. The recent Asian financial crisis has put a constraint 
in these South-east Asian governments to come up with the adequate resources. As a
37 Here, again, “Asia” refers to the Asia-Pacific region, which includes South-east Asia as well. The same 
reservation as the previous footnote has pointed out should be noted.
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result, how to achieve a balance between recovering economic growth and maintaining 
environmental standard will pose the greatest challenge to the governments in South-east 
Asia. At this junction, the World Bank should be able to play its new role o f assisting the 
implementation o f the FCCC by offering its innovative mechanisms to aid these South­
east Asian countries in implementing the FCCC. The next sub-section will first examine 
the relationship between the South-east Asian countries and the FCCC.
6.2.2 South-east Asia and the FCCC
The potential impact of the adverse effects o f climate change on the Asian 
countries seems disproportionate to their historical contribution to the problems. For 
example, large areas o f Asia dependent on monsoon rains may be especially vulnerable, 
because of the effects o f greater variability in the timing, size and distribution o f the rains 
brought by the climatic change. (Killick, 1992) Other impact includes: significant coastal 
tidal wave due to sea-level rise, increasing monsoon season flooding, reductions in 
agriculture and fishery production, and large-scale displacements o f population39 
(Qureshi and Hobbie, 1994, cited in Topping et al, 1996).
The historical emissions o f the GHGs might be low in South-east Asia. They, 
however, are catching up quickly as the process o f industrialisation in the region 
accelerates. According the International Energy Agency, the carbon dioxide (C02) 
emissions in Asia was 3.7% in 1973, but reached 9.9% in 1995, ie it nearly tripled in two 
decades40. The C02 emissions per unit o f GDP in East Asia, including South-east Asia, 
are three times the level in Latin America. I f  past trends continue, East Asia will account
38 For example, the IPCC Scientific Report identified five regions, ie Central North America, Southern 
Asia, Sahel, Southern Europe and Australia, for which model-based consensus climatic changes for 2030 
were constructed.
39 For the individual country report on climate change and global warming in South-east Asia, see: Garcia 
and Peralta, 1991 (the Philippines); Sagetong, P, 1991 (Thailand); and Sasmojo et al, 1991 (Indonesia). .
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for more than half o f the world’s incremental C02 and sulphur dioxide emissions, except 
to the extent that cleaner technologies are used (World Bank, 1993b, p. 41). The most 
important source o f anthropogenic emissions o f GHGs in the Pacific Rim is the energy 
sector, the end use o f which is predominantly by the industrial sector (44%) (Uzawa, 
1991). .The energy demand o f an economy is usually a function o f its GDP, its industrial 
structure and the energy intensities o f its sectors. As a result, a higher growth rate of 
GDP, as is in the case of South-east Asia, is associated with a higher growth rate of 
energy demand. C02 emissions are closely related to total energy consumption and fuel 
mix. Korea and Thailand, for example, had the fastest growth rates o f C02 emissions of 
7% and 6%, respectively (Han and Chatteijee, 1997).
In addition to the C02 emissions, irrigated rice fields, a common scenery in rice- 
producing countries in South-east Asia, are estimated to emit into the atmosphere 
methane that is responsible for approximately 20% o f the methane emissions in the 
Pacific Rim. Slash-and-bum, a wide-spread practice in South-east Asia particularly 
related to the increase in unemployment in the sugarcane and other industries, has double 
implications for the phenomenon o f global wanning —  the release o f C02 by the 
burning of forests and the emission of C02 and methane through the processes of decay 
and decomposition (Uzawa, 1991). Deforestation activities for commercial purposes, 
particularly by large multinational corporations, have been on a gigantic scale since the 
1970s. During the process o f burning the forest, not only C02 will be emitted, disastrous 
forest fire causes regional air pollution as well, as has been witnessed in the Indonesia 
fire in late 1997 and early 1998. Deforestation reduces the sink function o f forests in 
absorbing C02 emission as well.
The recent economic turmoil in South-east and East Asia that began in the
40 However, “Asia,” as defined by the IEA, includes countries in North and South Asia, but excludes
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autumn of 1997 might retard the economic growth and result in a lower GDP growth rate 
in the region. Considering the correlation between energy demand and the growth rate of 
GDP, this might suggest that the energy demands, hence the emissions o f GHGs, will 
decrease during the next couple o f years in this region41. However, without proper policy 
safeguards, some o f the resource-rich South-east Asian countries might resort to 
exploiting their natural capital stock in the hope o f earning more foreign exchange. 
Deforestation due to commercial logging and the practice o f slash-and-bum might are 
also likely to increase in the face o f high unemployment and financial difficulties. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to predict how this financial crisis in South-east Asia is 
going to affect the climate change regime42.
Compared with other less developing countries, however, South-east Asia still 
stands out as the higher level o f industrialisation and the consequent energy demand have 
rendered the region to produce the highest level o f GHGs emissions among developing 
world43. Applying the principle o f common but differentiated responsibility, the FCCC 
distinguishes its Parties and imposes different treaty obligations correspondingly. In the 
Kyoto Protocol, differentiation is made between Annex I Parties as well. For instance, 
the targets privately agreed are different between the EU, the US, and Japan. Economies 
in transition are given different treatment in the Annex I Parties (for example, Kyoto 
Protocol, Article 3.5). In view of this trend, differentiation is very likely to be made
China. Therefore, this figure does not exclusively represent the change o f CO emission in South-east Asia.
41 However, in a preliminary study on the impact on industrial growth and environmental performances in 
Indonesia after its financial crisis, it is observed that “since the start o f the crisis pollution intensity for 
organic waste in industrial effluents has increased by 15%” (Afsah, July 1998). Although the study only 
examines water pollution, the reasons for these poor environmental performances, ie the lower regulatory 
inspection and enforcement and higher pollution control costs, might cause other environmental problems 
such as air pollution and climate change.
42 Most of the literature produced so far concentrate on the financial and economic aspect o f this Asia 
crisis. Few have looked at the social impact o f the adjustment programmes designed either by the 
governments or from the IMF. See, for example, Khor, 1998. Even fewer have yet to look at the 
environmental impact of the financial crisis and the rescue measures.
43 For example, the C 02 emissions per unit o f GDP in East Asia, including South-east Asia, are three times 
the level in Latin America.
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among non-Annex I Parties, ie developing country Parties, when the next round of 
negotiation begins. I f  this is the case, more advanced developing countries with higher 
emissions level, such as East and South-east Asian countries, are probably the first group 
of non-Annex I Parties to be required to undertake more substantive commitments under 
any future Protocol44.
The development path after the 1970s in South-east Asian countries has followed 
the traditional model o f “economic” development advocated by the BWIs. As has been 
discussed previously, SAPs from the BWIs have, to a large extent, encouraged this 
model of development during the 1980s. As this section has demonstrated, 
environmental impact in general o f this traditional model o f “economic” development 
has been felt in the region o f South-east Asia in terms o f domestic, regional, and global 
environmental problems. On the one hand, the circumstance might provide a good 
opportunity for the World Bank to employ its innovative mechanisms to help countries 
of South-east Asia to deal with potential threat imposed by climate change. On the other 
hand, this unintended environmental impact o f a development path promoted by the 
BWIs has wider implications for the BWIs. As Chapter 5 pointed out, instead of 
challenging the basic ideology and economic theories behind the design o f the SAP, this 
thesis suggests a more modest reform for the BWIs to consider an introduction of “SAP 
with a climate safety net”. The case study on South-east Asia, however, clearly 
demonstrated the inadequacy o f the underpinnings o f the traditional model of 
“economic” development in failing to take the environmental constraints into account. 
This, as a result, contradicted with the commitments publicly made by senior
44 For example, during the Kyoto Protocol negotiation, a New Zealand proposal called for “progressive 
engagement” according to relative levels o f development when discussing whether developing countries 
should promise to undertake binding emissions limitation commitments. The central thrust o f the New  
Zealand proposal is the so-called “double conditionality” —  Annex I Parties needed early agreement by 
non-Annex I Parties on future commitments, but non-Annex I Parties would not be held to commitments if
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management of the BWIs to the goal o f sustainable development. “SAP with a climate 
safety net” might help to correct some o f the environmental impact relating to climate 
change brought about by the traditional model o f development promoted by the BWIs. It 
is, however, unable to address the fundamental causes o f and solutions to climate change 
and environmental degradation in general brought out by this traditional model of 
development as long as the donors and the management o f the BWIs stop short o f re­
evaluating the underpinnings o f “development” they seek to promote in the developing, 
countries. Admittedly, a reform on such a grant scale is bound to be difficult to 
implement in the short run. Nevertheless, from the recent Letter o f Intent submitted by 
the Indonesian government to the IMF for a stand-by arrangement in 1998 in which 
environmental factors have been taken into account, encouraging sigh has emerged 
toward this wider and more fundamental reform in the BWIs.
In the meantime, South-east Asian governments are facing difficulties in dealing 
with the problems o f climate change and in implementing the FCCC in the face of 
declining domestic resources after the recent financial crisis. The World Bank with its 
innovative mechanisms designed specifically for the purpose o f controlling climate 
change can not be placed in a better position now to assist their South-east Asian 
members to implement the FCCC and to adopt a more sustainable development path.
6.3 Can the innovative mechanisms help?
How can the BWIs assist their South-east Asian members to implement the 
FCCC in the face o f financial crisis? As these South-east Asian countries become
Annex I Parties did not fulfil their Kyoto commitments. This proposal was objected by most o f the 
developing countries and failed in the end.
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“better-off’ they are no longer eligible to draw from the ESAF o f the IMF45. In fiscal 
year 1998 amid the fmancial crisis, two SALs were concluded: one Economic Recovery 
and Social Sector Loan to Malaysia and one Finance Companies Restructuring Loan to 
Thailand (World Bank, 1998a). These two SALs were designed with specific purposes in 
the face of dire financial situation and did not deal with structural adjustment process that 
involves comprehensive macroeconomic-policy reforms. It seems, thus, that the “SAPs 
with a climate safety net”, as proposed in the preceding chapter, might have difficulties 
to apply in these two SALs. Nevertheless, any future SALs/SECALs from the World 
Bank, if  involving a comprehensive structural adjustment process, can still be designed 
with a “climate safety net” to assist the implementation of the FCCC in this region. At 
the moment, on the other hand, the innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank seem able 
to provide more readily available fmancial resources to these South-east Asian countries 
to tackle the threat o f climate change46.
The discussion in Chapter 5 on the evaluation o f these innovative mechanisms 
illustrates that these mechanisms of the World Bank have the prospect of offering 
developing countries more financial resources to implement the FCCC under conditions 
that are designed in a decision-making process with more participation from developing 
countries. In the case of South-east Asia, can these innovative mechanisms help in the 
face o f a deteriorating environment, natural as well as economic?
Environmental problems such as global warming have international benefits as 
well as local ones. However, from the perspective o f national and local costs and 
benefits, these problems may not necessarily be o f high priority, in particular in a
45 Only members listed in the Annex to the decisions regarding SAF/ESAF are eligible to draw from these 
two facilities. All four South-east Asian countries discussed in this chapter are not on the lists. However, 
other South-east Asian countries such as Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, and Vietnam are still eligible to draw 
from the ESAF as of 1996.
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growth-oriented region like South-east Asia (Hammer and Shetty, 1995)47. After the 
fmancial crisis broke out in 1997, it is not difficult to envisage the lack o f resources to 
attend to environmental problems. In addition, as South-east Asian countries do not have 
substantive commitments to reduce GHGs emissions under the Kyoto Protocol yet, it is 
understandable that the control o f GHGs emissions might be low on the agenda o f the 
governments in South-east Asia. However, as the environment might be further 
threatened after the Indonesia forest fire and the financial crisis48, this lack of 
determination and resources in the South-east Asian governments could seriously affect 
the prospect o f tackling the threat o f climate change in this region.
In response to the financial crisis, the IMF has already negotiated stand-by 
arrangements with Thailand and Indonesia. It is an encouraging sign that in the Annex to 
the Letter o f Intent from the Indonesia government to the IMF, dated 29 July 1998, 
“environment” is included in the matrix of structural policy commitments49. 
Nevertheless, there is no indication that resources will be reserved to deal with 
environmental problems. Therefore, the innovative mechanisms o f the Bank might be a 
source of external financing for South-east Asian countries to tackle the threat of climate 
change and other environmental problems.
The fmancial resources available under these innovative mechanisms might be 
insignificant compared to those available under other regular loans from the BWIs. The 
latest replenishment o f the GEF, agreed on March 1998, has pledged US$2.75bn 
covering fiscal year 1998-2001. The proposed PCF under the Bank GCI has its initial
46 As of October 1998, there are six GEF projects in the climate change portfolio operating in these South­
east Asian countries: three in Indonesia, one in the Philippines and two in Thailand. Note that all six of  
them are associated with World Bank lending.
47 For example, in a recent World Bank report on the environmental issues and priorities for East and 
South-east Asia, problems relating to global warming and climate change are not even mentioned in the 
report (World Bank, 1997b).
48 See, for example, Afsah, July 1998 and the Chapter 6.2.2 for further discussion.
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pledge of US$ 100-120m. As for the Bank AIJ programme, it is estimated that amount 
available from a single donor may be in the range o f US$ 2-5m for each project. On the 
other hand, the IBRD alone handed out US$ 11 bn of its SAL/SECALs during fiscal year 
1998. The amount o f money available for Thailand and Indonesia under the stand-by 
arrangements recently agreed with the IMF is about, respectively, US$ 3.9bn and 
US$ 6bn.
Regardless o f  the comparatively small amount o f money these innovative 
mechanisms are able to provide, they still represent a source o f finance exclusively for 
environmental purposes. In addition, it is expected that projects funded under these 
mechanisms will be able to leverage other external finance50. Moreover, if  formal link 
between these mechanisms with the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol is to be established, and 
emissions reduction from projects funded under these Bank’s mechanisms can be 
credited under the Kyoto Protocol, these mechanisms will then be able to attract more 
donors, state or private parties, and to leverage more financial resources. The financial 
resources available under these innovative mechanisms might, as a result, increase. 
South-east Asian countries have already received several GEF grants since its pilot phase 
came into operation.
There are six GEF projects in the climate change portfolio in South-east Asia as 
o f  October 1998. All the six GEF projects are associated with World Bank lending. In 
addition, in response to the Indonesia forest fire and the resulting haze problem in South­
east Asia, a medium-sized GEF project, “Indonesia: emergency response measures to 
combat fires in Indonesia and to prevent regional haze in South-east Asia”, has been 
granted in June to July 1998. As for the Jl-related mechanisms, no Bank AIJ projects are
49 For example, the Indonesian government indicated that it will accelerate programmes for converting to 
cleaner fuels by the end of 1999.
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undertaken in South-east Asia at present. As for the PCF, South-east Asian countries did 
not participate in the first Consultative Group Meeting for the PCF Potential Host 
Countries, which was held in March 1998 in Slovak Republic51. South-east Asian 
countries should tap into the resources available under these mechanisms as they have 
few alternative source of finance for environmental purposes left in the face o f economic 
difficulties. The BWIs, in addition to providing assistance for their financial difficulties, 
should also inform these South-east Asian countries the Opportunities available under the 
innovative mechanisms of the World Bank in helping to tackle environmental problems 
such as climate change in the region.
50 For example, the independent evaluation report on the operation o f the GEF I concluded that: “GEF 
grants have leveraged additional funding for global environmental benefits from both Implementing 
Agencies and other funding sources.” (GEF, March 1998, p. xi.)
51 Briefings of this and other Consultative Meetings can be found at: http://ww-esd.worldbank.org/cc.
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CH A PTER 7: CONCLUSION
When private capital began pouring into developing countries in the 1990s, the 
BWIs found themselves playing diminishing roles as major- providers of fmancial 
resources for developmental purposes. As more developing countries begin turning to 
other external financial sources, the influence o f the BWIs over their developing country 
members might gradually decline as the legal and quasi-legal instruments used for 
leveraging influence, such as structural adjustment lending, programme and policy-based 
lending and conditionality, would be applied less frequently. In the meantime, 
developing countries continue to assert that their domestic resources have been stretched 
to the limit to implement various MEAs that have proliferated in the past decade.
After publicly endorsing the concept o f sustainable development at the 1992 
UNCED, the BWIs, in particular the World Bank have been offering themselves a new 
role in assisting the implementation o f MEAs in developing countries. The most 
noticeable trend towards this move is the introduction o f innovative mechanisms by the 
World Bank for the specific purpose o f providing resources to implement the MEAs, the 
FCCC being one o f the most important.
This thesis set out to examine whether the experiences o f the BWIs in promoting 
“economic” development, a traditional development model, in developing countries 
might provide valuable insights as to how can they promote “sustainable” development 
through the implementation o f the FCCC in developing countries. To this end, this thesis 
has examined the following. Firstly, the governance structure o f the BWIs and its 
implications on the relationship with the developing countries. Secondly, the legal and 
quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs in their existing SAPs operations to
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influence developing countries and the effectiveness o f these instruments. Thirdly, what 
lessons can be learned in the operations of the SAPs to understand what makes these 
legal and quasi-legal instruments effective or ineffective. And, finally, whether these 
lessons can be applied in the Bank’s innovative mechanisms to enable the World Bank to 
play a more effective new role in assisting the implementation o f the FCCC. The main 
conclusions follow.
As Chapter 2 pointed out, the relationship between the BWIs and the developing 
countries has been affected by a governance structure that is perceived as asymmetrical 
by the developing countries. Developing countries have, since 1972, campaigned for the 
reform of a decision-making process by arguing that the process was dominated by 
developed countries and that it failed to reflect the needs or importance o f the developing 
countries. However, little has been achieved. By virtue o f their more frequent use of the 
BW Is’ resources, developing countries were disproportionately subject to decisions 
relating to the BWIs’ lending operations and more specific obligations arising from loan 
agreements or similar documents. The unbalanced decision-making process might 
deepen the negative feeling that developing countries have toward the BWIs in the sense 
that they are prevented from participating more fully in the decision-making process, and 
they have to bear the costs and consequences o f the resulting decisions. As a result, 
developing countries might feel that they have been treated asymmetrically in the BWIs’ 
decision-making process and their wider operations: the governance structure o f the 
BWIs has thus affected the relationship between the institutions and the developing 
countries.
Chapter 3 examined the structural adjustment operations o f the BWIs. All the 
relevant instruments used in structural adjustment lending from the BWIs, such as Letter
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of Development Policy and Policy Framework Papers enable the BWIs to have immense 
leverage over the borrowing developing governments. Failure to comply with conditions 
prescribed in these instruments can trigger legal and/or practical consequences such as 
suspension and/or cancellation of loans or declining external financing from other 
sources. Programme and policy-based lending and the application o f conditionality are 
arguably the most powerful legal and quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs to 
gain such leverage in influencing the developing countries. In terms o f the effectiveness 
o f these legal and quasi-legal instruments in inducing changes o f domestic laws and 
policies, ie in producing an outcome, empirical evidence is rather indirect and patchy 
from the research papers produced by the BWIs and other institutions. The thesis 
nevertheless suggested a certain degree o f the effectiveness in producing an outcome by 
analysing the issue from legal and political perspectives in the context o f the leverage the 
BWIs may have over developing countries through the application of these legal and 
quasi-legal instruments. In terms of the effectiveness o f the SAPs in achieving the 
desirable result, ie in producing an impact, the empirical research from the BWIs and 
other institutions is inconclusive as to whether the SAPs have been able to improve the 
overall economic state in the borrowing countries as envisaged by the BWIs. However, 
there were cases where the full implementation o f conditions and policy 
recommendations o f the SAPs have produced the intended results, and most o f the 
relevant research suggests that “borrower ownership” is one o f the keys for successful 
implementation. The thesis proceeded to examine what could have affected the intensity 
o f ownership. Again, direct empirical evidence was elusive in the research conducted by 
either the BWIs or other institutions. Nevertheless, by examining the legal aspect of 
ownership in the context o f “fairness” theory articulated by Franck, this thesis was able
to suggest that the asymmetric governance structure, perceived by the developing 
countries in the BWIs, has affected the perception o f fairness that developing countries 
hold toward the BWIs. This has undermined the willingness o f developing countries to 
implement rules prescribed by the BWIs. Moreover, from some references to existing 
literature and the analysis inferred by this thesis, it was revealed that the governance 
structure o f the BWIs and its implications on the relationship between the BWIs and the 
developing countries might be one element that weakens the intensity of borrower 
ownership. As a result, the chapter was able to have a rudimentary conclusion that the 
governance structure o f the BWIs might be one element that affected the effectiveness of 
these legal and quasi-legal instruments in producing an impact.
On the basis of these arguments and analysis, with various efficacy according to 
the availability o f direct or indirect empirical evidence, proposed in Chapter 3, this thesis 
suggested that lessons learned from the experiences o f the BWIs’ SA operations are that 
the legal and quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs have been more effective in 
producing an outcome than producing an impact, and one o f the key elements could be 
that the BWIs’ governance structure was perceived as asymmetrical by developing 
countries and therefore affected the relationship between the BWIs and the developing 
countries.
Chapter 4 began to look at the innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank. All of 
which were designed to assist the implementation o f the FCCC in developing countries. 
Only GEF has established formal arrangements with the FCCC and built up extensive 
operational experiences. The restructured GEF has a novel decision-making process that 
enables more participation from developing countries. It has also established a closer link 
with the FCCC that gives the authority o f making the majority o f decisions relating to
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GEF operations to the COP to the FCCC, a forum over which developing countries feel 
they can have more control. All these distinctive characteristics o f GEF might help to 
mitigate the asymmetry problem perceived by the developing countries in the BWIs and, 
as a result, improve the relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries. On 
the other hand, this chapter has been able to identity, from the GEF projects and official 
documents relating to the operations o f the GEF, practices similar, but not yet directly 
comparable, to programme and policy-lending and the application o f conditionality, 
arguably the most powerful legal and quasi-legal instruments employed by the BWIs to' 
influence developing countries.
Thus Chapter 4 implied that with similar practices to conditionality and 
programme and policy-lending, GEF might have the leverage to produce policy changes 
in the recipient countries, ie to produce an outcome; meanwhile, with the novel 
governance structure, GEF might help improve the relationship between the World Bank 
and the developing countries. As a result o f this, it might increase the chances o f these 
policy changes being implemented and, ultimately, be able to produce the desirable 
impact in the recipient countries. Thus, GEF might be able to achieve one o f its 
objectives, ie the implementation of the FCCC, more effectively.
What the thesis has pointed out was that, legal and quasi-legal instruments such 
as the SAPs, conditionality, and programme and policy-based lending are not themselves 
blamed for straining the relationship between the BWIs and the developing countries. It 
was the way in which they were designed and the manner in which they were imposed on 
the developing countries that provoked such controversies over the years, in particular 
when they were associated with institutions such as the BWIs whose governance 
structure has long been subject to demand for reform from the developing countries.
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When a financial mechanism such as GEF emerged as a significant source o f funding 
exclusive for environmental purposes for developing countries, it is not difficult to 
imagine that conditionality and programme and policy-based lending were the least 
features developing countries would like to see. Nevertheless, as this thesis has argued, 
GEF, with its novel governance structure and closer link with the FCCC, broke away 
from the traditional international financial institutions as it provides opportunities for 
developing countries to participate in the design o f conditionality and policy advice. 
Thus, rather than advocating an outright ban on conditionalities and the like, developing 
countries might want to take advantage o f the opportunities and explore possibilities to 
design conditionality proportionate to their own needs.
This thesis does take note of the coercive nature o f these instruments, which is 
what makes them so effective at producing an outcome in the borrowing governments in 
the first place. The donors and management o f the BWIs are surely aware o f the coercive 
nature in their mechanisms and have used them to promote the development model they 
perceive as ideal in their developing country members. It is definitely arguable that, by 
associating closely with the World Bank, GEF and any conditionality might have 
developed are using the same coercive tools to promote the ideal model o f “sustainable 
development” in the developing countries. The argument that GEF and the BWIs can use 
tools such as conditionality to promote sustainable development in developing countries, 
however “imperialistic” it might sound, has its validity, provided that the following two 
conditions are met. First o f all, procedural safeguards must be built in to allow 
developing countries to participate fully and equally in the process. Secondly, 
appropriate financial and technological assistance must be provided to enable developing 
countries to grow out o f poverty without deteriorating the environment. Furthermore, as
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developing countries have become Parties to the FCCC and agreed to respect its 
objectives, conditionality and policy advice associated with GEF and the “SAP with a 
climate safety net” are in any case helping developing countries to comply with their 
obligations under the FCCC.
Nevertheless, it takes time to change the perceptions developing countries have 
toward these coercive legal and quasi-legal instruments such as conditionality and 
program and policy-based lending, or even toward the BWIs. This is beyond the ambit of 
the thesis. Nevertheless, the World Bank, and the BWIs as a group, could take note of 
what GEF has been able to achieve in terms o f overcoming difficulties to reach a 
governance structure that is regarded as less asymmetric from the viewpoints o f the 
developing countries. It is not the purpose o f the thesis to review the governance 
structure of the BWIs as such. The thesis demonstrated that, with governance structure 
reform, the BWIs might be more effective in employing their fmancial, legal and 
political influence in such a way as to produce both a desirable outcome, ie policy 
changes for the purpose o f structural adjustment and development, and an impact, ie a 
prosperous economic state in their developing country members.
Legal and quasi-legal instruments such as conditionality and policy-based lending 
have been examined in the context o f the SAPs and the GEF. They have not yet 
developed in the case o f the other two innovative mechanisms o f the World Bank, the 
AIJ programme and the GCI/PCF. These two mechanisms, established exclusively 
within the World Bank, operate in a different context from the SAPs and the GEF. Both 
focus on a single issue o f assisting the implementation o f the FCCC and both are relevant 
to joint implementation, an implementation technique under the FCCC. The way they 
influence developing countries is different from that employed by the SAPs and the GEF.
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They are market-oriented mechanisms in which private entities are expected to play a 
more significant role than the governments and the BWIs. Partly because o f this reason, 
and partly because of the limited operational experiences in these two mechanisms, this 
thesis does not examine these two mechanisms as closely as the SAPs and the GEF. This, 
however, does not imply that these two mechanisms are less important than the SAPs and 
the GEF for the BWIs to play their new role. These two mechanisms might be unable to 
give the BWIs much leverage over developing country governments since they do not 
operate in the same manner as the SAPs and GEF do. Nevertheless, the thesis has 
identified issues in the operations and design o f these two mechanisms that have 
implications on the relationship between the World Bank and its developing countries, 
which is another essential pillar in the present study. This thesis concludes that the closer 
link these mechanisms are able to develop with the FCCC, the better the prospects of 
addressing asymmetry problems perceived by developing countries in the operations of 
the World Bank.
Chapters 3 and 4 examined the issues that are essential for the BWIs to play a 
more effective role in the developing countries, including the new role o f assisting the 
implementation o f the FCCC. Chapter 5 continued the discussion on this new role by 
analysing the interaction between the BWIs and the FCCC in more detail. As 
membership and areas o f competence began to overlap between the BWIs and the FCCC, 
this chapter examined the affect of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol obligations on the 
BWIs’ exiting operations from the perspectives o f three groups: the institutions 
themselves, , developed country members who hold the majority votes in the Boards of 
Executive Directors and developing countries. From the BWIs’ perspective, as members 
of international community, they should be subject to the “normative reach of those
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MEAs that have been adopted precisely to lay down principles and standards o f global 
applicability” (Handl, 1998, p. 661). The recent practices o f the World Bank, such as the 
internal policies and approval of restructured GEF, confirmed the wider responsibility it 
required as a member o f international community. From the perspectives o f both 
developed and developing countries, their treaty obligations under the climate change 
regime have, to various degrees, affected their positions under the BWIs either as 
decision makers or borrowers that are subject to loan obligations. Thus, Chapter 5 
posited that the BWIs could no longer carry out their regular operations in total disregard 
of treaty obligations under the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Based on this conclusion, 
the chapter also proposed several suggestions on designing a SAP with “a climate safety 
net” and how future directions the Bank’s innovative mechanisms can take in the best 
interests o f both developed and developing countries.
Chapter 6 presented a case study on four developing countries in South-east 
Asian to test the arguments proposed in the previous chapters. The difficulties in 
providing empirical data from existing literature to support the rudimentary conclusion 
from Chapter 3 with regard to the effectiveness o f the SAPs was once again encountered 
in this chapter. The development path pursued by developing countries in South-east 
Asia and promoted by the BWIs has produced negative environmental impact in general 
and contributed to the special circumstances o f South-east Asia under climate change 
regime. The chapter pointed out that this traditional model o f “economic” development 
has led South-east Asia to embark on a development path that impeded South-east Asian 
governments’ abilities to achieve the objectives o f the FCCC.
Under the circumstances, the case study on South-east Asia has two implications 
for the BWIs. One was concerned with the operations o f the World Bank and its
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innovative mechanisms. The limited domestic resources o f South-east Asia, particularly 
after the recent financial crisis, to implement the FCCC have provided an opportunity to 
see whether the World Bank can use its innovative mechanisms constructively and play/its 
new role effectively in assisting the implementation o f the FCCC in this region. The 
other implication was for the wider operations of the BWIs. The environmental impact of 
the development path pursued by South-east Asia under the support o f the BWIs 
demonstrated the inadequacy o f the underpinnings o f the traditional model of 
“economic” development perceived as ideal by the donors and management o f the BWIs. 
The environmental impact of the SAPs was touched upon briefly in Chapter 5 before a 
moderate suggestion was put forward to for a “SAP with a climate safety net”. From the 
case study on South-east Asia, it was vividly illustrated that a successfully “adjusted” 
region with impressive “economic” development, with significant influence from the 
BWIs in the process o f adjustment, could contribute to domestic, regional and global 
environmental problems. Thus, the case study showed that, as long as the BWIs stopped 
short of re-evaluating the fundamental underpinnings o f “development” they perceive as 
ideal, and the economic theories behind the design o f their SAPs, the causes o f and 
solutions to climate change and environmental degradation in general will remained 
unresolved.
The BWIs have witnessed various socio-economic changes in the environment in 
which they operate. They have responded to the changing demands o f services required 
by their member states as well. During the past five decades, the BWIs have proved to be 
flexible with respect to their institutions and operations in meeting these challenges. 
When the threat of climate change requires fundamental changes in all aspects o f
269
economic activities, the BWIs face a new challenge and is required to play a new role in 
assisting the implementation of the FCCC in their developing country members.
The present study set out to examine whether the experiences o f the BWIs in 
promoting “economic” development can offer valuable insights on the methods that they 
can use to promote “sustainable” development through assisting the implementation of 
the FCCC. By examining the relationship between the BWIs and the developing 
countries and its implications on the effectiveness o f the legal and quasi-legal 
instruments employed by the BWIs, the thesis has been able to identify lessons to be 
learned from the existing operations o f the BWIs. If  properly taken into account and 
addressed, these lessons might help the BWIs, especially the World Bank to play the new 
role more effectively.
The issues that have been identified as significant in the present study are yet to 
be tested empirically and do not represent all the elements that make the operations of the 
BWIs effective. The suggestions and evaluations proposed in this thesis are neither 
exhaustive nor comprehensive. Nevertheless, the present study offers a new perspective 
on addressing the emerging and important issue o f interaction between international 
financial institutions and the MEAs in general, and the relationship between the BWIs 
and the FCCC more specifically. With the proliferation o f the MEAs and increasing 
global economic and environmental interdependence, the function and perception o f 
international law and international institutions are undergoing rapid transformation and 
have been subject to extensive discussion among legal scholars. The thesis endeavours to 
contribute to the growing literature on the subject from the more specific aspect o f re­
examining the traditional roles and operations o f the Bretton Woods Institutions as a 
more practical way to approach this evolving subject.
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